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THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

30 June, 1927.

Review of Current Military Writings

FOR THE USE OF

Instructors of The General Service Schools
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

April-June, 1927

CONTENTS

	Page
I.—New Books Received with Index to Reviews.....	215
II.—Review of Books.....	231
III.—Periodicals Received.....	274
IV.—Publications Received from Other Service Schools.....	277
V.—Subject Index of Selected Magazine Articles.....	293

THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS PRESS

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

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1927

I. NEW BOOKS RECEIVED WITH INDEX TO REVIEWS

(Titles of books which have appeared under "New Books Received" in previous numbers of the R.C.M.W. are shown in italics.)

(*) Indicates not to be reviewed.

(†) Indicates review pending.

General Works

	Page
THE GERMAN ARMY BOOKERY IN BERLIN. (DIE DEUTSCHE HEERES-BÜCHERIE IN BERLIN.) By Dr. Friedrich Stuhlmann, Lt. Col., German Army, Ret., Librarian. 1927. 94 pages. Library No. 025.123.....	•
THE JOHN CRERAR LIBRARY, THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1926. By Board of Directors. 1927. 61 pages. Library No. 025.123.....	•

Philosophy

THE WORLD IN THE MAKING. By Keyserling.....	231
THE BOOK OF MARRIAGE. A NEW INTERPRETATION BY TWENTY-FOUR LEADERS OF CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT. (Translation from the German.) By Count Hermann Keyserling, Estonian Philosopher. 1927. 511 pages. Library No. 104.....	•
TRAVEL DIARY OF A PHILOSOPHER. (Translation from the German.) By Count Hermann Keyserling, Estonian Philosopher. 1927. 2 vols. Vol. I, 338 pages. Library No. 104.....	•
THE EGO AND THE ID. (Translation from the German.) By Sigmund Freud, M.D., LL.D. 1927. 88 pages. Library No. 131.....	•
FURTHER CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEORY AND TECHNIQUE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS. By Sandor Ferenczi, M.D. 1926. 450 pages. Library No. 131.....	•
<i>Influencing Human Behavior.</i> By Overstreet.....	231

Religion

THE LOST BOOKS OF THE BIBLE. (Translated from the Original Tongues.) 1926. 286 pages. Library No. 225.4.....	•
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Sociology

MORTALITY STATISTICS, 1924. By U. S. Department of Commerce. 1927. 487 pages. Library No. 312.73.....	•
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL YEAR BOOK, 1926. By Dodd, Mead & Co., New York. 1927. 799 pages. Library No. 314.0.....	•
THE AMERICAN YEAR BOOK, 1926. By Hart.....	231
THE NEGRO IN OUR HISTORY. By Carter G. Woodson, Ph.D. 1927. 593 pages. Library No. 325.26.....	•
IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR CHILDREN, 1920. A STUDY BASED ON CENSUS STATISTICS. By U. S. Department of Commerce. 1927. 431 pages. Library No. 325.73.....	•
SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1912-1923. By Stickney.....	232

	Page
PROBLEMS IN PAN AMERICANISM. By Samuel Guy Inman. 1926. 426 pages. Library No. 327.73.	
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THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION. By Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard. 1927. 2 vols. Vol. I, 824 pages. Library No. 330.973.	
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DASSLER'S KANSAS FORM BOOK. A MANUAL OF LEGAL AND BUSINESS FORMS. By C. F. W. Dassler, Leavenworth Bar. 1912. 793 pages. Library No. 340.0.	
MILITARY GOVERNMENT. COMPARISON OF AMERICAN, BRITISH, AND FRENCH SYSTEMS OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY. A LECTURE. G.S.S., Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. 1927. 16 pages. Library No. 344.2.	
STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PASSED AT THE SECOND SESSION OF THE SIXTY-NINTH CONGRESS, 1926-1927. By U. S. Congress. 1927. 1597 pages. Library No. 345.111.	
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	Page
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED, 1926.—TITLE 19, CUSTOMS DUTIES, PARAS. 1 TO 122. By West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn. 1927. 463 pages. Library No. 345.21.....	•
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED, 1926.—TITLE 19, CUSTOMS DUTIES, PARAS. 123 TO END. By West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn. 1927. 400 pages. Library No. 345.21.....	•
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The Armies and Navies of the World

THE CHINESE ARMY AS A MILITARY FORCE. By Impey.....	232
STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION OF THE FRENCH ARMY. By U. S. War Dept. 1927. 9 pages. Library No. 355.0242.....	•
SWITZERLAND'S MILITARY-POLITICAL SITUATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE WORLD WAR. THE CONFEDERATE MILITIA SYSTEM. (German text.) By zu der Luth.....	232
REORGANIZE OUR STANDING ARMY. (Translation from the Japanese.) By Lt. Gen. Noriharu Shiki, Japanese Army. 1927. 33 pages. Library No. 355.0252.....	•
CATALOGUE OF THE (BRITISH) WAR OFFICE LIBRARY. PART III (SUECT INDEX). FIFTEENTH ANNUAL SUPPLEMENT (JANUARY TO DECEMBER, 1926). Compiled by F. J. Hudleston, C.B.E. 1927. 127 pages. Library No. 355.06.....	•
WARRIORS AT EASE. By Armstrong ("A.A.").....	233

	Page
QUIZ COMPEND FOR RESERVE OFFICERS. BASED UPON ARMY REGULATIONS 140—37. By Maj. William R. White, U.S.A. 1925. 114 pages. Library No. 355.30973.....	•
GENERAL ORDERS AND BULLETINS, WAR DEPT., U. S. ARMY, 1926. By U. S. War Dept. 1927. 500 pages. Library No. 355.3173.....	•
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THE RASP, 1926. By U. S. Cavalry School. 1926. 315 pages. Library No. 355.452273.....	•
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The Art of War

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GOVERNMENTS AND WAR. A STUDY OF THE CONDUCT OF WAR. By Maurice.....	234
General Tactics According to the Experience of the Great War. 5th Revised Edition. (French text.) By Culmann.....	235
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FRENCH AND GERMAN POST-WAR TACTICAL PROCEDURE (AS RELATED BY A GERMAN ARMY OFFICER). By U. S. War Dept. 1927. 1 page. Library No. 356.120.....	•
IMPERIAL MILITARY GEOGRAPHY. By Cole.....	236
IMPERIAL DEFENCE, 1588-1914. By Fuller.....	236
STATESMANSHIP OR WAR. By Brig. Gen. John McA. Palmer, U.S.A. 1927. 232 pages. Library No. 356.4073.....	†

The Combined Arms

	Page
GENERAL TACTICAL FUNCTIONS OF LARGER UNITS. By G.S.S., Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. 1927. 210 pages. Library No. 357.01173.	•
ORGANIZATION OF A FIELD ARMY (FRANCE). By U. S. War Dept. 1927. 6 pages. Library No. 357.023.	•
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COMMON MISTAKES IN THE SOLUTION OF TACTICAL PROBLEMS AND HOW TO AVOID THEM. By Lt. Col. A. B. Beauman, British Army. 1926. 50 pages. Library No. 357.1242.	•
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THE CAVALRY DIVISION IN RECONNAISSANCE. 2 MAP PROBLEMS WITH 2 MAPS. CAVALRY COURSE 1926-1927. (LA DIVISION DE CAVALERIE EN EXPLORATION.) By École Supérieure de Guerre, France. 1927. 12 pages. Library No. 357.1244.	•
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MAP PROBLEM NO. 1, (FIRST YEAR'S COURSE)—MOVEMENT BY MARCHING AND HALT OF A DIVISION. WITH MAPS, MIRECOURT & LANGRES, 1:80,000. (EXERCISE SUR LA CARTE NO. 1—MOUVEMENT PAR VOIE DE TERRE ET STATIONNEMENT D'UNE DIVISION. CARTES NÉCESSAIRES, MIRECOURT, LANGRES, 1:80,000.) By École Supérieure de Guerre, France. 1926-1927. 14 pages. Library No. 357.1244.	•
MAP PROBLEM NO. 1 AND TACTICAL RIDE NO. 1, 1ST YEAR'S COURSE 1926-1927. ORGANIZATION OF A DEFENSIVE POSITION (DIVISION), WITH MAPS 1:50,000. (EXERCISE SUR LA CARTE NO. 1 ET EXERCISE EXTÉRIEUR NO. 1, 1ÈRE ANNÉE D'ÉTUDE, 1926-1927. ORGANISATION D'UN POSITION DÉFENSIVE.) By École Supérieure de Guerre, France. 1927. 5 pages. Library No. 357.1244.	•
MAP PROBLEM NO. 2, 1ST YEAR'S COURSE, 1926-1927. STUDY OF THE DEFENSIVE ORGANIZATION OF A DIVISION, WITH MAPS. (EXERCISE SUR LA CARTE NO. 2, 1ÈRE ANNÉE, 1926-1927. ÉTUDE DE L'ENTAILLON DÉFENSIVE D'UNE DIVISION.) By École Supérieure de Guerre, France. 1927. 11 pages. Library No. 357.1244.	•
MAP PROBLEM NO. 3, 1ST YEAR'S COURSE, 1926-1927. EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARTILLERY OF A DIVISION IN THE APPROACH MARCH. WITH MAP 1:50,000. (EXERCISE SUR LA CARTE NO. 3, 1ÈRE ANNÉE D'ÉTUDES, 1926-1927. EMPLOI D'UNE ARTILLERIE DIVISIONNAIRE DANS LA MARCHÉ D'APPROACHE.) By École Supérieure de Guerre, France. 1927. 33 pages. Library No. 357.1244.	•
MAP PROBLEM NO. 4. 1ST YEAR'S COURSE, 1926-1927. PRELIMINARY STUDY OF THE DIVISION IN OFFENSIVE COMBAT. THE APPROACH MARCH, CONTACT, AND ENGAGEMENT. WITH MAPS 1:80,000. (EXERCISE SUR LA CARTE NO. 4, 1ÈRE ANNÉE D'ÉTUDES, 1926-1927. ÉTUDE DE PRÉLIMINAIRES DU COMBAT OFFENSIF DE LA DIVISION. MARCHÉ D'APPROACHE, PRISE DE CONTACT ET ENGAGEMENT.) By École Supérieure de Guerre, France. 1927. 10 pages. Library No. 357.1244.	•

- MAP PROBLEM No. 5, 1ST YEAR'S COURSE, 1926-1927. ATTACK OF A DIVISION AGAINST A HASTILY ORGANIZED POSITION, WITH 2 MAPS 1:50,000. (EXERCISE SUR LA CARTE No. 5, 1ÈRE ANNÉE D'ÉTUDES, 1926-1927. ÉTUDE DE L'ATTAQUE D'UNE DIVISION CONTRE UN ENNEMI EN POSITION SUR UN TERRAIN SOMMAIREMENT ORGANISÉ.) By École Supérieure de Guerre, France. 1927. 14 pages. Library No. 357.1244.
- MAP EXERCISE No. 2, 1ST YEAR'S COURSE 1926-1927. ATTACK OF A FORTIFIED POSITION (DIVISION), WITH MAPS, (EXERCISE SUR LA CARTE No. 2, 1ÈRE ANNÉE D'ÉTUDE, 1926-1927. ATTAQUE D'UNE POSITION FORTIFIÉE.) By École Supérieure de Guerre, France. 1927. 9 pages. Library No. 357.1244.
- MAP EXERCISE No. 3 AND TERRAIN EXERCISE No. 2, 1ST YEAR'S COURSE 1926-1927. CONTACT AND ENGAGEMENT (DIVISION), WITH MAP 1:50,000. (EXERCISE SUR LA CARTE No. 3 ET EXERCISE SUR LA TERRAIN No. 2, 1ÈRE ANNÉE D'ÉTUDES, 1926-1927. ÉTUDE DE LA PRISE DE CONTACT ET DE L'ENGAGEMENT.) By École Supérieure de Guerre, France. 1927. 7 pages. Library No. 357.1244.
- MAP EXERCISE No. 4 & TERRAIN EXERCISE No. 3, 1ST YEAR'S COURSE, 1926-1927. ATTACK BY A DIVISION OF A HASTILY ORGANIZED POSITION, WITH MAPS 1:50,000. (EXERCISE SUR LA TERRAIN No. 3. 1ÈRE ANNÉE D'ÉTUDES, 1926-1927. ÉTUDE DE L'ATTAQUE D'UNE POSITION ORGANISÉE DEPUIS PEU DE TEMPS.) By École Supérieure de Guerre, France. 1927. 8 pages. Library No. 357.1244.
- MAP PROBLEM No. 1, 2ND YEAR'S COURSE, 1926-1927. COUNTER ATTACK BY A DIVISION PRECEDING A GENERAL WITHDRAWAL. (EXERCISE SUR LA CARTE No. 1, 2ÈME ANNÉE D'ÉTUDE, 1926-1927. ÉTUDE D'UNE CONTRE-ATTAQUE PRÉCÉDANT UN REPLI.) By École Supérieure de Guerre, France. 1927. 7 pages. Library No. 357.1244.
- MAP PROBLEM No. 1, 2ND YEAR'S COURSE, 1926-1927. MOVEMENT BY MARCHING AND HALT OF AN ARMY CORPS. WITH MAPS, SOISSONS 4-4, 1:80,000. (EXERCISE SUR LA CARTE No. 1. MOUVEMENT PAR VOIE DE TERRE ET STATIONNEMENT D'UN CORPS D'ARMÉE. CARTES NÉCESSAIRES, SOISSONS 4-4, 1:80,000.) By École Supérieure de Guerre, France. 1927. 8 pages. Library No. 357.1244.
- MAP PROBLEM No. 2, 2ND YEAR'S COURSE, 1926-1927. THE ARMY CORPS IN THE DEFENSIVE, WITH MAPS 1:80,000. (EXERCISE SUR LA CARTE No. 2, 2ÈME ANNÉE, 1926-1927. LE CORPS D'ARMÉE DANS LA DEFENSIVE.) By École Supérieure de Guerre, France. 1927. 10 pages. Library No. 357.1244.
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	Page
MAP PROBLEM No. 4, 2ND YEAR'S COURSE, 1926-1927. THE ARMY CORPS IN THE ATTACK. WITH MAP OF METZ 1:80,000. (EXERCISE SUR LA CARTE No. 4, 2ÈME ANNÉE D'ÉTUDES, 1926-1927. LE CORPS D'ARMÉE DANS L'ATTAQUE.) By École Supérieure de Guerre, France. 1927. 16 pages. Library No. 357.1244.....	•
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	Page
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THE IDEALS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT. By Edward H. Cotton. 1923. 325 pages. Library No. 923.173.	303
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	Page
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THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE. By Rostovtzeff.	239
A HISTORY OF GREECE (ANCIENT) FOR COLLEGES AND HIGH SCHOOLS. By Philip Van Ness Myers, L.H.D. 1895. 577 pages. Library No. 938.0. (Presented by Maj. Sherman Miles.)	*
THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF THE GREEKS. By Myres	240
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World War

	Page
WORLD WAR HISTORY. HEARING BEFORE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SIXTY-NINTH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION. By Lt. Col. Thomas J. Dickson, U.S.A. 1927. 29 pages. Library No. 940.301.....	†
FIVE WEEKS: THE SURGE OF PUBLIC OPINION ON THE EVE OF THE GREAT WAR. By Scott.....	240
THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR. VOL. XI: BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR, 1898-1914. By G. P. Gooch, D.Litt., and Harold Temperley, Litt.D. 1926. 389 pages. Library No. 940.310.....	†
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THE LIMITATIONS OF VICTORY. By Fabre-Luce.....	241
THE WORLD CRISIS, 1916-1918. By Churchill. (Vols. 3 & 4.).....	242
SOLDIERS AND STATESMEN, 1914-1918. By Sir William Robertson, Field-Marshal, British Army. 1926. In 2 vols., Vol. I, 333 pages. Library No. 940.3122.....	*
MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA. By Count Bernstorff. 1920. 415 pages. Library No. 940.3131.....	*
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY DURING THE WAR. FROM THE BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES TO THE FALL OF THE MONARCHY, AUG. 1914 TO NOV. 1918. (French text.) By Auerbach.....	247
<i>Economic and Social History of the World War.—Experiments in State Control.</i> By Lloyd.....	247
<i>Economic and Social History of the World War.—Trade Unionism and Munitions.</i> By Cole.....	248
<i>Economic and Social History of the World War.—Food Production in War.</i> By Middleton.....	248
<i>Economic and Social History of the World War.—Labour Supply and Regulation.</i> By Wolfe.....	249
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR.—THE FORMS OF WAR GOVERNMENT IN FRANCE. (Translated and Abridged Series.) By Pierre Renouvin. 1927. 186 pages. Library No. 940.3221.....	†
<i>Economic and Social History of the World War.—The British Coal Mining Industry During the War.</i> By Redmayne.....	250
THE FRENCH ARMIES IN THE GREAT WAR. TOME III: THE OFFENSIVES OF 1915. THE WINTER OF 1915-16. PERIOD 1 MAY, 1915, TO 21 FEBRUARY, 1916. (ANNEXES AND MAPS BOUND IN 5 SEPARATE VOLUMES.) (LES ARMÉES FRANÇAISES DANS LA GRANDE GUERRE. TOME III: LES OFFENSIVES DE 1915. L'HIVER DE 1915-1916 (1ER MAI 1915-21 FÉVRIER 1916.) By General Staff, French Army. 1923. 720 pages. Library No. 940.3444.....	*
THE FRENCH ARMIES IN THE GREAT WAR. TOME III, ANNEXES, VOL. I: THE OFFENSIVES OF 1915. THE WINTER OF 1915-16. PERIOD 1 MAY, 1915 TO 21 FEBRUARY, 1916. (LES ARMÉES FRANÇAISES DANS LA GRANDE GUERRE. TOME III, ANNEXES, 1ER VOLUME: LES OFFENSIVES DE 1915. L'HIVER DE 1915-1916. (1ER MAI 1915-21 FÉVRIER 1916.) By General Staff, French Army. 1924. 1141 pages. Library No. 940.3444.....	*
THE FRENCH ARMIES IN THE GREAT WAR. TOME III, ANNEXES, VOL. II: THE OFFENSIVES OF 1915. THE WINTER OF 1915-1916. PERIOD 1 MAY, 1915, TO 21 FEBRUARY, 1916. (LES ARMÉES FRANÇAISES DANS LA GRANDE GUERRE. TOME III, ANNEXES, 2ER VOLUME: LES OFFENSIVES DE 1915. L'HIVER DE 1915-1916 (1ER MAI 1915-21 FÉVRIER 1916.) By General Staff, French Army. 1925. 1244 pages. Library No. 940.3444.....	*

	Page
THE FRENCH ARMIES IN THE GREAT WAR. TOME III, ANNEXES, VOL. III: THE OFFENSIVES OF 1915. THE WINTER OF 1915-1916. PERIOD 1 MAY, 1915, TO 21 FEBRUARY, 1916. (LES ARMÉES FRANÇAISES DAS LA GRANDE GUERRE. TOME III, ANNEXES, 3E VOL.: LES OFFENSIVES DE 1915. L'HIVER DE 1915-1916. (1ER MAI 1915-21 FÉVRIER 1916.) By General Staff, French Army. 1926. 1395 pages. Library No. 940.34444.	*
THE FRENCH ARMIES IN THE GREAT WAR. TOME III, ANNEXES, VOL. IV: THE OFFENSIVES OF 1915. THE WINTER OF 1915-1916. PERIOD 1 MAY, 1915, TO 21 FEBRUARY, 1916. (LES ARMÉES FRANÇAISES DANS LA GRANDE GUERRE. TOME III, ANNEXES, 4E VOL.: LES OFFENSIVES DE 1915. L'HIVER DE 1915-1916. (1ER MAI 1915-21 FÉVRIER 1916.) By General Staff, French Army. 1926. 932 pages. Library No. 940.34444.	*
THE FRENCH ARMIES IN THE GREAT WAR. TOME III, MAP FOLIO: THE OFFENSIVES OF 1915. THE WINTER OF 1915-1916. PERIOD 1 MAY, 1915, TO 21 FEBRUARY, 1916. (LES ARMÉES FRANÇAISES DANS LA GRANDE GUERRE. TOME III: CARTES: LES OFFENSIVES DE 1915. L'HIVER DE 1915-1916. (1ER MAI 1915-21 FÉVRIER 1916.) By General Staff, French Army. 1926. 60 maps. Library No. 940.34444.	*
THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918. (German text.) By Schnitler.	251
THE MOST IMPORTANT MILITARY AND POLITICAL EVENTS OF THE WORLD WAR. A LECTURE. (German text.) By v. Moser.	252
GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, A.E.F., LANGRES, FRANCE, 1918. THE INTELLIGENCE BRANCH OF THE GENERAL STAFF. By G.H.Q., A.E.F. 1918. 160 pages, with maps. Library No. 940.36132. (Presented by Lt. Col. Robinson.)	*
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AIR SERVICE, AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, 1918. By Toulmin.	253
THE BRIDGE TO FRANCE. By Hurley.	254
<i>The Eastern Railways in the Great War, 1914-1918.</i> (French text.) By Marchand.	254
<i>Operations of the XXI Army Corps, 1 August to 13 September, 1914.</i> (French text.) By Legrand-Girarde.	256
THE EMPIRE AT WAR. By Sir Charles Lucas. 1926. Vol. V. 465 pages. Library No. 940.36220.	*
A HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR. THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE AND FLANDERS, 1914-1918. By Arthur Conan Doyle. 1918. In 6 vols., Vol. I, 349 pages. Library No. 940.362250.	*
RECORD OF THE 4TH ROYAL IRISH DRAGOON GUARDS IN THE GREAT WAR, 1914-1918. By Gibb.	256
THE OPERATIONS OF THE EIGHTEENTH GERMAN ARMY (VON HUTIER) FROM 21 MARCH TO 5 APRIL, 1918. (LES OPÉRATIONS DE LA XVIII E ARMÉE ALLEMANDE [ARMÉE VON HUTIER] DU 21 MARS AU 5 AVRIL 1918.) By G.H.Q., French Armies of the North and Northeast. 1918. 14 pages. Library No. 940.363152.	*
<i>Four Years at Austro-Hungarian General Headquarters.</i> (French text.) By v. Cramon.	256
THE KING OF THE GERMAN ALPS AND HIS HEROES. THE BATTLES IN THE ORTLER MOUNTAINS, 1915-18. (AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.) (DER KONIG DER DEUTSCHEN ALPEN UND SEINE HELDEN. ORTLERKÄMPFE 1915-1918.) By Maj. Gen.	

v. Lempruch, German Army, Ret. 1925. 153 pages. Library No. 940.3632611.....	Page *
AUSTRIA'S ARTILLERY IN THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918. FROM OFFICIAL SOURCES AND CONTRIBUTIONS BY PARTICIPANTS. (ÖSTERREICH'S ARTILLERIE IM WELTKRIEGE 1914-1918.) By H.Q., Brigade Artillery Section, Lower Austria No. 3. 1926. 429 pages with maps. Library No. 940.3632630.....	*
The European War. <i>Strategical Introduction</i> . (French text.) By Feyler.....	257
Problems in Strategy drawn from the World War. <i>The Problem of the War</i> . (French text.) By Feyler.....	258
THE EVOLUTION OF TACTICAL IDEAS IN FRANCE AND GERMANY DURING THE WAR OF 1914-1918. (Translation from the French.) By Lt. Col. Lucas, French Army. 1927. 332 pages. Library No. 940.3720.....	*
WITH CLAUSEWITZ THROUGH THE PROBLEMS, QUESTIONS, ERRORS, AND COMPLICATIONS OF THE WORLD WAR. (German text.) By Leinveber.....	258
THE GEOGRAPHICAL CONDITIONS OF THE (WORLD) WAR. A STUDY OF THE MILITARY GEOGRAPHY OF THE FRENCH FRONT FROM 1914 TO 1918. (French text.) By Villate.....	261
SOUTHEAST MACEDONIA AND ASIA MINOR. GEOLOGICAL PRESENTATION OF THE THEATER OF WAR 1914-1918. (SÜDOSTMazedonian UND KLEINASIEN. DIE KRIEGSSCHAUPLÄTZE 1914-1918 GEOLOGISCH DARGESTELLT.) By Prof. J. Wilser. 1925. 114 pages with maps. Library No. 940.377.....	*
GEOLOGIC PRESENTATION OF THE THEATERS OF WAR, 1914-1918. VOL. I: ELSACE. (DIE KRIEGSSCHAUPLÄTZE 1914-1918 GEOLOGISCH DARGESTELLT. HEFT I: ELSASS.) By Dr. E. Kraus. 1924. 154 pages. Library No. 940.410.....	*
GEOLOGIC PRESENTATION OF THE THEATERS OF WAR, 1914-1918. VOL. II: LORRAINE. WITH 4 TABLES. (DIE KRIEGSSCHAUPLÄTZE 1914-1918 GEOLOGISCH DARGESTELLT. HEFT 2: LOTHRINGEN.) By Dr. E. Kraus. 1925. 212 pages. Library No. 940.410.....	*
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GEOLOGIC PRESENTATION OF THE THEATERS OF WAR, 1914-1918. VOL. IV: VICINITY OF VERDUN. (DIE KRIEGSSCHAUPLÄTZE 1914-1918 GEOLOGISCH DARGESTELLT. HEFT IV: VOR VERDUN.) By Dr. Fr. Sturm. 1923. 44 pages. Library No. 940.410.....	*
GEOLOGIC PRESENTATION OF THE THEATERS OF WAR, 1914-1918. VOL. V: THE ARGONNES AND CHAMPAGNE. (DIE KRIEGSSCHAUPLÄTZE 1914-1918 GEOLOGISCH DARGESTELLT. HEFT 5: ARGONNEN UND CHAMPAGNE.) By Dr. K. Hummel. 1923. 82 pages. Library No. 940.410.....	*
GEOLOGIC PRESENTATION OF THE THEATERS OF WAR, 1914-1918. VOL. 12: GEOLOGY OF CENTRAL BALKAN PENINSULA. (DIE KRIEGSSCHAUPLÄTZE 1914-1918 GEOLOGISCH DARGESTELLT. HEFT 12: GEOLOGIE DER ZENTRALEN BALKANHALBINSEL.) By Dr. Franz Kossmat. 1924. 193 pages. Library No. 940.440.....	*
GEOLOGIC PRESENTATION OF THE THEATERS OF WAR, 1914-18. VOL. 14: THE ISTHMUS DESERT AND PALESTINE, WITH 4 MAPS AND 4 PROFILES. (DIE KRIEGSSCHAUPLÄTZE 1914-1918 GEOLOGISCH DARGESTELLT. HEFT 14: DIE ISTHMUSWÜSTE UND PALÄSTINA.) By Dr. Paul Range. 1926. 82 pages. Library No. 940.450.....	*
Intelligence Operations. <i>On Special Missions. Memoirs of a Secret Service Agent of the Entente</i> . (French text.) By Lucieto.....	261

	Page
ILLUSTRATIONS TO ACCOMPANY NOTES ON THE INTERPRETATION OF AIRPLANE PHOTOGRAPHY, SERIES A. By British G.H.Q. (Intelligence). 1918. 63 plates. Library No. 940.410242. (Presented by Lt. Col. Robinson.)	"
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A VOICE FROM THE FRONT. BÜLOW'S ADVANCE, RETREAT, AND PRESERVATION OF HIS OWN AS WELL AS OF THE (GERMAN) FIRST ARMY, 1914. (German text.) By v. Wrede	262
FROM NANCY TO CAMP DES ROMAINS IN 1914. (FROM THE OFFICIAL SOURCES OF THE GERMAN REICHSARCHIV.) (VON NANCY BIS ZUM CAMP DES ROMAINS 1914.) By Gen. Ludwig Gebssattel, German Army. 1925. 154 pages with maps. Library No. 940.41123	"
THE CRISIS IN THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE. THE BATTLES OF THE GERMAN SECOND AND THIRD ARMIES AGAINST THE FRENCH FIFTH AND NINTH ARMIES AT PETIT MORIN AND MARAIS DE ST. GOND. (DIE KRISIS IN DER MARNESCHLACHT. KÄMPFE DER II. UND III. DEUTSCHEN ARMEE GEGEN DIE 5. UND 9. FRANZÖSISCHE ARMEE AM PETIT MORIN UND IN DEN MARAIS DE ST. GOND.) By Lt. Col. Eugen Bircher, German Army. 1927. 303 pages with maps. Library No. 940.4114	"
SITUATION MAPS OF THE MARNE CAMPAIGN AND THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 28 AUG.-10 SEPT., 1914. INCLUDING A SYNOPSIS OF MILITARY EVENTS DURING THAT PERIOD. (German text.) By v. Mantey	"
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THE TRUTH ABOUT THE LOSS OF THE HEIGHTS OF THE MEUSE AND OF SAINT-MIHIEL IN SEPTEMBER 1914. (French text.) By Bize	263
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE HEIGHTS OF NOTRE DAME DE LORETTO, NEAR LENS, 1914-1915. OFFICIAL MONOGRAPH. (LORETTO.) (German text.) By Werner Beumelburg. 1927. 221 pages. Library No. 940.4117043	"
YPRES 1914. (FROM THE OFFICIAL SOURCES OF THE GERMAN REICHSARCHIV.) (YPERN 1914.) By Werner Beumelburg. 1926. 217 pages with maps. Library No. 940.41172	"
DOUAUMONT 1916. (FROM THE OFFICIAL SOURCES OF THE GERMAN REICHSARCHIV.) (German text.) By Werner Beumelburg. 1926. 185 pages with maps. Library No. 940.4130	"
THE MILITARY DEFEAT OF GERMANY IN 1918. (French text.) By Paquet	263
THE PREPARATION OF THE GERMAN ARMY FOR THE GREAT BATTLE IN FRANCE IN THE SPRING OF 1918. PART I. THE BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR THE COMMAND. (DIE VORBEREITUNG DES DEUTSCHEN HEERES FÜR DIE GROSSE SCHLACHT IN FRANKREICH IM FRÜHJAHR 1918. I. GRUNDSÄTZE FÜR DIE FÜHRUNG.) By Colonel Jochim, German Army, Ret. 1927. 74 pages. Library No. 940.4151	"
THE BATTLE OF COURCELLES-MÉRY, 9-11 JUNE, 1918. (Translation from the French.) By Colonel de Ripert d'Alauzier, French Army. 1925. 50 pages. Library No. 940.41514	"

	Page
RUSSIA IN THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918. (Translation from the German.) By Jurij Daniloff, Former Deputy Chief of Staff, Imperial Russian Army. 1927. 207 pages. Library No. 940.4201.....	*
TANNENBERG. THE CANNAE OF THE WORLD WAR. (ILLUSTRATED). (German text.) By v. Francois.....	264
NOTES ON THE BATTLE OF TANNENBERG, WITH GERMAN PAMPHLET CONTAINING SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS, SITUATION MAP 1:100,000, ORGANIZATION TABLES GERMAN EIGHTH ARMY, AND FOREWORD BY GENERAL HINDENBURG. By U. S. War Dept. (G-2 Report). 1927. 9 pages. Library No. 940.4211143.....	*
THE CONQUEST OF NOWO GEORGIEWSK (1915). (FROM THE OFFICIAL SOURCES OF THE GERMAN REICHSARCHIV.) (DIE EROBERUNG VON NOWO GEORGIEWSK.) By Capt. Franz Bettag, German Army, Ret. 1926. 127 pages with maps. Library No. 940.42124.....	*
THE BREAKTHROUGH ON THE ISONZO, 1917. PART I: THE BATTLE OF TOLMEIN AND FLITSCH. PART II: THE PURSUIT TO THE PIAVE. (FROM THE OFFICIAL SOURCES OF THE GERMAN REICHSARCHIV.) (German text.) By v. Dellmensingen.....	265
THE SERBIAN CAMPAIGNS IN 1914 AND 1915. (French text.) By Feyler.....	267
THE BATTLES IN THE CARPATHIANS AND THE DNJESTER IN 1915. (FROM THE OFFICIAL SOURCES OF THE GERMAN REICHSARCHIV.) (KARPATHEN UND DNJESTER SCHLACHT 1915.) By Lt. Gen. Friedrich v. Friedeburg, German Army, Ret. 1926. 153 pages with maps. Library No. 940.4421.....	*
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THE TURKISH WAR IN THE WORLD WAR. (French text.) By Larcher.....	267
ALLENBY OF ARMAGEDDON. A RECORD OF THE CAREER AND CAMPAIGNS OF FIELD-MARSHAL VISCOUNT ALLENBY. By Raymond Savage. 1926. 353 pages. Library No. 940.45032.....	†
THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN IN 1915. OFFICIAL MONOGRAPH. (SCHLACHTEN DES WELTKRIEGES. Bd. 16. DER KAMPF UM DIE DARDANELLEN 1915. IM AUFTRAGE DES REICHSARCHIVS.) By Dr. Carl Muhlmann, Maj. German Army. 1927. 194 pages. Library No. 940.452043.....	*
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A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA 1914-1918. By Evans.....	268
REVOLT IN THE DESERT. By Lawrence.....	268
ALLENBY'S FINAL TRIUMPH. By W. T. Massey. 1920. 344 pages. Library No. 940.4556.....	*
GERMANY'S POLITICS OF IMPOTENCY DURING THE WORLD WAR. (DEUTSCHE OHNMACHTSPOLITIK IM WELTKRIEGE.) By Admiral A. v. Tirpitz, German Navy. 1926. 676 pages. Library No. 940.4806.....	*
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Franco-German War

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FREDERICK THE GREAT AND HIS SEVEN YEARS WAR. By Ronald A. Hall, C.C.S. 1915. 240 pages. Library No. 943.0056.....	Page
THE AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN WAR IN BOHEMIA, 1866. By Col. R. O. Anderson, British Army. 1912. 89 pages. Library No. 943.0072.....	*
THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA, 1866. By Lt. Col. G. J. R. Glunicke, British Army. 1907. 221 pages with maps. Library No. 943.0072.....	*
THE MARCH OF THE SEVENTY THOUSAND. By Baerlein.....	269

Napoleonic Wars

THE WARS OF MARLBOROUGH, 1702-1709. By Frank Taylor, Lincoln College, Oxford, England. 1921. In 2 vols., Vol. I, 490 pages. Library No. 944.0034.....	†
<i>The Opinions and Reflections of Napoleon.</i> By Breed.....	269
A SHORT HISTORY OF THE CHIEF CAMPAIGNS IN EUROPE SINCE 1792. (Translation from the German.) By Gen. A. v. Horsetzky, Austro-Hungarian Army. 1909. 501 pages. Library No. 944.00503436.....	*
A HUNDRED YEARS AGO. BATTLES BY LAND AND BY SEA: ULM, TRAFALGAR, AUSTERLITZ. By Col. George Armand Furse, British Army. 1905. 416 pages. Library No. 944.00531142.....	*
<i>Napoleon.</i> By Ludwig.....	270
THE MANEUVER OF WAGRAM. (French text.) By Camon.....	270

Russo-Japanese War

CONFERENCES ON THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. (CONFÉRENCES SUR LA GUERRE RUSSO-JAPONAISE.) (Translation from the Russian into French.) By General Staff Academy "Nicholas," Russia. 1907. In 5 Vols. (9 parts), Vol. I, 381 pages. Library No. 947.253247. (Presented by Maj. Sherman Miles.).....	*
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THE BATTLES OF TRENTON AND PRINCETON. By William S. Stryker, Adj. Gen. of New Jersey. 1898. 514 pages. Library No. 973.3626.....	*
THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. By William S. Strkyer, Adj. Gen. of New Jersey. 1927. 297 pages. Library No. 973.3642.....	†

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STATESMEN AND SOLDIERS OF THE CIVIL WAR. By Maurice.....	271
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAVIES IN THE WAR OF THE REBELLION. By U. S. Navy Dept. 1927. 457 pages. Library No. 973.780.....	*

American Indian Campaigns

CUSTER'S LAST BATTLE. By Charles Francis Roe, former Brig. Gen. U.S.A. 1927. 40 pages. Library No. 973.825.....	*
THE SHEEPEATER CAMPAIGN, 1879. By Brown.....	273

II. REVIEW OF BOOKS

THE WORLD IN THE MAKING. (Translation from the German)

By Count Hermann Keyserling. 293 pages. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1927.) Library No. 100.

Count Keyserling, author of *The Travel Diary of a Philosopher*, *The Book of Marriage*, and of *The World in the Making* is the founder and president of the School of Wisdom in Darmstadt, Germany.

All of his works have been much discussed in the United States. Their brilliance of style and clearness of thought had much to do with their success, but it was primarily due to the messages which they brought.

The third of his works, *The World in the Making* is described as the essay which condenses Keyserling's doctrine, a dazzling profusion of ideas forming, in opposition to the negative work of Spengler, the largest system on human development that has been dared since Nietzsche.

Of general interest in the study of philosophy.

A. B.

INFLUENCING HUMAN BEHAVIOR

By H. A. Overstreet. 292 pages. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1925.) Library No. 150.01.

The author is Professor of Philosophy at the College of the City of New York. The book consists of lectures delivered in 1924 before the New School for Social Research in New York City which were designed as a course indicating how human behavior can actually be changed in the light of new knowledge gained through psychology. The central idea of the book is the exposition of a technique which will get ourselves believed in and accepted, or which will get people to think with us. In this connection the author states "What we attend to controls our behavior. What we can get others to attend to controls their behavior. In these two sentences we have the key to the influencing of human behavior." In developing this idea there are presented many valuable suggestions for teachers, lecturers, and writers.

The psychological principles of the means used by speakers and writers to capture and hold attention are simply explained. These are illustrated by interesting examples taken from current events, speeches, and writings. The book is written in a simple, pleasant style. Few technical terms are used and these are so used as to be readily understood and remembered.

The book is of value to all instructors. It will be found of value in the preparation of conferences, problems, and texts.

P. V. K.

THE AMERICAN YEAR BOOK, YEAR 1926

By Albert Bushnell Hart. 1178 pages. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927.) Library No. 317.3.

This is the second volume in the new series of the "American Year Book," edited by Professor Hart with the cooperation of a board representing many of the national learned societies. The preparation of the manuscript for both volumes has been financed by the New York Times through Mr. Adolph S. Ochs. A new feature of the 1926 volume is the inclusion at the end of each division of a section on cognate societies. Readers who desire more detailed information on a given subject than is given in the

year book are thus put in touch with the officials of those organizations that are most intimately acquainted with that particular subject. In general the book follows the lines of the preceding volume with only a slight rearrangement of divisions. As a whole the presentation of material could hardly be better, and the signing of each section by an authority on the topics treated gives as great a measure of responsibility as could be desired by the general reader.

(Reprint of review on p. 556, *American Review of Reviews*, May, 1927.)
Of general interest as a book of reference.

SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1912-1923

By Edith P. Stickney, Ph.D. (Stanford Univ.) 191 pages. (Stanford Univ., Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1926.) Library No. 327.40.

To this work was awarded the George Louis Beer prize by the American Historical Association in 1925.

A study of one of the important and most perplexing issues of modern international relations. In this volume the history of Southern Albania, in its international aspects, is traced through the Balkan Wars, the World War, the Paris Conference, and the deliberations of the League of Nations. This is an unusually scholarly work.

(Extract from review of George H. Blakeslee, Professor of History and International Relations, Clark University.)

Of general interest in the study of current European diplomacy; of special value to the G-2 Section.

THE CHINESE ARMY AS A MILITARY FORCE

By Lawrence Impey. 56 pages, with maps and photographs. (Tientsin: Tientsin Press, Ltd., 1926.) Library No. 355.0151.

This is a second and enlarged edition. The author writes from firsthand knowledge as he was with Marshal Wu Pei-Fu's Army for a considerable time. He describes in detail the various arms and administrative reviews of the Army and comes to the conclusion that, if well handled, the Chinese soldier would be first class. There is a short account of the Civil War of 1925 in North China. It is hard to follow the narrative of the operations as the only maps are two "sketch" maps with no scale or explanation. There are numerous photographs which are interesting.

(Reprint of review on p. 439, *The Army Quarterly*, January, 1927.)
Of general interest and of particular value to the G-2 Section.

SWITZERLAND'S MILITARY-POLITICAL SITUATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE WORLD WAR.—THE CONFEDERATE MILITIA SYSTEM (DIE SCHWEIZ. IHRE MILITÄRPOLITISCHE LAGE VOR UND NACH DEM WELTKRIEGE.—DAS EIDGENÖFFISCHE MILIZSYSTEM)

By Lt. Col. Rudolf zu der Luth, Swiss Army. 374 pages. (Charlottenburg: Offene Worte, 1925.) Library No. 355.02494.

The difficulties of Switzerland during and since the war are very clearly exhibited in this book, written by a Swiss officer, though published in Germany. It is a compendium of the whole Swiss military question, still more important than ever, as the author points out; for by joining the League of Nations Switzerland has renounced her neutrality, and armies

operating in pursuance of their duties under the League now have the right to traverse her territory. Whilst rapid mobilization is one of the most important elements of victory, the Swiss Government is inclined to trust to fortifications and to mobilize gradually. Colonel zu der Luth prints a long account of the arrangements made between France and Italy in 1916-1917, in view of an expected German attempt to move through part of Switzerland, describes the mobilization of the Swiss Army in 1914, and how it guarded the frontier, and gives the lessons drawn from that five-year service. They are mainly, that the instruction of officers and men was insufficient and longer courses and longer service with the colors are necessary, and that greater care is required in the selection and promotion of officers. The endeavors of the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel Sonderegger, to get reforms introduced merely led to his dismissal.

The organization of the new Swiss divisions in course of introduction is:

Infantry.—3 brigades of two three-company battalions and a two-company *Landwehr* battalion each, and two cyclist companies, a machine-gun company (9 heavy machine guns) and three infantry parks.

Cavalry.—2 squadrons.

Artillery.—12 field-gun batteries, 2 field-howitzer batteries, two heavy field-howitzer batteries, 2 mountain batteries, 7 artillery parks and an observation company.

Technical troops.—A sapper battalion, 1 telegraph company, 1 bridging company, 1 balloon section, 1 searchlight company, 1 mountain telegraph company, 1 tunnelling company.

Services.—Field ambulance detachment, field hospital, supply detachment and transport.

The criticisms on this all-burning question in Switzerland are that there is not enough infantry (26 companies including cyclists), too little artillery and no army heavy artillery, no trench mortars. Further, the length of service is insufficient, though increased; it is in all only 171 days for infantry and engineers, 196 for cavalry, and 202 for artillery. The recent manoeuvres have shown that the horses are untrained; some of the batteries are motor-drawn.

The author describes at length, with sketches, how Switzerland could be attacked from Italy and from France; and how France and Italy could, through Switzerland, reach the Upper Rhine.

(Reprint of review on pp. 177-8, *The Army Quarterly*, April, 1927.)

Of general interest and of special value to the G-2 Section.

WARRIORS AT EASE

By Anthony Armstrong ("A.A."). 164 pages. (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1926.) Library No. 355.1042.

As a purveyor of yarns of the humorous side of soldiering "A.A." must take high rank. His little book, "Warriors at Ease," is a collection of his contribution to *Punch*.

He has an excellent sense of humour and of the ridiculous and he extracts from every day proceedings of barrack life and training an inordinate amount of fun. All the characters are well drawn and their little idiosyncracies ably brought out.

We like his series dealing with "On Manoeuvres" best of all though in actual fact there is little to choose between any of the tales.

Umpires and umpiring come in for a certain amount of gentle and amusing criticism, but "A.A." in the end admits their usefulness for he states "that it is felt that if a Commander can thus defeat an Umpire who knows all the ground and the plans and dispositions of both sides he should have no difficulty in outwitting an enemy, whose knowledge is confined to one side."

The whole book is one long laugh from beginning to end and we strongly recommend all those who have not yet met Captain Bayonet, Corporal Scabbard and Private Pullthrough, to do so as soon as possible, and we are certain that they will not regret the 3s. 6d. which the book costs.

(Reprint of review on p. 146, *British Cavalry Journal*, January, 1927.)
Of general interest.

GOVERNMENTS AND WAR. A STUDY OF THE CONDUCT OF WAR

By Major-General Sir F. Maurice, K.C.M.G., C.B. 171 pages. (London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1926.) Library No. 356.0.

This is one of the most important military books that have appeared of recent years, and one which deserves the close study of every individual, soldier or civilian, who has his country's welfare at heart. It deals, as its title indicates, with the relation between policy and strategy in wartime; between the Government which directs the war, and its servants, the military leaders who conduct it. The book abounds in thought-provoking matter and interesting suggestions which should at least help to focus public attention on this vital question, the solution of which has been generally recognized as peculiarly difficult in democratically-governed countries, but which nevertheless, if not solved, may well disastrously affect Great Britain's fortunes when next she goes to war.

The first part of General Maurice's book is devoted to a consideration from an historical point of view of the conduct of war by a democratic Government. He draws his examples from the American Civil War, since, in his opinion, we are too close to the Great War for our information to be complete or our judgment impartial. He then studies first of all the relations between Jefferson Davis, the President of the Southern Confederacy, and his two principal military lieutenants, Joe Johnston and Lee; and next those of Lincoln with McClellan and with Grant. His conclusions are that Davis, with whom a little knowledge was in truth a dangerous thing, never got the best value out of either of his military advisers, because he neither laid down a clear policy for them nor allowed them to do their own work without interference; while Lincoln, after a series of unsuccessful experiments with McClellan, finally devised, on Grant's appointment to supreme command, a sound system which brought victory to the North. This system was that Grant had the military control of all the Union Armies to plan and carry out his campaign at will; Halleck, the Chief of Staff at Washington, acted as channel for correspondence between him and Lincoln; and the latter's role was that of supporting his General, supplying him with what he required, and controlling and coordinating the national effort for the attainment of the object of the War.

From this historical argument General Maurice passes on to what will probably be for most people the most interesting portion of his book—the discussion of what would be the ideal system for the conduct of war by a democratic Government such as our own. He considers it necessary for such a system to be thought out and laid down before the outbreak of hostilities, if it is to be useful when war comes. It must clearly define, for the benefit of all concerned, the respective functions and powers of the statesman and the soldier, and the degree of control to be exercised by the former over the latter. The lack of such a prepared system has in the past cost us heavily in money and lives, and this gap in our preparations for war must be adequately filled before war comes upon us again. In this contention few soldiers at any rate will disagree with the author; but when he comes to the question of the ideal system which he thinks should be established, he is on more debatable ground. Briefly, he disapproves of War Councils and War Cabinets of statesmen with soldiers in attendance, which he considers too slow-working and clumsy, and he suggests that as in the American Civil War Lincoln was his own War Cabinet, so in any future

war our Prime Minister should assume a sort of temporary dictatorship, and take over sole responsibility for the conduct of the war. Advising him would be the three Chiefs of Staff, who would also be responsible for the carrying out of the tasks allotted to their respective Services. This General Maurice states to have been the practice of Chatham in the Seven Years' War, and he believes that we cannot do better than follow this excellent example. But it must not be forgotten that Chatham was by no means guiltless of the sin of trespassing on the legitimate province of the soldier; and also that he was brought to power actually in time of war, when our fortunes were at a low ebb, and was promptly discarded when the danger had passed. Is it conceivable that a proposal to give any Prime Minister, however able and popular, a dictator's powers even in the most extreme case of public necessity, would ever be passed by a British Parliament unless and until that dire necessity arose? Doubts such as these, however, in no way detract from the great interest and value of the book, which should appeal to all those who are responsible in any way for the well-being of this country—that is, to every intelligent voter and certainly to every thinking soldier.

(Reprint of review on pp. 423-425, *The Army Quarterly*, January, 1927.)

Of general interest and of special value to the Command and G-2 Sections.

GENERAL TACTICS ACCORDING TO THE EXPERIENCE OF THE
GREAT WAR. 5TH REVISED EDITION. (TACTIQUE GÉNÉRALE D'APRÈS L'EXPÉRIENCE DE LA GRANDE GUERRE. 5 ÉDITION REMANIÉE)

By Colonel F. Culmann, French Army. 687 pages. (Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle & Cie, 1926.) Library No. 356.12.

In his introduction, the author states that the instruction given by him at the general staff center of instruction of the Group of Armies of the East in 1915-1916, and to division commanders and officers of higher grades of the Greek Army at Athens in 1917-1918, forms the basis of this work. Also, he states that although the general plan followed in former editions has been adhered to in this, the fifth edition, new paragraphs and chapters have been added to bring the work abreast of recent developments, and to present the latest thought on such subjects as communications in open warfare situations, machine gun battalions, aviation, and artillery.

The work is divided into five parts.

a. Part One contains a brief discussion of tactical principles and a rather detailed technical survey of communications, infantry and tanks, cavalry, artillery aviation, antiaircraft artillery, and the means and methods of gathering information.

b. Part Two deals with open warfare under the headings: marches and security, general principles of combat, offensive and defensive combat, and observations on general staff work. But little use is made of historical examples to illustrate the points made.

c. Part Three deals with stabilized warfare under the general headings: artillery, infantry, organization of the ground, gas, mines, raids, and reliefs.

d. Part Four deals with penetrations in stabilized situations.

e. Part Five deals with transportation.

There is nothing new in this work. It is of interest as a reference book for collateral reading, only.

A. E. W.

IMPERIAL MILITARY GEOGRAPHY

* By Capt. D. H. Cole, British Army. 387 pages. (London: Sifton Praed & Co., Ltd., 1926.) Library No. 356.1942.

That Captain Cole's book has been found of value to the military student is amply proved by the fact that a third edition has become necessary less than two years after its first appearance.

The book has been considerably enlarged and revised. There is a new chapter dealing with the climates of the Empire. Among other alterations are a description of Great Britain, an account of the modern States of Arabia and a description of the northern and north-eastern frontiers of India. There are some very useful new maps.

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The bibliography at the end of each chapter is extremely useful as also are the appendices at the end, which deal with constitutions and governments of the dominions and colonies.

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This is an extremely valuable contribution to the literature of military geography and no military library should consider itself complete without a copy. A very good point is that the author keeps off politics and personal bias.

(Extract from review on pp. 439-440, *The Army Quarterly*, January, 1927.)

Of general interest and of particular value to the G-2 Section.

IMPERIAL DEFENCE, 1588-1914

By Colonel J. F. C. Fuller, British Army. 102 pages. (London: Sifton Praed & Co., Ltd., 1926.) Library No. 356.4042.

In this little volume of about one hundred pages Colonel Fuller, whose pen seems seldom to be idle, looks back on the past, and narrates in a brief form, suitable for soldiers who have little time to spend on reading, the growth of Imperial defence up to the outbreak of the Great War. The British Empire he finds to be based on five principles: domestic peace, the balance of power, security of frontiers, command of the sea, and Colonial self-government. He then shows how in our history these principles were recognized or ignored, and the consequences of such recognition or neglect on the fortunes of British arms in our various wars, from the defeat of the Armada to what he calls "the climax of unpreparedness" on the eve of the Great War. As for the outlook for the future, the author declares in his conclusion that by our acceptance of the creed of self-determination and our entanglement in the League of Nations and in the Washington Treaty, we have already abandoned all five of the principles on which our Empire has in the past been built up, and have as yet found no others to replace them. We should be wise, he considers, to act as we did in 1815: get behind our sea-wall—which, be it noted, is by no means so effective a protection now as then—and establish on a firmer footing than ever the British League of Nations—our empire. The book is within its limits as good reading as any of the author's works, and affords much stimulus for thought on a subject which has been much in the public mind during the recent Imperial Conference.

(Reprint of review on pp. 433-434, *The Army Quarterly*, January, 1927.)

Of general interest.

THIRTY YEARS OF MODERN HISTORY

By William Kay Wallace. 293 pages. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926.) Library No. 909.

The author states that he has "sought to outline the historical factors that have determined the course of events during the past thirty years—The older ideas of nationality are breaking down in the West." When an author chooses a field wide as the world, it is worth while checking up on his qualifications. The following is culled from "Who's Who": Degrees; B.A. and M.A. Secretary at U. S. Legations, Tokyo, Copenhagen, Havana, from 1908 to resignation in 1913. Special War Correspondent of London Times with French, British, Belgian, and Italian armies, 1914-17. Captain, General Staff, MID, Jan. '17; prepared daily and weekly survey of progress of World War issued by General Staff for confidential information of the President, Chief of Staff, and Secretary of War; wrote weekly reviews of operations issued by the Secretary of War to the press. Prepared the official summary of operations and part played by American forces in the field, as issued by the General Staff. He was on the Peace Commission, and was assistant military attaché to Italy in 1918 and was decorated Knight of the Crown of Italy. Author of the following works: *Greater Italy*, 1917; *The Trend of History*, 1922; *The Passing of Politics*, 1924.

This career is very interesting, it has provided abundant travel and pleasant official contacts. It indicates ability to observe and write—it gives no assurance of authority or knowledge of the subject matter of the volume. Therefore, before accepting the statements to be found in the volume the reader should require that they be well substantiated.

The statements of the book are wide and positive and often plausible yet they are not adequately proven by either example or reference. To be sure, references are given often, but usually on limited subjects and to other writers of theories. Reading the book, one gets into a vague atmosphere that seems far from the normal realities of actual living. Some of the ideas are familiar, some undisputed, but never does one meet the tangible commonplaces of everyday experience which are normal to accounts which are sincere and sound. It is manifestly unfair to deal with isolated quotations.—Yet the following are intended to be fair samples of how widely the reasoning of the book varies from our commonplace but actual knowledge of men and events.

The author seems to consider that politics (or the system of government) before 1900 were not concerned with economics. "Man's destiny today is economic. The spirit of our times must find expression in economic institutions. No matter how faulty, how inadequate the channels of expression may be, it is useless to seek to compress the spirit of our age within the bounds of politics." (p. 235). How can a citizen of this country, conceived in an economic war, preserved by another, with protective tariffs, trust-busting, and other national election issues, consider government or politics except as economics and an economic institution.

The author implies that labor unions brought about the anti-trust laws. "The American Federation of Labour in time not only became the most important national labor body, but through its affiliation with international unions the working classes in America gained a self-conscious realization of class solidarity that in principle transcended the boundaries of the state. Its more immediate purpose was to check the growth of the concentration of capital that was beginning to take place. The anti-trust legislation enacted testifies to the measure of success achieved in the political field." (p. 60.) Let us analyze these statements—laboring classes—self conscious—class solidarity—purpose to check concentration of capital—anti-trust legislation the measure of success. Is any one of these ideas correct? Is anyone of these implications generally admitted? Take the conclusion that labor unions caused anti-trust legislation, think of the big-

gest trusts, Standard Oil, United States Steel—is or was labor against them? The answer to every one of these questions is no, with qualifications perhaps, but from ordinary common knowledge of ordinary common people the answer is no. What did break the trusts? Not labor which found advantages in dealing with centralized control but business men, especially the small merchants and manufacturers who objected to being squeezed out.

Who won the war? Here is a new light on this old question. "The war was thus in the first instance a struggle between the two opposed systems: organization versus individualism. In the contest victory in the end rested with those who were able to apply the best type of organization. The Germans erred in believing that they had a monopoly in this field. They failed to recognize that the time was ripe for the universal adoption of methods of organization." (p. 202.) No indication is given here as to what the best type of organization was although this best type of organization seems to be the winning factor of the war.

In all there are two hundred and seventy eight pages of hazy generalization like those quoted. Seldom if ever is any tangible basis given to prove these assertions while even the most casual reader will often find cause stated as effect and effects or results stated as causes. While the book contains passages of merit, as a whole, for military purposes, it is worthless, perhaps even misleading.

T. J. C.

THE COMMONPLACE BOOK OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: A REPERTORY OF HIS IDEAS ON GOVERNMENT

By Gilbert Chinard. 392 pages. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1926.) Library No. 923.173.

This volume makes available to the public a manuscript in the Library of Congress which may be regarded as a source book of Jefferson's ideas on government. The bulk of the commonplace book represents the notes taken by Jefferson on law, political science and religion during his formative years. Portions are believed to have been written after 1774 and not later than 1776, and the last section was compiled at a date that cannot be ascertained, but was certainly after 1781. Professor Chinard deserves all credit for the scholarly manner in which he has dealt with the manuscript, for his enlightening introduction, and for the notes that he has appended.

(Reprint of review on pp. 557-558, *American Review of Reviews*, May, 1927.)

Of general interest.

A GREATER THAN NAPOLEON—SCIPIO AFRICANUS

By Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart, British Army. 280 pages. (London: William Blackwood & Sons, Ltd., 1926.) Library No. 923.537.

The grounds on which Captain Liddell Hart, one of the most prominent of the modern school of military writers, bases Scipio's claim to a place among the greatest soldiers in history are his three-fold greatness as a general, as a man and as a statesman. As a general Scipio showed, according to Captain Liddell Hart, "a unique understanding of war in its three spheres—mental, moral and physical, and of their interplay, and successfully translated this understanding into effective action," in a manner unrivalled either by Alexander or Caesar in ancient, or by Napoleon in modern, times. His private character combined all the personal domestic virtues of the Roman with the love of civilization and culture of the Greek. He was, as an earlier biographer said, "greater than the greatest of bad men, and better than the reputed best of good men." As a statesman he raised

Rome from a mere second-rate Power to be the mistress of the whole Mediterranean world, and this he achieved not by the absorption, but by the control, of the peoples he had conquered, by the formation not of a Roman Empire, but of a Roman confederation. For him, in fact, the true end of war was a more perfect peace. These far-reaching claims Captain Liddell Hart endeavours to substantiate by an exhaustive and admirably-written narrative of Scipio's career, which, if it can hardly be said conclusively to prove the writer's claim to his hero's preeminence over Napoleon, at least serves to establish Scipio as a very great soldier and a very great man.

(Reprint of review on pp. 434-435, *The Army Quarterly*, January, 1927.)

Of general interest and of special value to the Command and G-2 Section.

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE

By M. Rostovtzeff. 631 pages. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1926.) Library No. 937.0.

In recent years, the gloomy prophecies of the fate of Western civilization have turned the attention of scholars with increasing interest to the study of the decay of nations and especially to that of the ancient Roman Empire. What was the cause of the decline of this civilization which endured for over a thousand years? Many theories have been put forward, religious, political, biological, economic, and social. None of these, singly, offers a satisfactory explanation. The truth lies in a number of causes, but to determine which is cause and which is effect is almost impossible after the lapse of centuries.

To summarize briefly the main political thesis of the book under review, the early emperors rested their power on a vigorous municipal life in the provinces where the cities were ardently loyal to the power which had brought relief from Republican exploitation, and had secured peace and prosperity throughout the world. The emperors extended the municipal system wherever they could, partly to secure an ample supply of military recruits from the urban bourgeoisie and partly to derive greater support for the administration. However, the urban aristocracy was small in proportion to the proletariat in the city and country districts. The latter class supported the bourgeoisie, and were oppressed and exploited by them. The deep-rooted antagonism between these classes was the cause of the civil war and anarchy of the third century. In that fateful period, the armies were recruited from the proletariat instead of from the upper classes. When the soldiers realized their power, they forced the emperors, nominated by them, to pursue a policy of ruthless extermination against the city bourgeoisie.

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The theory that soil-exhaustion played a part in the decline of municipal life is completely rejected by Professor Rostovtzeff. He believes that the existing remains of a few country villas and the ruins of Pompeii prove that there was no decline in the fertility of the soil. Will the excavation of country residences in Vermont a few centuries hence prove that New England farms retain their fertility? In my opinion, the evidence cited by Simkhovitch, Westermann, Heitland, and others cannot be lightly set aside in spite of Professor Rostovtzeff's dictum. It is, of course, unsafe to generalize. Soil-exhaustion is a matter of slow progress, and in some parts of the Empire the river-valleys, as in Egypt and in Northern Italy, retained their fertility longer than the uplands, but not every city was possessed of fertile lowlands, and here the exhaustion must have come much earlier. This tendency was aggravated by the lack of knowledge of scientific farming on the part of the peasant, and the fact that the farmer was forced to exploit his land in order to meet his heavy taxes.

* * * * *

Viewing the Empire as an aggregation of city-states, the author gives an excellent survey of the social, industrial, and commercial life of the cities. The most important contribution of the book is the history of the development of imperial requisitions or liturgies. At the outset, these burdens were slight and easily borne. Gradually the system was extended until the whole Empire groaned under their weight. The agricultural communities suffered most as their oxen and other beasts were continually being requisitioned for service in the imperial post. Under the double handicap of imperial liturgies and exhausted land, the peasants sought refuge in abandonment of their farms and flight. In the face of this movement, the government had no remedy except to bind the peasant to the soil. Thus the institution of serfdom was legally adopted.

In his final chapter the author gives a brief but illuminating survey of the age of Diocletian. Here he sums up and discusses some of the most important theories which have been advanced for the decline of the Empire. While Professor Rostovtzeff wisely refrains from any theory of his own, his suggestion that every civilization is doomed to decay as soon as it begins to penetrate the masses shows that he evidently shares the prevailing pessimism in regard to the fate of Western civilization.

(Extract from review on pp. 408-410, *The Yale Review*, January, 1927.)

Of general interest and of special value to the G-2 Section.

THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF THE GREEKS

By John L. Myres. 436 pages. (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1927.) Library No. 938.0.

Such reading as most of us have done on the subject of Greek politics has had to do with the institutions—the machinery of government—that the Greeks set up for themselves. In this volume of lectures on the Bennett Foundation of Wesleyan University, Professor Myres, of Oxford, goes back to the underlying ideas on which the Greek political structure was erected. The notions of authority, justice, law, and individual freedom in ancient Greece are explained.

(Reprint of review on p. 557, *American Review of Reviews*, May, 1927.)

Of value in the study of political history.

FIVE WEEKS. THE SURGE OF PUBLIC OPINION ON THE EVE OF THE GREAT WAR

By Jonathan French Scott. 305 pages. (New York: The John Day Co., 1927.) Library No. 940.310.

The five weeks that passed between the assassination at Sarajevo and the outbreak of the Great War, in 1914, suggested the title of this book. The diplomacy of that period has been carefully studied by historians of the war. Dr. Scott's purpose, however, is different. He is trying to estimate the weight of public opinion, in the five nations chiefly concerned, in bringing on the war. Editorial expressions in the newspapers, reports of parades and mobs, the fluctuation of prices, and various indications of the shifting of sentiment, are guides that help to fix national responsibility. Dr. Scott used them with telling effect. There is sustained interest in his treatment from start to finish. It is one of the "live" books about the war's causes.

(Reprint of review on p. 556, *American Review of Reviews*, May, 1927.)

Of general interest in the study of the political history of the World War; of special value to the G-2 Section.

THE LIMITATIONS OF VICTORY

By Alfred Fabre-Luce. Translation from the French. 364 pages. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1926.) Library No. 940.3121.

Here is a striking and notable book, the product of ripe scholarship, of penetrating insight into men and events, and of broad philosophic grasp of developing international relations during the years before the great war. The author lifts his discussion from the plane of politics and diplomatic manoeuvre to that of morality, testing and appraising the acts and foreign policies of the various European states by new standards, and thus has given us a distinctive, and even unique, presentation of the subject and the most satisfying treatise extant.

His ultimate purpose is to aid in averting the "general ruin, latent war, and the decline of Western civilization" (p. ii) which he believed would result from France's post-war policy. The best means of accomplishing this result, he concluded, was by an objective, scientific, and impartial study of pre-war history: for "many of our recent mistakes can be traced to false theories" concerning the origin of the war (p. 329).

That he has accomplished his purpose of adducing evidence to dispel illusions and rectify erroneous views shines forth from almost every page. His presentation of pre-war history is original and profound. He has penetrated more deeply into the causation of the war than any other historian; besides his, the most learned works, as those of Montgelas and Ewart, seem almost superficial. He has fathomed the depths of the psychology and morality underlying events and courses of development, dissecting foreign policies and exposing to the reader's eyes their hidden forces, motives, and springs of action. He contributes but little to our actual knowledge of events, but adds enormously to our understanding of their deeper meaning, of their vital and essential part in bringing on the war. He has an unequalled insight into foreign relations, the nature and implication of the two great alliances, and what their possibilities were for war or peace. His analysis of events, his syntheses and interpretations, are original and illuminating in the highest degree.

He has made a closer approach to scientific impartiality than any other writer on this subject, save perhaps Renouvin. He exposes the falsehoods, evasions, and manifold dishonesties of both German and Entente partizans. He rejects alike the theory of causation propounded by the Congress of Versailles and that formulated by Montgelas, whom he apparently considers a turncoat and propagandist, abandoning his original views concerning Germany's responsibility and now engaged in the campaign that is being waged against the Entente states (p. 211).

Though he withholds no deserved criticism of French policy, he does not by any means attempt to exonerate Germany and Austria from a large share in responsibility for the war. He summarizes as follows "the three vulnerable points of the Imperial policy in July, 1914: Austro-German complicity against Serbia; the refusal of a Conference; the initiative in declaring war" (p. 25). In judging Germany's acts he further asserts: "In 1914 Germany's challenge was really a gamble, a toss-up between peace and war, the act of a powerful nation, weary of negotiating, and trusting to luck" (p. 224). In pointing out "where Germany was really to blame," he argues that she was more militaristic than the other European states (p. 210) at a time when she might have made her influence felt on the side of peace, and "having thus failed in her role of guide, shaken peace by her vain threats, and done nothing to deprive her adversaries of the reasons for their nationalistic agitations, Germany was very ill equipped to throw on them the whole blame for the ruin caused by the war" (p. 210). The reparations he therefore considers justified on moral grounds (p. 214).

M. Fabre-Luce takes no part in that vilification of Sir Edward Grey which just now is the mode of certain circles. While admitting that Grey

was not candid in withholding from Parliament an explanation of the dangerous possibilities contained in the Franco-British engagements, he says of Grey, "There are people who, failing to appreciate his real intentions, mistook his constitutional scruples for hypocrisy, and put down his policy to a Machiavellian wish to 'allow' war to come about; we can only say that he could not have adopted any other attitude, in view of the state of public opinion" (p. 195).

Contrary to the current interpretation of pre-war events, he minimizes the importance of conflicting economic interests. They could bring about a war in the twentieth century, he argues, only when they revived questions of prestige, aroused revenge, or awakened the bitterness surviving from the past or fear of invasion (pp. 79-88, chap. III.). He is thus led to regard the antagonism between France and Germany as the pivot of European policy and the cause of that evolution in the two great combinations of powers which brought about the war (p. 123).

One charm of his book is the spirit in which it is written. Its author is always the scholar, gentle, courteous, tolerant, humane, seeking the truth, not a swashbuckling disputant, arrogant and contemptuous, aiming primarily to stain and to stigmatize an opposing group of statesmen or writers, or slashing and mangling historical evidence until it fits his purpose.

(Reprint of review on pp. 324-326, *American Historical Review*, January, 1927.)

Of general interest in the study of the World War and of special value to the G-2 Section.

THE WORLD CRISIS, 1916-1918

By The Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill, C.H., M.P. In 2 Volumes; 627 pages. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927.) Library No. 940.3122.

This work continues and completes the author's account of the World War which has already appeared under the same general title.

To some extent the work may be considered a defense of the author's doctrines and methods of waging war which have been freely criticised by many writers of high professional authority. He tells the story of his own activities and about this thread he analyses the main events of the last three years of the war, setting himself "at each stage to answer the questions 'what happened, and why?'" The ideas of the author are developed by means of documents written by him before or during the events described. There are few men who had the varied opportunities of learning about the war who have had the author's broad experience in political, military, and naval life and who write so well. After leaving the Admiralty and during the first five months covered by this work, the author commanded a battalion in the line in France. Thereafter, until July, 1917, he was in Parliament, and was also engaged in defending his conduct as First Lord of the Admiralty before the Statutory Commission of Inquiry into the Dardanelles Expedition. In July, 1917, he became Minister of Munitions in Mr. Lloyd George's administration.

The author's ideas on strategy are indicated by the following: "These volumes will leave the reader in no doubt about the opinion of their author. From first to last it is contended that once the main armies were in deadlock in France the true strategy for both sides was to attack the weaker partners in the opposite combination with the utmost speed and ample force. * * * The first German decision to attack the strongest led to her defeat at the Marne and the Yser, and left her baffled and arrested with the ever-growing might of an implacable British Empire on her hands. Thus 1914 ended. But in 1915 Germany turned to the second alternative, and her decision was attended by great success. Leaving the British and French to shatter their armies against her trench lines in France, Germany

marched and led her allies against Russia, with the result that by the autumn enormous territories had been conquered from Russia; all the Russian system of fortresses and strategic railways was in German hands, while the Russian armies were to a large extent destroyed and the Russian State grievously injured.

"The only method by which the Allies could rescue Russia was by forcing the Dardanelles. This was the only counter-stroke that could be effective. If it had succeeded it would have established direct and permanent contact between Russia and her western allies, it would have driven Turkey, or at least Turkey in Europe, out of the war, and might well have united the whole of the Balkan States, Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria and Roumania, against Austria and Germany. * * * However, the narrow and local views of British Admirals and Generals and of the French Headquarters had obstructed this indispensable manoeuvre." However, when this opportunity had passed Churchill worked loyally and intelligently to help develop the method and means which might win on the Western front. The author's views on strategy do not appear to have lessened his ability to analyze events as they occurred, and the book is not a harping on what might have been.

It is contended that the defeat of the French and British armies in the disastrous battles of Champagne and Loos proved the German front unbreakable in the West, and that until one side or the other should develop a vast superiority either in means or method no decision could be obtained. It is claimed that preponderance in man power alone, even with the help of the Americans, could not produce a decision against the perfected methods of the modern defensive, that no adequate tactical method was developed, and that only the adoption on a large scale of mechanical means, gas, tanks, airplanes, machine guns, and caterpillar transport, would furnish the preponderance which would allow the offensive to be delivered upon a wide enough front and with sufficient surprise to produce a decision. It is claimed that it was Ludendorff's offensives of 1918, and not the wearing down of the German resources by the battles of 1916 and 1917, which changed the equilibrium; Ludendorff shattered and tore his army to pieces by offensives which used improved and perfected tactical methods, but which were not provided with adequate means to overcome the defensive; this decisive shift in the equilibrium alone made the allied successes of the fall of 1918 possible. In developing this idea the author makes a very complete analysis of casualties on both sides, giving the latest corrections of the casualty lists which have been published since the war by the French, British, and German War Offices. He concludes this study with the statement: "During the whole war the Germans never lost in any phase of the fighting more than the French whom they fought, and frequently inflicted double casualties upon them. * * * The second fact which presents itself from the tables is that in all the British offensives the British casualties were never less than 3 to 2, and often nearly double the corresponding German losses. However, comparing the French and British efforts against the Germans on the Western Front, the French suffered in all the periods concerned, irrespective of the kind of operation, heavier losses than those they inflicted on the enemy: whereas while the British suffered heavier losses in all offensives, they exacted more than their own losses when attacked by the Germans."

Referring to the German decision to attack Verdun in 1916, it is stated that the true strategic objectives of Germany at that time were the Black Sea and the Caspian. * * * "But from all the prospects so opened out to her in the East Germany was lured away. The final destruction of Russia, the overawing and conversion of Roumania, the conquest of granary after granary and oilfield after oilfield, the indefinite menace to the British Empire in Asia, with consequent diversion and dissipation of British forces, were all renounced by Falkenhayn in a few meager sentences. Germany was made to concentrate her whole available offensive effort

upon the cluster of wooded hills and permanent defenses which constituted the strong fortress of Verdun. * * * From the moment when he received the news of the total evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula, the opportunity of General von Falkenhayn, Chief of the German General Staff, was to pronounce the word ROUMANIA. He pronounced instead the word VERDUN."

On the allied side, it is stated that plans for 1916 should have included a surprise attack upon the Dardanelles. * * * "Within two months of our evacuation they had withdrawn all their troops from the Gallipoli Peninsula except three divisions. * * * The British Army that might attack the deserted Peninsula lay within thirty-six hours' steaming of whatever landing places might be selected. * * * The enemy was once again off his guard, and the choice of time and place had, in this theatre at least, returned to our hands. The very barriers of inhibition that existed in the minds of the British Cabinet, and of which the enemy was clearly conscious, were the prime reason for the attempt. * * * Surprise—that sovereign talisman of War—springs from the doing of the exact thing the enemy is certain will never be tried. * * * Thus, he views the Battle of the Somme as a mistake which the events of 1915 and the attack on Verdun forced upon the British.

The following is taken from the chapter on the intervention of the United States:

"Of all the grand miscalculations of the German High Command none is more remarkable than their inability to comprehend the meaning of war with the American Union. It is perhaps the crowning example of the unwisdom of basing a war policy upon the computation of material factors alone. * * * How rash to balance the hostile exertions of the largest, if not the leading, civilized nation in the world against the chance that they would not arrive in time upon the field of battle! * * *

"There is no need to exaggerate the material assistance given by the United States to the Allies. All that could be sent was given as fast and as freely as possible, whether in manhood, in ships or in money. But the war ended long before the material power of the United States could be brought to bear as a decisive or even as a principal factor. * * *

"But if the physical power of the United States was not in fact applied in any serious degree to the beating down of Germany; if for instance only a few score thousand Germans fell by American hands; the moral consequences of the United States joining the Allies was indeed the deciding cause in the conflict. * * *

"American historians will perhaps be somewhat lengthy in explaining to posterity exactly why the United States entered the Great War on April 6, 1917, and why they did not enter at any earlier moment. American ships had been sunk before by German submarines; as many American lives were lost in the *Lusitania* as in all the five American ships whose sinking immediately preceded the declaration of war. As for the general cause of the Allies, if it was good in 1917 was it not equally good in 1914? There were plenty of reasons of high policy for staying out in 1917 after waiting so long. * * *

Step by step the President had been pursued and brought to bay. By slow merciless degrees, against his dearest hopes, against his gravest doubts, against his deepest inclinations, in stultification of all he had said and done and left undone in thirty months of carnage, he was forced to give the signal he dreaded and abhorred. Throughout he had been beneath the true dominant note of American sentiment. He had behind his policy a reasoned explanation and massive argument, and all must respect the motives of a statesman who seeks to spare his country the waste and horrors of war. But nothing can reconcile what he said after March, 1917, with the guidance he had given before. * * *

"But anyhow all was settled now. 'A drunken brawl,' 'Peace without victory,' where were these festering phrases on April 2d? Amid the clink

and clatter of a cavalry escort the President has reached the Senate. He is reading his message to Congress and to mankind. Out roll the famous periods in which the righteousness of the Allied cause was finally proclaimed."

The 1917 fall offensives of the British were not justifiable and never gave any prospect of success. Churchill at this time advised against them but Lloyd George was reluctantly won over to them by Robertson and Haig. Haig supported them from conviction but Robertson drifted into their support. Aside from hopes of decisive victory G.H.Q. was animated by two reasons: to keep up the fighting to cover up the alleged exhaustion of the French after the Nivelle offensive and to help the antisubmarine campaign by the capture of Ostend and Zeebrugge. The latter reason was a false one for which the Admiralty was responsible, because these two ports were only convenient advanced bases for submarines which could operate almost as easily from their home bases in the Elbe, the Weser and the Ems.

Summing up the Battle of Cambrai, the author says: "If the British and French war leaders had possessed * * * the vision and comprehension which is expected from the honoured chiefs of great armies, there was no reason why a battle like Cambrai could not have been fought a year before, or better still, why three or four concerted battles like Cambrai could not have been fought simultaneously in the spring of 1917. * * * Could the secret have been kept? Would not preparation on so large a scale, even behind the line, have become apparent to the enemy? To all these questions we will answer that one-tenth of the mental effort expended by the Headquarters Staff on preparing the old-fashioned offensives of which the war had consisted, one-twentieth of the influence they used to compel reluctant Governments to sanction these offensives, one-hundredth of the men lost in them, would have solved all the problems easily and overwhelmingly before the spring of 1917. As for the Germans getting to hear of it * * *—what use would they have made of their knowledge? What use did Ludendorff make of the awful disclosure, not as a mere rumour or questionable intelligence report, but of the actual operation of the Tanks in September, 1916? There is a melancholy comfort in reflecting that if the British and French commands were short-sighted, the ablest soldier in Germany was blind. In truth these high military experts all belong to the same school. * * * It has been necessary to the whole argument of this volume to dwell insistently upon these aspects of the Battle of Cambrai. Accusing as I do without exception all the great ally offensives of 1915, 1916, and 1917, as needless and wrongly conceived operations of infinite cost, I am bound to reply to the question, what else could be done? And I answer it, pointing to the Battle of Cambrai, 'This could have been done.' This in many variants, this in larger and better forms ought to have been done, and would have been done if only the Generals had not been content to fight machine-gun bullets with the breasts of gallant men, and to think that that was waging war."

The reason for holding the large reserve in England in the spring of 1918 is given as the fear of the Cabinet that the military leaders, in spite of their own convictions, would be led into further disastrous offensives. He says: "I urged that the Cabinet should send all the men that were needed to reconstitute the Army, and should at the same time forbid absolutely any resumption of the offensive. The Prime Minister however did not feel that, if the troops were once in France, he would be strong enough to resist those military pressures for an offensive which had so overborne the wiser judgment of Statesmen. He therefore held, with all his potent influence, to a different policy. He sanctioned only a moderate reinforcement of the Army, while at the same time gathering in England the largest possible number of reserves. In this way he believed he would be able alike to prevent a British offensive and to feed the armies during the whole course of the fearful year which was approaching. This was in fact achieved. But

I held, and hold still, that the War Cabinet should have been resolute, as I believe it would have been found strong enough at once to support and to restrain the High Command in France."

Referring to General Pershing's offer of all his resources to Foch on March 28 the author says: "But the decision which the emergency President Wilson took to remedy the consequences of previous long delay involved personal deprivations of a peculiar kind for the soldiers of the United States. To serve in one's national army, under one's own leaders, amid a great mass of men animated by a common spirit is one ordeal. To serve in isolated divisions or brigades or even regiments under the orders of foreign Generals, flanked on either side by troops of different race and language and of unknown comradeship or quality, is another. * * * But in the dire need of the great struggle and in a loyal desire to share the tribulations of their allies, American soldiers by scores of thousands readily obeyed orders from their Government to serve, albeit under the general supervision of Pershing, as isolated companies or even platoons in British or French units in order that the largest number might come under the fire of the enemy at an earlier period."

Referring to the German collapse in 1918, the author offers the opinion that by initiating a withdrawal to her frontiers immediately after her defeat in the Battle of Montdidier in August, Germany could have obtained a peace of negotiation without having to place herself in the appalling position of yielding to the discretion of her enemies. But this last chance was lost because the German Headquarters could not make up its mind to face the consequences of such an action.

Speaking of the German strategical situation after the Battle of Montdidier, he says: "A British advance against the enemy's front, Cambrai-St. Quentin, in the direction of Maubeuge would if successful compromise and compel the early retreat of all the hostile armies deployed with the Ardennes at their back between Maubeuge and Verdun. * * * Marshal Foch independently from his higher standpoint held of course the same view; and it fell to him to concert the whole immense operation. He had however at General Pershing's desire lent himself reluctantly to an American advance upon Metz and into the Saar Valley, if the St. Mihiel attack succeeded. This was an irrelevant and divergent feature. If the British Army was to undertake the tremendous task of smashing through the Hindenburg Line and advancing upon Maubeuge, it was imperative that all other operations should aim at the vital point and contribute to the supreme result. Haig therefore at the end of August urged Foch to alter the American offensive from a divergent to a convergent direction, i.e., from east to northwest, and towards Mezières instead of towards Metz. Foch entirely agreed, and after further conferences with Pershing obtained his assent to the change of plan."

This book is valuable for orientation upon the broad conduct of the war and upon the interdependence of the various Allied efforts. It is of considerable importance as a study of the relationship between commanders in the field and high executive officials and of the control by the latter of military operations.

It is of considerable value to all sections.

P. V. K.

April-June, 1927

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY DURING THE WAR. FROM THE BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES TO THE FALL OF THE MONARCHY, AUG. 1914 TO NOV. 1918. (L'AUTRICHE ET LA HONGRIE PENDANT LA GUERRE, DEPUIS LE DÉBUT DES HOSTILITÉS JUSQU'À LA CHUTE DE LA MONARCHIE, AOÛT 1914-NOVEMBRE 1918)

By Bertrand Auerbach, Dean of the Faculty of Letters at Nancy, France. French text, 604 pages. (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1925.) Library No. 940.3132.

This is a most interesting and complete summary of the history of the Austro-Hungarian Empire from the opening of hostilities until the fall of the monarchy. Practically every book of importance on the subject seems to have been consulted. Besides the bibliography, there is an index of persons mentioned, with a brief description, e.g. *Erdödy (Comte) officer d'ordonnance de l'Empereur Charles*, which will be invaluable to students.

The author considers that the collapse of Austro-Hungary is explained, by its internal difficulties, the perennial struggle between Germanism Magyarism, and the -isms of the seventeen nationalities composing the old Empire, quenched in 1914 for a moment by the general animosity against Serbia. The Army and its commanders, and the various campaigns and the relations of the German and Austro-Hungarian staffs are described, but three-quarters of the 620 pages are devoted to events after the death of Franz-Joseph: interior politics, the dismissal of Conrad von Hötzendorf, Seidler's ministries, Czernin as Minister of Foreign Affairs, the preliminaries of the divorce of Austria and Hungary, the Polish question, the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bukarest; the food crisis, the Princes of Parma scandal; the scheme to obtain a separate peace, the Imperial manifesto, the end of dualism and the advent of personal union, and the military collapse.

It is a pitiful story of the downfall of an Empire until 1914 always friendly to the British Empire, but which got into bad company and was made a tool of.

(Reprint of review on pp. 413-414, *The Army Quarterly*, January, 1927.) Of general interest and of special value to the G-2 Section.

**ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR.—
EXPERIMENTS IN STATE CONTROL**

By E. M. H. Lloyd. 460 pages. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1924.) Library No. 940.322.

This is a monograph of the British Series of the Economic and Social History of the World War prepared under the direction of the Division of Economics and History of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The work as a whole was described and its very great value noted in R.C.M.W. No. 23.

This volume after a short but interesting account of British army supply in past wars describes the conditions of British army supply in 1914 at the outbreak of war. The confusion and waste arising from the practice of competitive bidding and the various steps taken by the government from regulation to complete control of the production and distribution of various articles such as jute, linen, wool, and leather are clearly described.

The manner in which private industries were utilized in the national service without destroying their identity is of considerable interest.

Of general interest to the G-4 Section and of special interest to officers having to do with supply in any other than its purely military application.

T. J. V. N.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR.—TRADE UNIONISM AND MUNITIONS

By G. D. H. Cole. 251 pages. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1923.) Library No. 940.322.

This is a monograph of the British Series of the Economic and Social History of the World War prepared under the direction of the Division of Economics and History of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The work as a whole was described and its great value noted in R.C.M.W. No. 23.

The Trade Unions of Great Britain which developed during the industrialization of the country in the hundred years preceding the World War had under the pressure of circumstances developed regulations for the conduct of its members which limited their labor and their output. This condition arose from two causes; on the one hand to prevent exploitation by unscrupulous employers, on the other hand to provide jobs for the ever increasing number of workmen.

In addition regulations were very strict as to the nature of work that could be performed by the members of the various Trade Unions and the manner in which it should be performed.

When the very complicated peace time industrial machinery was thrown out of gear by the war and enormous emergency production of munitions became necessary, a serious problem arose. While the needs of the country were great the Trade Unions did not feel disposed to sacrifice the advantages they had gained in a hundred years of struggle without compensation. By a series of very skilful temporary adjustments and compromises a balance was maintained between the employers and the Trade Unions and the necessary munitions were produced.

That no final or even partly permanent solution was reached was shown by the tremendous industrial conflicts which have convulsed Great Britain since the war.

Of great general interest but of little special interest to officers at these schools.

T. J. V. N.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR.—FOOD PRODUCTION IN WAR

By Thomas Hudson Middleton, K.B.E., C.B., LL.D., Deputy Director-General, Food Production Department. 373 pages. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1923.) Library No. 940.332.

This is a monograph of the British Series of the Economic and Social History of the World War prepared under the direction of the Division of Economics and History of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The work as a whole was described and its very great value noted in R.C.M.W. No. 23.

During the Napoleonic Wars Great Britain had been able to supply the major part of her food requirements by home production. In the century that elapsed between Waterloo and the outbreak of the World War in 1914 the growth of population and the progressive industrialization of the country had made it necessary to depend for a constantly increasing proportion of necessities on importation for supply.

Foreign competition had made grain production unprofitable and what remained of food production instead of being diversified as it had been originally had taken on special forms for the special markets created in a very wealthy country under peace conditions.

Before the war it was seen that steps would have to be taken to increase food production and to direct it and plans accordingly were made.

April-June, 1927

As in the industrial field, use had to be made of the existing economic machinery which had been developed by private owners in peace time.

Government control was first operated by advice and assistance and then, as the need became greater, through the failure of shipping by increasing government regulation.

At the close of the war it became necessary to solve another problem. Foreign competition was resumed and home food production again became too expensive. Government control was relaxed but the farmers had to be aided in the period of transformation to a peace basis.

Of general interest only to officers at these schools.

T. J. V. N.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR.—LABOUR SUPPLY AND REGULATION

By Humbert Wolfe. 417 pages. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1923.) Library No. 940.332.

This is a monograph of the British Series of the Economic and Social History of the World War prepared under the direction of the Division of Economics and History of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

This work was described and its value noted in the R.C.M.W. No. 23.

When a State is compelled to throw the whole of its resources into the conduct of a war, the problem of man power becomes of first importance. The effort that can be exerted by any State is automatically restricted or extended; first by the number of men and women available either for the services in the field or at home, and secondly by the use, ordered or disordered, that is made of those resources.

The State must dispose its man power so as to serve all the four following needs simultaneously and as fully as possible:

1. A sufficient supply of men, of the prescribed military age, physically fit for war, must be provided to supply and replenish the armed forces.
2. The larger the combatant forces the greater will be the number of men and women required at home to equip, clothe, and feed the armed forces.
3. While the normal ranks of industry will be heavily drained for these two purposes, it will be imperative to provide the labor which will guarantee the provision of the necessities for the civilian population, *i.e.*, food, heat, light, clothes, transport, etc.
4. Finally, as the war continues, the strain on the financial resources and particularly on the international credit of an industrial nation dependent on manufacture and export for its support will grow heavier, and it will therefore be necessary to provide labour to keep the export trades of the country working at the highest point compatible with the fulfillment of the first three calls.

In the case of the United Kingdom 5,500,000 men were called to the colors out of an estimated total male population of 14,350,000.

It can be seen what a tremendous strain was thrown on the remaining population to fulfill the other three needs and how difficult the duty of the Government was in disposing it for the task. The problem was further complicated by the interruption through the vicissitudes of war of the normal sources of supply of raw material, manufactured goods, and above all, of food, and the nation was required to provide substitutes as far as practicable from its own resources.

This book is an account of the way in which the solution to the problem was achieved.

For the ideal solution to this problem there was needed a central State machine, fully equipped with experience, exact knowledge, and power.

No such machine existed in the United Kingdom at the outbreak of war. On the contrary, five different departments handled labour policy and recruiting.

Gradually under the needs of the situation an authority, never fully equipped and approximating only very distantly the ideal machine, grew through various stages until it took final form in August, 1917, in the Ministry of National Service.

This book contains a tremendous lesson in government for the reader who has time to reflect and experience enough to understand.

Of great general value to all officers.

T. J. V. N.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR.—THE BRITISH COAL MINING INDUSTRY DURING THE WAR

By Sir R. A. S. Redmayne, K.C.B., M.Sc. 341 pages. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1923.) Library No: 940.3222.

This volume is another of the excellent monographs prepared for the British Editorial Board of the Division of Economics and History of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The work undertaken by the Division of Economics and History of preparing an Economic and Social History of the World War is explained in the issue of the R.C.M.W. for October-December, 1926, and its very great value noted. (R.C.M.W. No. 23. Page 74.)

The object of this monograph is to give a clear and concise account of the coal mining industry of the United Kingdom during the period covered by the Great War and up to the termination of government control and the settlement following the national strike of the miners in 1921.

The present day, industrialized civilization of Great Britain is based on the development of steam power permitted by an extensive supply of coal.

Of fairly recent years the export of coal has been an important factor in maintaining the balance of British trade. The manufactured material exported from Great Britain had little bulk compared to the raw material and food stuffs imported. To remedy this, markets for coal were developed throughout the world and coal was mined in large quantity for export.

The mines themselves had been exploited over centuries and were operated under widely differing conditions as to land tenure, labor, and mechanical developments. In addition a very powerful and autocratic miners union existed.

The war, by drawing a portion of the labor into the armies, by closing former markets and opening new ones, and by making the mining of coal vitally important for munition production, completely threw out of gear the very delicate and very complicated machinery of the coal industry.

In addition producers and labor unions, realizing how indispensable their industry had become, were inclined to take advantage of their position.

It was necessary for the government step in, first with a certain measure of control, largely advisory, later with a tight grip on the industry.

The problems met and solved, at least temporarily, or avoided entirely were special and of interest to Great Britain and their discussion is beyond the scope of this review.

The book is of great interest to all officers who have to consider industrial and governmental problems in connection with purely military matters.

T. J. V. N.

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918. (DER WELTKRIEG, 1914-1918)

By Col. Gudmund Schnitler, Gen. Staff, Norwegian Army. 229 pages. (Berlin: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1927.) Library No. 940.3451481.

This work by Colonel Schnitler who during the war was Norwegian Military Attaché with the German and Austro-Hungarian Armies and is now an instructor at the Staff College, Oslo—is a particularly accurate and important summary of the war. It forms 227 closely printed pages. The author does not discuss the causes of the outbreak of hostilities, but confines himself to the operations and the moral and economic state of the Central Powers, as he saw it, only occasionally making a criticism or expressing an opinion.

A few of his phrases will be extracted. The following is his view of the final stage of the battle of the Marne:

"The situation of the German First Army (however favorable it might be as regards Maunoury) was, however, highly dependent on what was happening farther east on the Marne. Kluck received information that the German positions there were heavily threatened, that the German Second Army was compelled by Franchet d'Espérey's attack to withdraw its right flank towards the Marne, and that British troops had crossed the Marne during the morning, and had arrived in rear of the German First Army. General von Kluck had now to withdraw his left flank somewhat, and send a division eastward against the British. It was, however, too late to stop them. The British streamed over the Marne with ever-increasing forces. * * * With pride can the French and British Armies and their leaders look back on all they accomplished. After weeks of retreating, with true Gallic bravery and with British fearlessness, they had found the strength and courage once more to advance to the attack. The German offensive in the West had failed. No illusion could hide this fact, although the German Armies stood deep in the enemy's land."

Of the Somme he says:

"If the battle of the Somme in the tactical and strategic sense had no direct importance, its consequences, nevertheless, were great, particularly in the moral aspect. It gave the Western Powers confidence. Their Armies had accomplished in common an achievement that gave good promise for the future. The confidence of the German troops in victory was no longer so great as before. * * * The old, steadfast, highly-trained body of the German Army, particularly in the infantry, had, for the most part, also disappeared. A great part of the best, most experienced and most reliable officers and men were absent from their places. Within the German Army a remarkable decrease of moral force had shown itself. This was all the more the case, as the heavy losses had made it necessary to send to the front a great number of young soldiers, whose training was defective."

The author appears to think that the high wages of workers in Germany as compared with the pay of the soldiers—maintained contrary to the wishes of Hindenburg, who proposed to conscript everybody and pay all alike—was the cause of the beginning of the break-up of Germany. The arrival of prisoners released from Russia, after the peace of Brest-Litovsk, their discontent at being again sent to the front, and the Bolshevik doctrine which they had absorbed was the next most important factor.

As regard the Passchendaele campaign, Colonel Schnitler says that it almost brought about a crisis for the Central Powers, and was a most severe test of the German power of resistance.

At Cambrai, the Germans thought that the British power of attack was, at least temporarily, exhausted. The garrison of the German front was comparatively weak and without reserves (until the 107th Division arrived from Russia, detraining two days before the battle); for the Supreme Command expected to have time to bring up reinforcements during the usual long artillery bombardment before an attack.

The state of the German Army in July, 1918, is depicted: Attrition, so often derided as an operation of war, had achieved its purpose. As the author says, once the Germans had failed in their first knock-out blow at the Marne, "all depended on holding out," and in this they broke down:

"Since April the power of the German Army had steadily fallen. In particular, there was a shortage of infantry. The Recruit Contingent 1899 was already used up, and the Supreme Command did not dare employ that of 1900 (boys of 16). The most important reinforcement of the Army consisted of the convalescents reported fit for duty, about 60,000 men a month, a number altogether insufficient to replace the great losses. There was nothing else to do, but to give the divisions shorter fronts, and, in addition, to disband some divisions. In August, ten, at the beginning of October, twenty-two, divisions were broken up. The troops got fewer rest-days. They were thrown without pause from one fight into another. The superiority of the *Entente* became more and more oppressive, and made greater demands on the German front. Greater and greater exertions were required of the German troops. The German Army had no longer the credit balance of power, indispensable for attack."

As for Germany's Allies, even in March, 1918, "they had for some time been holding on only in hope of a German victory." In the end, in October, the German leaders decided not to carry out a great retreat, because "it would have had a depressing effect on the Army and the nation"; and, further, such a retreat would have had an unfavourable effect on the peace negotiations which the Germans were trying to bring about at this time." Thus Ludendorff fell between two stools.

There are unfortunately only two small sketch maps, of the Eastern and Western theaters, in the volume.

(Reprint of review on pp. 165-7, *The Army Quarterly*, April, 1927.)

Of general interest and of special value to the Command and G-2 Sections.

THE MOST IMPORTANT MILITARY AND POLITICAL EVENTS OF THE WORLD WAR. A LECTURE. (DAS MILITÄRISCH UND POLITISCH WICHTIGSTE VOM WELTKRIEGE. VORTRAG)

By Lieut. General Otto von Moser, German Army. 62 pages. (Stuttgart: Chr. Belser, 1927.) Library No. 910.345.

This lecture of sixty-two printed pages must have taken over three hours to deliver, but it is an extraordinary clever epitome of the main factors, and could hardly have been made shorter.

He begins by examining the various reasons advanced for the loss of the war: (1) The battle of the Marne; to this he replies that General Joffre had lost the battle of the Frontiers, the Russians lost Tannenberg, without losing the war, and the Germans won many a great battle after the Marne. (2) Verdun; but the Allies failed in many great offensives. (3) The collapse of Germany's Allies; but did not the Serbians, Rumanians and Russians also collapse? (4) The stab in the back; can it be said that the Germans were victorious in 1918? Did the stab in the back begin the defeat? Was not the Socialist action more of the nature of slow poisoning?

He argues that the causes of the great disaster were rather insufficient preparations for a great war; lack of cooperation between the Government and the Reichstag; the failure of both home and foreign diplomacy; and the lack of a leader of genius, neither Moltke, nor Falkenhayn, nor Ludendorff-Hindenburg, in his opinion, reaching that level. Later, he states that Ludendorff was only a "battle-captain," but he considers Conrad von Hötendorf a really great commander, hampered by only having an imperfect instrument in the Austro-Hungarian Army.

There are many complimentary remarks in reference to the British Army. It ought to have been completely destroyed before it could develop into a million-army:

"As a field of young corn, struck by a hailstorm, never ripens to bear fruit, so should the British Army have been overwhelmed in 1915 by a flood of hail and battles, strengthened in its frightfulness by the just hate of the British which filled every German heart."

In 1917 and later he states that the Supreme Command "threw against the British all that the Western Armies still possessed of good divisions." The exit of Mr. Asquith from power he thinks was as dangerous a blow to the Central Powers as the death of the Emperor Franz-Joseph.

In 1916 he considers that the German Western Armies "were bled white in a far higher degree than the French in the six-month soul and body destroying battles against fortified positions in the hell of Verdun." The unexampled drum-fire, numerical and material superiority of the Allies at the fearful battle of the Somme did the rest.

The year 1917 was not the success that it looked. The U-Boats did not stop the arrival of the Americans, the Eastern Armies were useless for fighting in the West, the Western Armies, "tired to the bones and their nerves deeply shattered," and political troubles at home were beginning. But it was the last chance of success, as Cambrai and Caporetto gave opportunities.

German diplomacy completely failed; the three Chancellors were merely painstaking officials. In 1918 no one insisted on Belgium being given up as a road to peace.

In 1918 the Germans were not fit to fight a defensive battle; an offensive was the last chance. And it was rightly made against the British, "since 1917 not only politically but militarily the most obstinate and most dangerous of Germany's enemies." He ascribes the failure to Ludendorff's lack of genius, not to the possession of genius by the generals of the *Entente*.

All hope of a reasonable ending to the war disappeared when Ludendorff demanded an armistice and the Chancellor failed to rouse the people to resistance. The Kaiser was not equal to his task, and in 1918 was as good as thrust aside. President Wilson is described as a super-Shylock.

If Germany is to rise again—and a nation of sixty millions cannot be repressed—she must away with political and social strife, and return to the virtues of pre-war days with the old German and the war-German Army as a model.

(Reprint of review on pp. 401-403, *The Army Quarterly*, January, 1927.)

Of general interest in the study of the World War and of special value to the Command and G-2 Sections.

AIR SERVICE, AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, 1918

By Lieut. Colonel H. A. Toulmin, Jr., A.E.F. 388 pages. (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1927.) Library No. 940.36164.

In this volume, Colonel Toulmin has undertaken to give a comprehensive history of the activities of the air service with the A.E.F. Colonel Toulmin was Chief of the Coordination Staff of the A.E.F. and so was strategically located to observe the many phases of activity connected with the formation of the air force. He begins his book with a general discussion of the functions of an air service. One is inclined to feel that this part of his work was not very well done. For example: such statements as "it is almost axiomatic that success in modern warfare depends on the success of the artillery" will scarcely be agreed to by most military students. ■■■

He then proceeds to give a conception of the geographical problem and of the general situation surrounding the formation of the air service. This phase of the work also has been much better covered by other writers.

Colonel Toulmin, however, has set down information of the utmost value in the succeeding chapters of his book. He speaks with almost painful frankness and does not hesitate to put blame where he thinks it is deserved. Considering that the air service was so new a thing and there was so little precedent to go by, it is perhaps excusable that so much disorganization existed in the early phase of the war. However, there is a very valuable lesson to be learned from our numerous failures, and these Colonel Toulmin has pointed out.

He then proceeds to describe in minute detail the organization of the various divisions which constituted the air service. This part of his book is of particular value. It should certainly be read by every senior officer of the Air Corps as well as by officers of other branches of the service who are ever apt to be called upon to deal with the staffs of larger units. Colonel Toulmin is particularly bitter—and one feels deservedly so—at the general attitude of boasting which characterized the beginning of the aircraft program and the meager results that were actually accomplished. He correctly points out that, while the Germans by no means took these boastings at their face value they nevertheless prepared for a much larger effort than the Americans were ever able to make in the air, this attitude was a direct help to the enemy.

The book terminates with a description of the military operations in the A.E.F., which consists very largely of quotations and charts taken from official records.

This is not an easy book to read but it is believed that it would well repay all officers who expect to serve on the general staff.

W. C. S.

THE BRIDGE TO FRANCE

By Edward N. Hurley. 334 pages. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1927.) Library No. 940.36169.

A somewhat biased account of the achievements of the Shipping Board and the Emergency Fleet Corporation, written by the man who was the Chairman of the first and President of the second.

The book is non-technical and should be of interest to all army officers who ever expect to have anything to do with organizing an over-seas expedition, since it emphasizes the importance of shipping and the difficulty of obtaining it.

The importance of cooperation, the necessity of clearly defining responsibility, and for giving to the responsible heads the necessary authority is brought out very forcefully.

The book is marred by too many references to individuals. There is an apparent attempt to enumerate all of the personages of the world and show that the author was on intimate footing with all of them. The index contains nothing but the names of the persons whom the author mentions.

Of general value.

E. S. H.

THE EASTERN RAILWAYS IN THE GREAT WAR 1914-1918. (LES CHEMINS DE FER DE L'EST ET LA GUERRE DE 1914-1918)

By A. Marchand, Inspector General, Eastern Railway Co., France. 601 pages. (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1924.) Library No. 940.362124.

This is a study of the work of the French Eastern Railway during the World War. However, its very nature precludes a strict limitation of the text to this one railroad. The result obtained is a very good discussion of many of the major problems of handling railroads in war.

The author has laid down some fine deductions on the proper relation between the military and the technical railroad officials. While written from the viewpoint of a civilian technical official, they are sound and worthy of study by any one interested in the control of railroads from the national or G.H.Q. viewpoint.

The text is divided into six books covering:

I. This book covers the concentration in 1917. This contains an interesting study of the concentration from a railroad official's viewpoint.

II. This book contains a general discussion of the relation of the railroad to the army.

Chapter I of this book contains a very interesting discussion of the Regulation Station, with particular reference to the various regulating stations of this system. This is the most valuable part of the work. Of particular interest to students of the American part in the war is the history of the Is-sur-Tille Regulating station (see page 112).

Chapters II and III are devoted to the subjects of supply and medical evacuations respectively.

III. A book on troop transportations performed. It is divided into a discussion of the movements in the nature of strategic maneuvers and a chapter on the handling of men on leave. It is interesting to note that this subject of leave trains was considered worthy of a special chapter in this book.

IV. This book is devoted to a discussion of the problems of handling the American effort, and contains an analysis of the American mental attitude not entirely complimentary.

It is particularly interesting to note that the author does not minimize the American effort.

V. This book takes up the major operations of the war as they affected the railroad and discusses them under the headings: offensive; defensive; and operation in 1918.

VI. This book is a general summary of the operations of the Eastern Railway during the war.

The chapters are devoted to the following subjects:

Chapter I. Chronological synopsis of the Eastern Railway activities during the war.

Chapter II. Commercial and military traffic.

Chapter III. Military construction work.

Chapter IV. Tracks and rolling stock available.

Chapter V. Finances.

Chapter VI. Organization of the Military Railway Service in the zone of the armies. (This chapter could well be read first by a student not familiar with the subject.)

Chapter VII. After the Armistice.

It is noted that the author ends each major discussion with a set of observations or conclusions which contain the meat of the book and any person desiring to learn the lessons taught by this book can obtain most of them by reading these special parts.

Of special value to the G-4 Section.

J. G. O.

**OPERATIONS OF THE XXI ARMY CORPS, 1 AUGUST TO 13
SEPTEMBER, 1914. (OPERATIONS DU 21^E CORPS D'ARMÉE,
1^{ER} AOÛT-13 SEPTEMBRE 1914)**

By General Legrand-Girarde, French Army. 205 pages with maps.
(Paris: Plon-Nourrit & Co., 1922.) Library No. 940.362154.

This book was evidently written by the author as a justification of his actions in command of the XXI Corps over this period in order to show that he was unjustly relieved and made the scapegoat for the mistakes of his superiors.

It deals with the operations of this corps as a covering force in the Vosges sector, 31st July-10 August, including its incorporation into the First Army, its operations in the valley of the Bruche; its advance into Alsace and the Battle of St. Blaise, 14 August; the Battle of Sarrebourg and the retreat to the Meurthe, 19-25 August; its operations on the left bank of the Meurthe, 26 August-2 September; its operations in Champagne; the Battle of the Marne, 7-11 September; and the pursuit on the 11-13 September to Souain where, in the latter date, General Girarde was relieved from command of the corps.

The narrative is based on personal impressions, quotations from general officers, both French and German, and contains many of the field orders issued by the XXI Corps during this period. It deals only with the operations of the corps and does not discuss, except incidentally, those of the armies of which it formed a part.

The book is of interest only in connection with the detailed operations of the French XXI Army Corps.

J. H. S.

**RECORD OF THE 4TH ROYAL IRISH DRAGOON GUARDS IN THE
GREAT WAR, 1914-1918**

By the Rev. Harold Gibb, Lieut. 4th R.I. Dragoon Guards. 75 pages.
(Canterbury, 1925.) Library No. 940.3622622.

According to the author, the 4th Dragoon Guards, as a part of the British 2nd Cavalry Brigade, was the first British unit to gain contact with the enemy on August 22, 1914, near Casteau, thus firing the first shot of the British Army in the World War.

The regiment participated in the Battle of Mons and the Retreat on Paris, being actually in contact with von Kluck's advance guard at the culminating point of the latter's westward drive.

The subsequent experiences of this regiment are in the main common to most of the other cavalry units on the Western Front.

(For detailed review see pp. 142-144, *British Cavalry Journal*, January, 1927.)

Of general interest in connection with the study of the advance of the First German Army in 1914; of special value to the Cavalry Subsection.

A. B.

**FOUR YEARS AT AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
(QUATRE ANS AU G.Q.G. AUSTRO-HONGROIS)**

By General A. von Cramon, German Army. French text, translation from the German into French. 324 pages. (Paris: Payot & Cie, 1922.) Library No. 940.363230.

The author of this book commenced the war in 1914 as Chief of Staff of the VIII Corps in the right wing of the Fourth German Army under the Grand Duke of Würtemberg. He continued with this corps in the advance through Luxemburg, the Battle of the Marne, the retreat behind the Aisne,

and thereafter until October, 1914. For some years prior to 1914, von Cramon had been head of the section of the German General Staff relating to Austrian affairs. He was therefore selected in January, 1915, as German plenipotentiary representing the German General Headquarters at the Austro-Hungarian Headquarters. In this position von Cramon was well acquainted with Austrian operations from February, 1915, until the end of the War. Certain phases of the operations in this period are considered at some length in this book, viz., the 1915 campaign against Russia, the 1917 and 1918 campaigns against Italy, and, to a lesser extent, the operations against Serbia in 1916 and the Roumanian campaign in 1916.

However, it is not from the purely military viewpoint that this book derives its greatest interest, but rather from the rather vivid play of personalities to be found in the discussion of Conrad, Falkenhayn, von Erz, Ludendorff, Francis Joseph, the young Emperor Charles, and the Austrian officials surrounding the young emperor. These men are discussed from two viewpoints, one purely personal and the other as military men, in their relations to the events in which they took part.

For example, the attempt to secure unity of command for the armies of the Central Powers appears to have been no less easy for them to attain than it was later for the allies, and this was largely because of a conflict of the personalities of Conrad and Falkenhayn. Even after unity of command was finally secured, Austrian cooperation was difficult to secure, largely because of interference by the young Emperor's wife at critical times.

Naturally the book covers a multitude of subjects and not all are equally important. Some of them are simply described as having arisen. Many of them are political rather than military, but under the German and Austrian systems they became questions for the military to deal with. For example, Austria by the end of 1915 was apparently convinced that she must have peace with Russia before the end of another year and had determined to cede Galicia to Russia and give her a free hand at Constantinople and with Serbia. Later this changed as the military situation changed and merged into the Polish question. Finally Poland was declared autonomous, but Germany and Austria could not determine the new frontiers of Poland nor yet the portions over which each should exercise predominant control. This continued until Russia fell, and even during the negotiation of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk there was no agreement between either on the Polish question or in what should be demanded of Russia. As a result the treaty imposed was not satisfactory to the Austrians.

As a source of general information and sidelights on Austria and the causes of her military failures during the war, the book is invaluable.

Of particular value to the G-2 Section.

H. H. S.

THE EUROPEAN WAR. STRATEGICAL INTRODUCTION. (LA GUERRE EUROPÉENNE. AVANT-PROPOS STRATÉGIQUES)

By Colonel F. Feyler, Swiss Army. French text, 333 pages. (Lusanne: Payot & Cie, 1915.) Library No. 940.372.

This work is the development of studies published during the war from day to day in the *Journal de Geneve*.

The author does not claim it to be history for he admits that he has no documents on which to base his facts.

It is an attempt to sum up the events of the World War to include the spring of 1915, to interpret their meaning and to speculate on the future outcome.

It has no value whatever as military history and only a very slight value to the general historian.

Much better secondary works based on authentic documents are now available.

T. J. V. N.

PROBLEMS IN STRATEGY DRAWN FROM THE WORLD WAR.

THE PROBLEM OF THE WAR. (PROBLÈMES DE STRATÉGIE
TIRÉS DE LA GUERRE EUROPÉENNE. LE PROBLÈME DE
LA GUERRE)

By Colonel F. Feyler, Swiss Army. French text, 279 pages. (Paris: Payot & Cie, 1918.) Library No. 940.372.

This book attempts to discuss the strategic problems which arose during the Great War. The author states very justly that it is necessary to understand the intentions and the war aims of the contending parties before passing judgement on the purely military operations.

It is believed, however, that the author has been a little too ambitious in his choice of a subject for the period (1918) in which he wrote.

At this time practically no reliable source material was available. The Allied source material was necessarily a war secret and that of the Central Powers was equally unavailable for research.

Even the material published by the Bolsheviki in 1917 did not appear in France until after the war and no mention is made of it.

The German war aims, for which no reliable source material could possibly have been at hand, are discussed at great length and definite values are assigned to them for the solution of the problem the author sets himself.

It is not believed that this book has any value at all that would repay the time spent on its perusal. Many more authoritative works have been published since the war.

Of no value to officers or to these schools.

T. J. V. N.

WITH CLAUSEWITZ THROUGH THE PROBLEMS, QUESTIONS,
ERRORS, AND COMPLICATIONS OF THE WORLD WAR. (MIT
CLAUSEWITZ DURCH DIE RÄTSEL UND FRAGEN, IRRUGEN
UND WIRRUNGEN DES WELTKRIEGES)

By Major-General Leinveber, German Army, Ret. 236 pages. (Berlin: B. Behrs Verlag, 1926.) Library No. 940.37243.

The title of this book is not attractive, but the matter in it is thoroughly worthy of study. It is a commentary from the point of view of the philosophy of Clausewitz on the operations described in the first volume of the German official account of the war. Its gist is that Germany went forth to battle, but not to war, and put greater value on troops than on a commander-in-chief, and that the official account fails equally by describing battles, not war. The World War was waged as if the times were still those of 1870-1871: "a modern warship is not, however, steered by the means that sufficed for a sailing ship." Moltke's principal assistant in the conduct of operations was the Quartermaster-General von Stein:

"overburdened with administrative details, he devoted as the war went on less and less time to his proper work. * * * The chief adviser, therefore, in the first months of the war was incontestably the head of the Operations Section, a lieutenant-colonel (Tappen), and his section was so poorly staffed that it had not even the necessary liaison officers to keep communication with the Armies."

The plan of campaign was drawn up as a military scheme, and carried out without the slightest reference to politics. Great Britain was forced into the war, and then, although she was the heart of the Coalition, no attempt was made to knock her out before she was ready or at least to smash her army and cut it off from home. The author hints that throughout the

war and now in the official account endeavour was and is being made to minimize the effect of the share taken in the fighting by the British with the definite purpose of creating a breach between the Empire and France.

Schlieffen's idea of another Cannae was merely a "misleading will-o'-the-wisp" for his successor Moltke. Hannibal's victory was achieved over "an unintelligent amateur, who, urged by mad ambition, puffed up with vanity, and blinded by love of glory, simply threw himself on his skilful antagonist and walked into his trap."

Such conditions could hardly be expected to recur.

General Leinveber discusses the battles of Mons and Le Cateau, giving them a prominence hitherto quite unknown in German writings.

We will translate portions of his text:

"Decisive annihilation (of the B.E.F.) at the first battle ought to have been the objective, and the last breath of horse and man expended on it. But the collection of information as regards the British entirely broke down here at the decisive point. If it had not been for an extraordinary piece of good luck which placed a Belgian newspaper in the hands of First Army (Kluck) on the 20th of August, which quoted the official London report of the successful landing of the B.E.F. in France, the headquarters of the First Army would have heard hardly anything of the British troops before the 22nd of August, the eve of the battle of Mons. * * * Where are the British? Are they here or where? Where is their left flank? Two corps and five cavalry brigades cannot make themselves invisible day in and day out. Meantime, the British Commander was excellently informed of the German advance and the German forces. Only on the night of the 22nd-23rd of August was the picture somewhat clearer for the Germans. British troops had been identified on the Canal du Centre and in Maubeuge. But even then the commander of the First Army thought his task was to march echeloned right and left ready to turn when his adversary appeared. * * * With this expenditure of force (4½ divisions) Britain had entirely destroyed the watered-down Schlieffen plan. This little flock of British—the First Army certainly took them to be at the peace strength of six divisions instead of four—had invisibly but effectively influenced Kluck, and had actually continuously checked an army of five corps and three cavalry divisions. * * *

"Thus stood the British, with united forces, well informed of the advance of the Germans and ready to receive them. They beat off the German attack, and were ready and determined to fight next day. Then came in the night the news of the retreat of the French Fifth Army, and nothing remained for Sir J. French but to march off too and withdraw his Army from the envelopment that threatened."

The following refers to Le Cateau:

"The British had escaped. In what direction? The staff of the First Army believed they had retired on their main body (sic) between Valenciennes and Maubeuge. Kluck proposed to attack the united British Army on the 25th and to envelop its left flank and defeat it. From British orders picked up it appeared, however, that the mass of the British Army had fought and had been defeated at Mons. Air reports—air reconnaissance was working well—very soon showed that the British were not inclined to take position at Valenciennes, but rather to retreat farther in a southeasterly direction. Was it possible to engage and annihilate them?

"On the 25th of August there were fights here and there with British rear guards. The (German) right wing, that was to be the enveloping and decisive one, was still lagging behind. Notwithstanding, it was hoped to intercept the retreat between Cambrai and St. Quentin, a tempting exploit for three cavalry divisions. And there might have been five available. But the union of the two cavalry corps as a great cavalry mass on the German right wing broke down on account of official narrow-mindedness. Instead of the I Cavalry Corps joining the II, it wobbled between the First

and Second Armies and interfered with the advance of both. The II Cavalry Corps, on the other hand, hung on to the heels of the retreating enemy, worried him and held him fast (sic). 'The cavalry corps commander in very difficult fight with enemy at Solesmes and Le Cateau, who in places is attacking. Support requested.' Thus ran the report on these fights.

"It revived the hope of the German First Army of still obtaining the long-wished decision by an enveloping attack. And yet it was only chance or good luck that it had thrown a part of the British Army into the hands of the Germans. It came about thus: Field-Marshal Sir J. French at first wished to renew the struggle by standing to fight on the 26th of August on the Le Cateau position; but he finally resolved to continue the retreat behind the Somme. In the early morning of the 26th of August the British I Corps retired. On the other hand, the II, which was west of Le Cateau, remained on the position, as its troops were completely exhausted. The British II Corps commander, therefore, wished to accept battle, in order to retire later at a suitable moment. As the enemy was so close, he believed that he could not get away without a fight.

"Field-Marshal Sir J. French gave his approval of the decision, adding the warning, 'Don't stay too long.' With the II Corps was the 4th Division. It had arrived most opportunely as a welcome reinforcement from England and had on the previous evening met the tired troops retreating from Mons, and made their situation easier. On these British troops fell the German independent cavalry on the early morning of the 26th; it had a bitter struggle with them. Only hours later (sic) came the help of the German IV Corps, which attached the front and right wing of the British. By midday there was fighting all along the line. The British stood firm in spite of heavy losses from the superior German artillery. The other corps (III and IV Reserve) were advancing towards the British right and left flank, respectively. But before these great enveloping movements could be effective, the resistance of the British right wing collapsed. When the Germans assaulted, only a few machine guns fired. In groups the British came out of their trenches and surrendered; others ran from cornstock to cornstock, seeking cover. In the centre the British beat off all attacks. Their left flank continued to fight the German cavalry corps, which had the welcome assistance of the artillery of two divisions (of the IV Reserve Corps) that were hurrying up. This had been pushed ahead by the energetic corps commander, with a cavalry escort. His idea was to envelop the British left by a wide turning movement. In the course of this his troops came into action against French cavalry, and allowed themselves to be diverted from the decisive direction, and failed to envelop. The breaking off of the action was only rendered possible by the heavy sacrifice of men, the British losing 7,812. Covered by strong cavalry forces, they retreated to the south-west in the dark in pouring rain in disorder. Numberless men remained in the field incapable of marching and worn out and became prisoners. But the British were not caught. They escaped badly mauled, but not yet decisively beaten. Envelopment had failed again, annihilation had not been accomplished. The sins of Mons avenged themselves here on the field of Le Cateau. Too late!

"Thus the strategic value of these two battle to us (the Germans) was extraordinarily small, but both were of inestimable importance to the enemy.

"Four and a half British divisions held a whole army of ten divisions effectively in check, and prevented it from enveloping and decisively beating the left wing of the French Armies. France has to thank Great Britain, as Moltke pointedly said, that she was not overcome at the first onslaught."

(Reprint of review on pp. 162-5, *The Army Quarterly*, April, 1927.)

Of general interest and of special value to the Command and G-2 Sections.

April-June, 1927

THE GEOGRAPHICAL CONDITIONS OF THE (WORLD) WAR. A
STUDY OF THE MILITARY GEOGRAPHY OF THE FRENCH
FRONT FROM 1914 TO 1918. (LES CONDITIONS GÉO-
GRAPHIQUES DE LA GUERRE. ÉTUDE DE GÉOGRAPHIQUES
MILITAIRE SUR LE FRONT FRANÇAIS DE 1914 À 1918)

By Captain Robert Villate, French Army. French text, 327 pages.
(Paris: Payot, 1925.) Library No. 940.377.

This is a most valuable work, designed to show that "ground is a factor in warfare that it is impossible to neglect." The various chapters deal with geology, especially as regards mining and digging deep dug-outs, the volume published by the Institution of Royal Engineers, "Geological Work on the Western Front," being made much use of; the influence of relief, in which the reverse slopes and the fight for observation are discussed; water courses and inundations; woods and forests, as regards cover, defences and supply of timber; towns and villages, as defended points and resources; roads and railways; and meteorology and weather. The final chapter shows how topography determines the lines of invasion. There are seventy-three illustrations and maps, and an extensive bibliography, and the author has had access to official records.

(Reprint of review on pp. 417-418, *The Army Quarterly*, January, 1927.)

Of general interest and of special value to the Command and G-3 Sections.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS. ON SPECIAL MISSIONS. MEMOIRS
OF A SECRET SERVICE AGENT OF THE ENTENTE. (LA
GUERRE DES CERVEAUX—EN MISSIONS SPÉCIALES. MÉ-
MOIRES D'UN AGENT DES SERVICES SECRETS DE L'ENTENTE.)

By Ch. Lucieto. 340 pages. (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1926.) Library
No. 940.4102.

This book opens with an incomplete and rather indefinite account of the German service of espionage before and during the late war. This is described rather in the terms of Mr. Oppenheim's novels. The author states further that, far from having disappeared or even decreased with the war, this service has been greatly increased and that approximately \$5,000,000.00 was allotted for this purpose in the budget of 1926. In addition there is a hidden fund, a "black box" which supplies deficiencies.

In 1914, at the outbreak of war, the Germans are said by the author to have had 15,000 agents in France. These were aided and replaced by a constant flow of agents from neutral countries. Agents intended for special missions were given special training for the mission on which they were to be sent and were specially selected according to the nature of the mission.

From this general discussion the author passes to relate specific incidents of the work of German spies and of the Allied campaign against them. Von Rieher, the pseudo Count de Tirlmont; Irma Staub; Mata Hari, the dancer, and many others are all discussed at length.

Of indirect interest only to the G-2 Section. Of great interest to officers engaged in confidential work or on a special mission outside the United States.

T. J. V. N.

**A VOICE FROM THE FRONT. BÜLOW'S ADVANCE, RETREAT AND
PRESERVATION OF HIS OWN AS WELL AS OF THE (GERMAN)
FIRST ARMY. (1914.) (STIMME AUS DER FRONT. BÜLOW'S
VORMARSCH, RÜCKSUG UND RETTUNG SEINER UND DER 1.
ARMEE)**

By Capt. Edmund Fürst v. Wrede, German Army, Ret. 36 pages.
(Bamberg: Carl Hübscher, 1925.) Library No. 940.4110.

As its title indicates this pamphlet is a defense of General (later Field-Marshal) von Bülow, the original commander of the German Second Army. It is the work of an ardent partisan. Prince von Wrede states that he saw Bülow many times during the months of the war, and, although he had a slight stroke in the spring of 1915, in 1914 he was, contrary to rumour, fit and well. The only new point made is that by the time that the Germans reached the Marne they were thoroughly exhausted, and only the fittest were still in the ranks. The saying of one soldier to another is quoted: "The French needn't be frightened of us any more; we have been marched 'kaput' " (smashed, finished, done).

Bülow had a difficult position between the First and Third Armies: "Kluck stormed ahead (thinking only of himself): Hausen hung back. * * * The Supreme Command let the reins completely drop."

Prince Wrede also discusses why Falkenhayn was selected to succeed Moltke, and Kluck, Bülow and Hindenburg passed over. The main reason advanced is that:

"All three were men with hard, uncomfortable personalities, difficult to get on with, of strong will and without consideration for the feelings of others. They were inconvenient, as Schlieffen had been. The Supreme Command, without a Chief, the Military Cabinet and G.H.Q. preferred a skilful, witty and ambitious man like Falkenhayn, who exactly fitted in with their ways."

(Reprint of review on pp. 405-406, *The Army Quarterly*, January, 1927.)

Of general interest in connection with the operations of the German Second Army in 1914. Of special value to Command and G-2 Sections.

**SITUATION MAPS OF THE MARNE CAMPAIGN AND THE BATTLE
OF THE MARNE 28 AUGUST 10 SEPTEMBER, 1914. IN-
CLUDING A SYNOPSIS OF MILITARY EVENTS DURING THAT
PERIOD. (KARTENBILD DES MARNEFELDZUGES UND DER
MARNESCHLACHT VOM 28 AUG. BIS 10 SEPT. 1914. DAR-
GESTELLT UND ERLÄUTERT)**

By Colonel v. Mantey, German Army, Ret. 55 pages and 14 maps.
(Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1927.) Library No. 940.4114.

The fourteen situation maps, in three colors, scale 1:750,000, show the situation from day to day of the French and German forces during the fourteen days period of the Marne Campaign.

The accompanying pamphlet of 55 pages gives a concise account of the operations from day to day for the same period.

Of general interest and of special value to the Command and G-2 Sections.

A. B.

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE LOSS OF THE HEIGHTS OF THE MEUSE
AND OF SAINT-MIHIEL IN SEPTEMBER 1914. (LA VÉRITÉ
SUR LA PERTE DES HAUTS DE MEUSE ET DE SAINT-MIHIEL
IN SEPTEMBER 1914)

By Lt. Col. Bize, French Army. French text, 123 pages. (Paris: Étienne Chiron, 1923.) Library No. 940.4115.

This work whose author is the ex-chief of the Staff of the 75th Reserve Division, which was driven off the Hauts de Meuse and lost the St. Mihiel bridge, is a document of first authority, backed up by copies of orders, but, unfortunately, without a map.

On the 17th of September, French G.H.Q. directed General Sarraill (commanding the Third Army) to recover from the Second Army the Reserve Divisions (65th, 67th and 75th) lent to it, and on the 19th, with the VIII Corps sent to him, "to drive back under the guns of Metz the enemy detachment still in Woivre." He did not use the VIII Corps, merely reconnoitered, and in the evening of the 19th sent the VIII Corps eastwards to St. Ménéhould, leaving the 75th Reserve Division (less one regiment) covering a front of 36 miles on the Hauts de Meuse.

On the 21st, outflanked on both sides by an advance of two German corps, it was driven back. But even then the French Army commander considered the attack a bluff. On the 22nd, three divisions, 12th, 40th and 67th (Reserve), were, however, hurried up and fought a defensive action, but it was too late. On the 24th, the 149th Brigade (75th Reserve Division) was driven over the river at St. Mihiel, and on the morning of next day the Fort des Romaines was captured and Verdun invested on the eastern side.

(Reprint of review on pp. 406-407, *The Army Quarterly*, January, 1927.)

Of general interest and of special value to the G-2 Section.

THE MILITARY DEFEAT OF GERMANY IN 1918. (LA DÉFAITE
MILITAIRE DE L'ALLEMAGNE EN 1918)

By Lieut. Colonel Paquet, French Army. 286 pages with maps. (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1926.) Library No. 940.4150.

The author was a member of the G-2 Section at the French General Headquarters during 1918, and consequently had intimate knowledge of and complete access to all reports, records, documents, and figures of that section. In addition, the G-2 Section at French Headquarters sent a mission to the British General Headquarters in 1918, to be in liaison and cooperate with the British G-2 Section. The greater part of the data collected by the latter were therefore probably available to the French mission and the author. While admitting that his figures at times are certainly in error, he points out that the errors were probably small and immaterial in view of the large masses of troops employed, and therefore represent approximately the correct totals of troops engaged, losses incurred, and replacements available.

Each offensive during the year, both German and Allied, is taken up in turn, especially with respect to the German dispositions, order of battle, reserves engaged, and losses incurred. The dissolution of certain German divisions and other units are pointed out, and the gradual shrinkage and wastage of the German army is apparent to the reader as one goes through the book. The conclusion drawn is that Germany had reached the end of the rope in a military sense late in 1918, and that the Armistice alone prevented a decisive defeat of the German army.

The book is of general interest and of value for reference purposes.

C. M. B.

TANNENBERG. THE CANNAE OF THE WORLD WAR. ILLUSTRATED.
• ED. (TANNENBERG. DAS CANNAE DES WELTKRIEGES IN
WORT UND BILD)

By General v. François, German Army. 72 pages. (Berlin: Deutscher Jägerbund, 1926.) Library No. 940.42111.

It will save reference to a map in reading this review if it is remembered that East Prussia, east of the Vistula, was 160 miles across and about 100 miles from north to south, that Warsaw lay 80 miles to the south of the centre of the southern boundary. Rennenkampf's Army entered East Prussia from the east, and Samsonov's from the Warsaw direction. Leaving the XX Corps and details to stop the latter, the remainder of the German Eighth Army faced Rennenkampf.

This work supplements an earlier military account by the same author in his book *Marneschlacht und Tannenberg*. It is illustrated by good sketch-maps and a number of excellent photographs taken during the battle—the Russian trenches, it appears from them, were straight and without traverses. One photograph, taken ten years afterwards, on the 24th of August, 1924, shows the principal officers who took part. François, very properly, is seated in the centre between Field-Marshal von Hindenburg and von Mackensen.

The book begins with a brief account of Hannibal's Cannae, with a diagram, describes the opening situation in August, 1914, and then passes on to the first battle in East Prussia, that of Gumbinnen. Here the author makes it evident, although he does not notice the fact, that there were all the elements of a Cannae prepared: the Germans and Russians met frontally; Mackensen's corps in centre was beaten and began a retirement; François's own I Corps on the left was successful, and on the enemy's flank; Below, with the I Reserve Corps, was in a position to envelop the other flank; a cavalry division was available to move round to the Russian rear. Instead of accepting the Cannae gambit, Prittwitz, the Army commander, decided on a general retirement to the Vistula, and thus lost an easy opportunity of beating Rennenkampf before turning against Samsonov. General von François has, nevertheless, a high opinion of Prittwitz, and knew him well, having been Chief of the Staff to Hindenburg when the latter commanded the IV Corps and Prittwitz had a division in it. He thinks that he had an attack of mental depression when the news of Samsonov's advance against the XX Corps, left to stop progress from the Warsaw direction, arrived almost simultaneously with the reports of Mackensen's failure at Gumbinnen; and that he took too seriously General von Moltke's last words to him in Berlin: "Don't be driven from the Vistula, keep the Army intact, in case of extreme need abandon the ground east of the Vistula."

Prittwitz, under the influence of some of his staff, plucked up courage again, dropped his idea of retreating to the Vistula, and, at 9:30 p.m. on the 20th, ordered the I Corps and 3rd Reserve Division by rail to the assistance of the XX Corps, whilst the XVII Corps (Mackensen) and I Reserve Corps (Below) marched westwards by road, covered by the cavalry division. As François says, the battle front was already set when Hindenburg-Ludendorff arrived on the 23d. And what happened afterwards was done in despite of the great pair.

Owing to muddles on the railways—which delayed the arrival of the troops in other instances also—François's Corps was late in reaching the right (south) flank of the XX Corps. Ludendorff, nevertheless, ordered it to attack, although it was still short of three-quarters of its field artillery, all its heavy guns, and all the ammunition columns. François wisely disobeyed, and waited until he had concentrated. In the midst of his initial success, Ludendorff ordered him to assist the XX Corps, which was in trouble. This corps, after a formal objection, had, with Goltz's fortress

division, obeyed Ludendorff's orders literally, with the result that its 41st Division had been beaten back with a loss of 2,400 men and 13 guns, and Goltz was caught in flank. The situation was restored by the independent action of Morgen's 3rd Reserve Division. François was meantime pushing detachments eastward to close the exits of the great forests in which two Russian corps were involved, and seize the road centres at Neidenberg and Willenberg. He was now informed by Ludendorff that "All depended on the I Corps," and ordered north-eastward *into* the forests! François again departed from his instructions, and continued to move eastward, and succeeded in blocking the exits across the frontier. Thus two elements of a Cannae were available: disaster in the centre and complete success on one flank. On the other flank the arrival of Mackensen and Below and the spreading out of their corps across the Russian rear was delayed by fighting with a detached Russian corps, contradictory orders, lack of cooperation, and a scare that considerable other Russian forces were approaching. Against François a strong Russian relieving force did come from the south, but he held on to the exits, and it drew off. In the event, Mackensen did not close the ring on the eastern side, and Ludendorff, at midnight on the 29th, reported by telephone to the Supreme Command:

"Battle is won. Pursuit will be continued tomorrow. The surrounding of two Russian corps will not now succeed (*wird wohl nicht mehr gelingen*)," and he issued orders for the collection of troops to move north against *Rennenkampf*. But François's corps was in the right place, and of the 92,000 men and 350 guns captured, it was responsible for 60,000 men and 231 guns. On turning to the official German war record, *Schlachten und Gefechte*, one finds that François did not suffer as severely as General Lanrezac for being right when his superiors were wrong: he was not removed from his post, but, except for a month's command of the Eighth Army in October, 1914, he remained a corps commander until July, 1918, when he disappears. In his book he merely tells a plain story, and makes no criticism or complaint; it is the reviewer who has emphasized the points of the narrative.

(Reprint of review on pp. 411-13, *The Army Quarterly*, January, 1927.)
Of general interest, and of special value to Command and G-2 Sections.

THE BREAKTHROUGH ON THE ISONZO, 1917. PART I: THE BATTLE OF TOLMEIN AND FLITSCH. PART II: THE PURSUIT TO THE PIAVE. (DER DURCHBRUCH AM ISONZO 1917. TEIL I: DIE SCHLACHT VON TOLMEIN UND FLITSCH. TEIL II: DIE VERFOLGUNG ÜBER DEN TAGLIAMENTO BIS ZUM PIAVE.) (FROM THE OFFICIAL SOURCES OF THE GERMAN REICHSARCHIV)

By General Konrad Krafft von Dellmensingen, German Army, Ret. In 2 volumes. 506 pages with maps. (Berlin: Gerhard Stalling, 1926.) Library No. 940.4333.

This book describes the preparations for the battle known to us as Caporetto and the first four days of the fighting. The compiler is General Krafft von Dellmensingen, the Chief of the Staff to the German general, Otto von Below, who commanded the Fourteenth Army, which played the main part. More than this, as representative of the Supreme Command, he had visited the ground and drawn up the report on which the decision to take the offensive was made. The volume is therefore of more than usual interest, and is much above the average even of German military historical work.

Driven from their last prepared position by the Italians in the eleventh battle of the Isonzo, the Austro-Hungarians were forced back into a wild mountainous region, where a new position could only be slowly developed by blasting trenches out of the rock, and organizing ropeway communications. They could not face another offensive where they lay; they must go back a long way, or forward to their old defenses, and they naturally called on their German Allies for advice and assistance. On the 29th of August, 1917, General von Waldstätten, the senior assistant of the Austrian Chief of Staff, appeared at German G.H.Q. with a scheme for an offensive which should break the front at Tolmein, go as far as Cividale and then roll up the Isonzo front. Ludendorff, involved in the Passchendaele fighting, could only provide 6 divisions, but he sent General von Krafft, who had led the Alpine Corps in the Rumanian campaign, to examine the situation. The latter, in view of the fact that Ludendorff was sending 6 of his best divisions, and of the state of Italian morale, whilst duly setting forth the difficulties of the enterprise in a report which is given in the text, agreed that an offensive offered good chances of success. The Austrians had retained a small bridgehead across the Isonzo at Tolmein, and this provided an opening whence the attack could be launched; but mountain equipment and pack animals were necessary. A panorama of the bridgehead—there are many excellent photographs in the book—shows a hilly rather than a mountainous country, the summits varying from 1,500 to 3,500 feet above sea-level, and considerably less above the valley. Ludendorff, whilst not failing to realize the difficulties, on the 8th of September agreed to a combined offensive. There was little time for preparation before the winter came on.

The monograph admits that it is easier to hide troops in hilly country than on a plain; but, thanks largely to the fact that the Italian aviators never crossed the crest of the Julian Alps, the 12 divisions for the offensive were assembled and made their approach marches, and all the 300 batteries were got up into position, without being discovered by the Italians.

General Krauss's group of 5 divisions was assembled in the valley of the Drau, west of Klagenfurt, General von Below's Fourteenth Army, of 7 divisions, in the valley of the Save, around Laibach and Krainburg. Roads and communications were improved, and, as in Falkenhayn's passage of the Rother Thurn Pass in Rumania, the troops were moved to the front on a time-table contrived on the block system of a single-line railway, with proper crossing places and signals. The guns were got up during the whole period of preparation, mostly by hand and by night, and were then left in battery covered up and watched only by sentries. For the infantry seven night marches were required; they took no vehicles, but machine guns, ammunition, medical equipment, means of illumination, hand grenades, signalling apparatus and rations were carried on the man or on pack animals; each division was therefore divided into three echelons, fighting troops, fighting train and baggage. Confusion and blockings which occurred towards the end of the movement were resolved by the rapid retirement of the enemy.

The artillery registered during the six days' approach march, the adjoining Austrian Armies firing heavily to disguise the operation. The bombardment was begun by a four-hours' gas shelling, 2 to 4 a.m., followed by a general bombardment for one hour, in which the trench mortars had great effect.

As is well known, all went according to plan, the attacks at the two extremities of the front selected, at Flitsch and Tolmein, broke in and secured the ground between them, and the whole Italian front gave way. The poor stand made is ascribed by the monograph to doubtful moral and obvious tiredness of the war:

"Already a few hours after the beginning of the fight troops fled from the front leaving their Army. Cries of 'The war is over, I'm for home,' were heard."

Truly, as in 1864, 1866 and 1870, German laurels were won against indifferent adversaries.

(Reprint of review on pp. 408-410, *The Army Quarterly*, January, 1927.)

Of general interest in the study of the Battle of Caporetto; of special value to the Command, G-2 and G-3 Sections.

THE SERBIAN CAMPAIGNS IN 1914 AND 1915. (LES CAMPAGNES DE SERBIE 1914 ET 1915)

By Colonel F. Feyler, French Army. French text, 133 pages. (Paris: Fred Boissonnas, 1926.) Library No. 940.440.

Colonel F. Feyler of the Swiss Army, who has already published two volumes on *La Campagne de Macedonie, 1917-1918*, has gone back to the early period, and issued *Les Campagnes de Serbie, 1914 et 1915* (Paris: Jean Budry). It deals in 133 pages with the three unsuccessful Austrian offensives in 1914, and the invasion of Serbia in 1915, and the retreat to the coast. The information has been derived directly from the Serbian G.H.Q. and headquarters of formations, besides published Austrian sources. The book is illustrated with sixteen beautiful photographs of the ground fought over. There are sketch-maps.

(Reprint of review on p. 415, *The Army Quarterly*, January, 1927.)

Of general interest and of special value to the G-2 Section.

THE TURKISH WAR IN THE WORLD WAR. (LA GUERRE TURQUE DANS LA GUERRE MONDIALE)

By M. Larcher, Major French Army. French text, 657 pages. (Paris: Berger-Levrault & Cie, 1926.) Library No. 940.450.

Commandant Larcher is a staff officer and Turkish scholar, who had already translated into French the Turkish official account of the Dardanelles campaign. Here he has undertaken an enormous task: to describe all the military operations in which Turkish troops took part between 1914 and 1918, to estimate the importance of Turkey's efforts in the Great War, and those of the other belligerents who were her allies or her opponents, particularly Britain, France, and Germany. His work has considerable value, since it is largely based upon Turkish accounts, which few European soldiers can read, and also because he has taken it very seriously. His bibliography covers 15 pages, with about 25 volumes or periodicals to a page, though, curiously enough, he has missed the most important contribution to the Palestine Campaign yet published, the seventh volume of the Australian official history—perhaps because this was published in Sydney. He gives us 65 sketch-maps, and what is still more useful, a large number of tables, orders of battle, etc.

On the whole he cannot be said to be particularly friendly to Great Britain. He exclaims at the contrast between British and Turkish strengths in Palestine rather exaggerating the disparity in numbers—without explaining how largely that campaign was an engineer's war, and how, time and time again, only the lack of water and the extraordinary difficulties of supply prevented the destruction of the Turkish forces. He writes:

"The operation from the 31st October to the 9th December, 1917, had cost the Turks 12,000 prisoners and 100 guns, mostly abandoned for want of teams. These were light enough material losses. The Turks had twice escaped the encirclement carefully prepared by an army incomparably superior."

Granted, but he might have added a rather fuller account of the causes, which were not entirely British lethargy, as he seems to suppose. He might also have added that the casualties of the enemy between the 31st October and 31st December of that year, according to the admission of the Turkish

Historical Section, were: Officers 1,039, Other Ranks 27,034, Animals 5,270. These cannot be called "light material losses," as they represent very nearly the Turkish rifle strength on the earlier date. His book is nevertheless well worth study as a remarkable general picture of Turkey at war. Many hints also can be gained from it as to the causes of the country's military and moral renaissance after a series of great disasters.

(Reprint of review on pp. 689-690, *The Royal Engineers Journal*, December, 1926.)

Of general interest and of special value to the G-2 Section.

A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA 1914-1918

By Major R. Evans, British Army. 135 pages with maps. (London: Sifton Praed & Co., Ltd., 1926.) Library No. 940.4530.

The author states in his preface that to try to deal with a four years' war in a book of 135 pages is to lay oneself open to criticism. In this case there can be little adverse criticism. He has succeeded in giving a history of the campaign in a manner that will make the book useful and interesting to all. The difficulties and problems which faced the commanders are fully discussed, the various actions are described shortly but clearly, and the author's criticisms are sound and impartial. His reflections on the campaign in the last chapter are interesting and well thought out. There are four good maps, which make the work of following the narrative easy.

(Extract from review on pp. 438-439, *The Army Quarterly*, January, 1927.)

Of general interest in the study of the World War and of special value to the Command and G-2 Sections.

REVOLT IN THE DESERT

By T. E. Lawrence. 435 pages. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1927.) Library No. 940.4556.

"Revolt in the Desert" is an abridgement of another book over twice as long, called "The Seven Pillars of Wisdom." The manuscript of this longer book, carried in a handbag, was stolen from the author in an English railway station. He rewrote it, printed eight copies of which he destroyed three. Doran has printed twenty-two copies of the large book. Comparison of the two books is reported to show that nothing very important has been left out of the abridged account which is called "Revolt in the Desert" and all essential parts of the narrative are included in this shorter account.

The military history of all nations whose operations in war have extended over wide territories is full of examples of the use of auxiliary armed forces composed of allies and usually of a peculiar and limited combat value. The employment of such allies for military purposes has been followed by our nation from its earliest days and with great advantage, very familiar examples are the former use of Indian scouts and the present Philippine Constabulary.

"Revolt in the Desert" is an authentic account of the handling of an Arab revolt for the benefit of Great Britain during the World War. The book is a valuable military text, it shows a clear definition and appreciation of the powers and limitations of these partisan bands and careful analysis of the functions and objectives practicable for such troops, while from beginning to end it clearly indicates the roles that personality and prejudice may play in partisan warfare.

Lawrence, unfit for military duty, slight and small, led the Arabs of the Desert in their revolt against the Turks. The Arab has always hated

the Christian, the Bedouins are the wildest of the Arabs, no Christian has been safe among them, yet Lawrence ruled them and became to them a hero.

Before Turkey entered the war the British promised support to an Arab war for independence. The revolt was petering out when Lawrence selected Feisal, one of the sons of the Grand Sherif of Mecca, to lead it, and established a working degree of mutual British-Arab confidence. Lawrence himself dressed like an Arab and lived as a Bedouin. Unobtrusive, seeking nothing for himself, his personal leadership succeeded through his knowledge of prejudices and use of individuals.

His description of events is that of an accomplished scholar and writer, his description of personalities reveals the keenest and most discriminating insight. From whatever standpoint the book is read: tactics, supply, travel, adventure, style, sociology, or psychology, the reader will be content.

Not everything is written that one might wish to learn but the account tells with detailed accuracy how Lawrence carried the Arab revolt north a thousand miles through Arabia and became in everything, except name, the leader of the tribes throughout the desert. He lived with and led them, summer and winter, for two years, until finally entering Damascus the crowds shouted "Feisal! Nasir! Shukri! Urens!" Naming the great Arab leaders and with them "Urens" (Lawrence). Lawrence shrank from notoriety and probably was disappointed at the results of the war; he is now a private under an assumed name in the British Tank Corps.

Of value to all officers.

T. J. C.

THE MARCH OF THE SEVENTY THOUSAND

By Henry Baerlein. 286 pages. (London: Leonard Parsons, 1927.) Library No. 943.70.

There is no stanger chapter in the history of the World War than that which was written by the Czechoslovak Army in Russia. It began as an army without a country; it came back seven and a half years later to an independent, stable, and prosperous fatherland, which it had been largely instrumental in creating, though all its fighting was done on foreign soil. The Czechoslovak legions had their origin in a single brigade, formed by settlers in Russia for service in the Russian Army. They recruited themselves by deserters from their fellow countrymen in the ranks of the Austrian Army and from prisoners in the Russian camps. Their organizing body became the spearhead of the Czechoslovak revolutionary movement. Despite the growing difficulties put in their way by the Tsarist Government, their numbers swelled until with the Revolution they became a force of seventy thousand. Their record for conspicuous gallantry survived the disintegration of the Russian front, when they were responsible for the last victory, at Zborov, before the Russian Army ceased to exist. Involved against their will in hostilities with the Bolsheviks, the legionnaires fought their way from the Ukraine across Siberia, turned in their tracks on the Allies' insistence, and fought their way back to form a new front against the Bolsheviks and the Germans, and finally, not until 1920, were repatriated from Vladivostok.

(Extract from review on p. 555, *The Living Age*, 15 May, 1927.)

Of general interest to the student of the World War; of special value to the G-2 Section.

THE OPINIONS AND REFLECTIONS OF NAPOLEON

Edited by Lewis Claflin Breed. 534 pages. (Boston: The Four Seas Company, 1926.) Library No. 944.00500.

The author has selected from the mass of Napoleon's writings and correspondence certain letters, documents, and extracts from documents

which clearly illustrate Napoleon's ideas and plans at eventful stages of his brilliant career.

Some space is devoted to letters of his early life, which show his precocity and his ambition to become distinguished.

More space is devoted to writings and documents bearing on government, politics, and diplomacy, the author's reason being that of all Napoleon's eventful career only about six and one-half years of it found him actually in campaign in the field.

The major portion of the book, however, deals with his life at St. Helena, where he devoted his remaining years to reviewing his past achievements.

The selections are well made and well arranged, and the book contains appendices which include the authorities consulted, reference to the authorities by notes, and an index.

The book is of general interest to all officers.

C. W. J.

NAPOLÉON

By Emil Ludwig. Translation from the German by Eden and Cedar Paul. 677 pages. (New York: Boni & Liveright, 1926.) Library No. 944.050.

Emil Ludwig in addition to his law and business occupations, writes plays and has done so since the age of fifteen years. However his dramatic biographies of Goethe, Wagner, and Bismarck have heretofore been his most pronounced successes. His new biography of Napoleon now published in English is well on its way to be the outstanding biography of 1927 in the United States. (Time, 28 February, 1927.)

Said Mr. Ludwig, last summer, "My pet aversion is the historical novel, which falsifies history to meet the requirements of romantic fiction, and falsifies romance by trying to force it into the framework of history. My ideal is to produce a work which shall be strictly accordant with the available documentary evidence, but shall none the less bear the imprint of an imaginary recreation."

In this biography the author has been able to recreate important scenes and to convey a sense of reality using only the writings or recorded conversations of Napoleon. These scenes and this sense of reality greatly aid the reader to understand the driving ambition of Napoleon, the politics of his period, and the necessity under which he acted after he came into power as First Consul.

The book offers no military study of Napoleon's campaigns, but it performs a much needed service for the military man in that it provides a most dramatic and interesting study of Napoleon as a man and as a leader. Almost as important as successful leadership is the study of reasons for failure in leadership. This book provides a study of both, as it sets forth the reasons for Napoleon's success and analyzes the causes of his fall.

This book should be read by all officers. It is particularly valuable to the G-3 Section as a study in leadership. See Review in "Time," 28 February, 1927.

H. H. S.

THE MANEUVER OF WAGRAM. (LA MANOEUVRE DE WAGRAM)

By General Camon, French Army. French text, 77 pages with maps. (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1926.) Library No. 944.0555.

The campaign of Wagram has been set for the entrance examination to the French *École Supérieure de Guerre*. This has had the result that General Camon has published a study entitled *La Manoeuvre de Wagram* (Paris: Berger Levrault, 5 francs), in which he brings to notice and discusses the

more important criticisms of which this campaign of Napoleon has been the subject. A valuable feature of the pamphlet is the list of French books on the operations of 1809, amongst them General Buat's 1809—*de Ratisbonne à Znaim*; General Bonnal's *La Manoeuvre de Landshut*; Commandant Saski's *Campagne de 1809 en Allemagne et en Autriche* (published by the *Section Historique de l'État-Major*, the third volume ending with Essling); and General Pelet's *Guerre de 1809*.

(Reprint of review on pp. 418-419, *The Army Quarterly*, January, 1927.)

Of general interest and of special value to the Command and G-2 Sections.

STATESMEN AND SOLDIERS OF THE CIVIL WAR. A STUDY OF THE CONDUCT OF WAR

By Major General Sir Frederick Maurice. 166 pages. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1926.) Library No. 973.700.

At the beginning of Chapter V, which is the last and is entitled "A System for the Conduct of War," we find this resumé and statement of theme:

We have now examined the relations which existed between two statesmen and four soldiers during a great war under democratic systems of government. They have been examined frankly, in the light of our own experience and not in that of the experience and knowledge of war prevailing in the sixties of the last century. What are we to learn to our advantage from the successes and failures of these men? The first lesson is, I think, obvious. Any government which hopes to wage war successfully and without undue cost, must have established before arms clash, a well considered system of conducting war. Lincoln, as we have seen, built up such a system under the stress of bitter experience. Davis, starting on his task with a far greater technical equipment than Lincoln possessed never devised any effective system.

* * * It is not sufficient for the statesmen to choose leaders for armies, navies, and air forces, and to say to them, "Now go and fight." I hope to have shown that was not Lincoln's attitude to Grant. There must be direction—and constant direction—of strategy, but if direction is not to become mischievous interference, the director must know how to direct. * * *

The statesmen and soldiers whose relations are considered in the earlier chapters, are Davis and J. E. Johnston, Davis and Lee, Lincoln and McClellan, and Lincoln and Grant. It is interesting to note that Davis and Johnston liked each other, and Lincoln and McClellan were politically antagonistic, that much of Davis's success in dealing with Lee was due to Lee's tact, and some failures to Lee's self-effacing modesty, while Grant's tact and judgment in his relations to Lincoln and in keeping Lincoln informed contributed enormously to Lincoln's success.

This text appears fairer to Davis than other foreign studies of his conduct of war. It is pointed out that Davis foresaw that the North would fight and fight hard; that he prevented a 60-day enlistment law; later obtained authority to accept volunteers in unlimited number for the duration of the war; and in April, 1862, procured the passage of a conscription act. The charge that Davis displayed lack of energy in providing arms and equipment is answered by reference to the very little better progress made by the Federal government with established organization, considerable manufacturing facilities, and free access to Europe.

Some of Davis's weaknesses and failures as seen by General Maurice are: the influence upon his conduct of the war of his conviction that a cotton famine (or some other cause) would cause Great Britain or France to inter-

vene; his failure to insist that the interests of the Confederacy should take precedence over the interests of the several states (a weakness inherent in the Confederate cause and theory of government); his excess of caution; his tendency to rely too much on his small military experience, which caused him to concern himself too much with detail and prevented him from seeing the necessity for competent military advice; his failure in 1862 after the second Battle of Manassas, and again after Chancellorsville in 1863, to see, as did Lee, that the best chance of winning the war lay in subordinating everything else to a retention of the initiative and to confronting the Federals with a victorious army in their territory; and his organization of the army into departments under direct control of his War Department instead of relieving Lee from command of the Army of Northern Virginia and placing that general in supreme military command. General Maurice points out that Davis did approve Lee's invasion of Maryland in 1862, and of Maryland and Pennsylvania in 1863, but failed sufficiently to subordinate other operations to the support of these invasions; that Davis did offer Lee supreme command in Virginia and the Carolinas in June, 1863, but only while remaining in executive command of the Army of Northern Virginia.

The reviewer feels that General Maurice is not quite fair to Davis on this last matter for, while he credits Lincoln at least with having evolved a satisfactory plan for the conduct of war when Grant was given supreme command, he fails to note that in 1864 Grant was sent with the Army of the Potomac not merely to accompany it, but actually in direct command (Burnside's Corps and Sheridan's Cavalry included).

The chapters on Lincoln and McClellan, and Lincoln and Grant, afford a clear and logical study of the evolution of Lincoln's plan for the conduct of war, and show that, although Lincoln never fully recognized the inadvisability of suggesting military operations, he eventually accepted and loyally supported each of Grant's plans, despite almost continuous adverse political pressure, and in the face of apparent failure. Particular importance is attached (and properly so) to Lincoln's "hold on with a bulldog grip" telegram to Grant in August, 1864, after Grant had indicated his opinion that it would be inadvisable to withdraw troops from the James for the suppression of expected draft riots.

These four chapters furnish a concise but astonishingly complete study of the major operations, with the changing situations and varying fortunes of the entire war. Only the most exceptional reader can fail to have his picture of the whole clarified and sharpened.

In the last chapter the attempt is made to outline a system for conduct of war by a democracy which should give success with the average statesmen and soldiers to be expected. Here he returns to the Civil War to point out that "statesmen and soldier should mutually understand each other's function and needs." He adds:

The Confederate President cannot, as I have tried to show, fairly be charged with undue interference with the operations of his generals in the field; the charge rather should be that he did not interfere enough in the right way. Abraham Lincoln had a very definite and sound policy from the beginning of the war; but he did not know how to translate that policy into instructions to McClellan, and McClellan did not know what advice to give his political chief, nor indeed was he aware that it was his duty to advise him at all.

It will appear from the foregoing that General Maurice rejects the commonly held view that Lincoln's original idea as to the purpose of military operations was the capture of the Confederate capital and other important positions, and that from Grant came the idea that the essential object was the destruction of the armed forces of the Confederacy.

Briefly, Sir Frederick Maurice believes that for effective conduct of war, it is necessary: to give some one statesman supreme directing authority; to

provide him with a competent chief military adviser for land, sea, and air, whose duties and functions as such are established constitutionally or legally, but who shall be subject to removal or replacement by the civilian dictator; to consider the relation between the statesman and the soldier as a partnership with the statesman as senior partner, who should be kept informed of, but not interfere in the junior's intentions and plans; and most important of all to provide in advance a workable system for government in war to be known and understood by statesmen, soldiers, and at least those people who guide public opinion.

(Extract from review on pp. 381-383, *U. S. Coast Artillery Journal*, April, 1927.)

Of general interest and of special value to the Command and G-2 Sections.

THE SHEEPEATER CAMPAIGN, 1879

By Colonel W. C. Brown, U.S.A., Ret. 30 pages. (Reprinted from the Tenth Biennial Report, Idaho Historical Society, 1926.) Library No. 973.835.

The Sheepeters were a small band of renegade Bannocks, Shoshones, and Weisers Indians, who derived their name from the fact that they subsisted largely on mountain sheep. After the Bannock War of 1878, the Sheepeters were joined by a few hostiles who sought refuge in the high timbered mountains.

About 1 May, 1879, Brigadier General O. O. Howard then commanding the Department of the Columbia sent out detachments of the 1st Cavalry and of the 2d Infantry (mounted) to arrest the murderers of certain ranchers and miners. In addition twenty Umatilla Indian Scouts were enlisted and placed under 2d Lieut. E. S. Farrow, 21st Infantry, with the author second in command.

After long and very severe marches conducted under great difficulties of weather and terrain, touch was gained with the hostiles.

Some sharp fighting followed between the small detachments in which the troops were operating and the Indians. One detachment under Lieut. Catley, 2d Infantry, was surprised and defeated with loss. Largely through the work of the Umatilla Indian Scouts contact was gained with the mass of the hostiles, they were defeated and finally run down and forced to surrender.

The author does not give his source material in full but states it consists of diaries of officers of the expedition, his own among others, reports and orders on file in the War Department and certain published accounts.

The work covers an operation interesting to all officers who have had to solve the problems arising along the Mexican Border.

T. J. V. N.

III. PERIODICALS RECEIVED

United States

Dailies:

Daily Data Sheet of the Key Men of America.
Journal of Commerce.
Kansas City Journal-Post.
Kansas City Star.
Leavenworth Times
New York Times.

Weeklies:

Army and Navy Journal.
Army and Navy Register.
Federal Reporter.
Intelligence Summary, War Department (Confidential).
Literary Digest.
Panama Canal Record.
Saturday Evening Post.
Time.
Turf Life.
Weekly Press Review, War Department (Confidential).

Semi-Monthlies:

Recruiting News.
Rider and Driver.
The Living Age.
The Pointer.
Spur.

Monthlies:

Aero Digest.
American Mercury.
American Review of Reviews.
American Rifleman.
Atlantic Monthly.
Book Review Digest.
Bulletin of the Pan American Union.
Coast Artillery Journal.
Chemical Warfare.
Current History.
Current Estimate of the Strategic Situation, War Department
(Confidential).
Federal Reserve Bulletin.
Historical Outlook.
Infantry Journal.
Military Notes, War Department (Confidential).
Military Surgeon.
Monthly Information Bulletin, Office of Naval Intelligence
(Confidential).
National Geographic.
National Republic.
Official Railway Guide.
Polo.
Scientific American.
Scientific Monthly.

The Bookman.
The Sportsman.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings.
Western Golfer.
World's Work.

Bi-Monthlies:

Annals.
Army List and Directory.
Army and Navy Courier.
Army Ordnance.
Field Artillery Journal.
Military Engineer.
Quartermaster Review.

Quarterlies:

American Historical Review.
American Journal of International Law.
Annals of Iowa.
Cavalry Journal.
Foreign Affairs.
Geographical Review.
Journal of American History.
Marine Corps Gazette.
New Mexico Historical Review.
North American Review.
Political Science Quarterly.
The Remount.
Yale Review.

England

Weeklies:

Army, Navy and Air Force Gazette.
Illustrated London News.
W. P. Phillips Information Service for Private Circulation
(Confidential).

Monthlies:

Tank Corps Journal.

Quarterlies:

Army Quarterly.
Cavalry Journal.
Journal of Royal Artillery.
Journal of the Royal United Service Institution.
Round Table.
Royal Engineers Journal.

France

Weeklies:

Bibliography de la France.
L'Illustration.

Monthlies:

Revue d'Artillerie.
Revue d'Infanterie.
Revue Militaire Française.

Bi-Monthlies:

Revue de Cavalerie.

Germany

Weeklies:

Militär-Wochenblatt.

Monthlies:

Heerestechnik.

Kriegskunst im Wort und Bild.

Quarterlies:

Wissen und Wehr.

Canada

Sémi-Monthlies:

Military Gazette.

Cuba

Monthlies:

Boletin del Ejercito.

IV. PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED FROM OTHER SERVICE SCHOOLS

ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Instructors'
File No.

<i>British Commonwealth.</i> Report of Committee No. 6.....	P.H. 188-G-17
<i>China.</i> Lecture by Maj. Gen. W. D. Connor, U.S.A.....	P.H. 188-G-24
<i>Command.</i> Lecture by Brig. Gen. E. L. King, U.S.A.....	P.H. 188-E-6
<i>Command Army.</i> Map Problem No. 1.....	P.H. 188-E-10
<i>Command Reconnaissance.</i> May 28-June 2, 1927. Purpose is to apply the test of the ground to the soundness and completeness of the war plan.....	P.H. 188-E-27
<i>Command Relation to War Plans.</i> Report of Committee No. 14.....	P.H. 188-E-21
<i>Committee Assignments (War Plans Period).</i> WPD Course.....	P.H. 188-B-11
<i>Current Estimate of the Comparative Military Power of Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia, Turkey, Germany, Poland, Japan, and China.</i> Extracts from Report of Committee No. 2.....	P.H. 188-G-15
<i>Current Estimate of the Comparative Military Power of Great Britain with the U. S.</i> Extracts from Supplement No. 1 to Report of Committee No. 2, Prepared by Maj. R. E. Lee, F.A.....	P.H. 188-G-15-A
<i>Current Estimate of the European Situation.</i> Report of Committee No. 9.....	P.H. 188-G-18
<i>Current Estimate of the Far Eastern Situation.</i> Extracts from Report of Committee No. 10-A.....	P.H. 188-G-19
<i>Current Estimate of the Latin-American Situation.</i> Report of Committee No. 4.....	P.H. 188-G-16
<i>Current Situation and Problems of the Air Corps and its Plans for the Future.</i> Lecture by Maj. Gen. M. M. Patrick, Chief of Air Corps.....	P.H. 188-E-4
<i>Employment of Air Force and Anti-Air Force in Large Operations.</i> Report of Committee No. 16.....	P.H. 188-E-23
<i>Employment of Air Forces in Large Operations for Tactical and Strategical Effects.</i> Lecture by Maj. H. C. Pratt, A.C.....	P.H. 188-E-8
<i>Estimate of the Comparative Military Power of Japan, China, and the U. S.</i> Extracts from Supplement No. 2 to report of Committee No. 2. Prepared by Maj. O. H. Fernbach, MI-Res.....	P.H. 188-G-15-B
<i>Field Exercise.</i> May 22 to 27, 1927 (Fort Adams, R.I.). Report of Committee No. 18.....	P.H. 188-E-25
<i>Functions of the Department of Commerce and some Commercial aspects of the International Situation.</i> Lecture by Mr. Clayton Lane, Dept. of Commerce.....	P.H. 188-G-14
<i>General information concerning the Command Course, During Period May 16-June 11, 1927.....</i>	P.H. 188-E-28
<i>G-2 Contributions to Specific War Plans.</i> Extracts from report of Committee No. 13, G-2 Course.....	P.H. 188-B-12
<i>G-2 Matters contained in Information Summaries, G.H.Q., A.E.F.</i> Extracts from Report of Committee No. 11.....	P.H. 188-G-20
<i>Historical backgrounds of our Military System.</i> Lecture by Lt. Col. W. G. Caples, C.E.....	P.H. 188-B-13
<i>Human Element in War.</i> Lecture by Maj. Gen. C. P. Summerall, Chief of Staff.....	P.H. 188-E-5

<i>The Human Element in War. Analytical study of command features, theater of operations, communications zone, frontier, corps area and territorial department. Report of Committee No. 3</i>	P.H. 188-E-14
<i>Index and Review of Committee Reports, G-2 Course</i>	P.H. 188-G-22
<i>Index and Review of Individual Reports, G-2 Course</i>	P.H. 188-G-13
<i>Joint Army and Navy Exercise. Narragansett Bay, R.I., May 16 to 21, 1927. Landing on a hostile shore, Defense against a landing, and Reference data for umpires</i>	P.H. 188-E-26
<i>Landing at Gallipoli. Lecture by Lt. Col. Ned B. Rehkopf, F.A.P.H.</i>	P.H. 188-E-3
<i>Lectures, G-2 Course. Revision of List published in G-2 Course No. 3, Dec. 23, 1926</i>	P.H. 188-G-3-A
<i>Limitation of Armament. Extracts from Report of Committee No. 12</i>	P.H. 188-G-21
<i>Major Campaigns and Operations in the World War, 1914, 1915, 1916. Report of Committee No. 7</i>	P.H. 188-E-18
<i>Naval Lectures. Delivered by Capt. G. J. Meyers, U.S. Navy</i>	P.H. 188-B-8
<i>Operation and Logistics of Large Units. Report of Committee No. 2</i>	P.H. 188-E-13
<i>Organization and Command of Large Units. Report of Committee No. 1</i>	P.H. 188-E-12
<i>Organization of Class for period April 18 to May 14, 1927. (War Plans Period.)</i>	P.H. 188-B-11-A
<i>Orientation and Outline of the Course, March 21 to May 14, 1927. (War Plans Period.)</i>	P.H. 188-B-10
<i>Potential development in our Military System. Lecture by Lt. Col. W. G. Caples, C.E.</i>	P.H. 188-B-14
<i>Preparation of the United States Fleet for Battle and its conduct therein. The Exercise of High Naval Command. Lecture by Rear Admiral W. V. Pratt, President, Naval War College</i>	P.H. 188-B-15
<i>Present methods employed in the Preparation of War Plans in Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan. Report of Subcommittee No. 3 of Committee No. 1</i>	P.H. 188-B-7
<i>Present Status of Antiaircraft Artillery. Lecture by Lt. Col. W. S. Bowen, C.A.C.</i>	P.H. 188-E-7
<i>Principles, Methods, and Doctrines of War. Lecture by Col. C. M. Bundel, F.A., Director, Command Course</i>	P.H. 188-E-2
<i>Principles, Methods, and Doctrines of War. Review, Command Course. Report of Committee No. 17</i>	P.H. 188-E-24
<i>Propaganda. Individual Report prepared by Lt. Col. Robert C. Lowry, MI-Res.</i>	P.H. 188-G-23
<i>Relation of the Marine Corps to Major Overseas Expeditions. Lecture by Col. R. H. Dunlap, USMC</i>	P.H. 188-E-11
<i>Report of Civil and Franco-Prussian Wars. Report of Committee No. 5</i>	P.H. 188-E-16
<i>Strategy of Napoleon's Campaigns. Report of Committee No. 4</i>	P.H. 188-E-15
<i>Strategy of the South African and Russo-Japanese Wars. Report of Committee No. 6</i>	P.H. 188-E-17
<i>Strategy of World War, 1917-1918. Report of Committee No. 8</i>	P.H. 188-E-19

THE CAVALRY SCHOOL

<i>Action of a cavalry brigade in a situation that requires a pursuit. M. P. No. 25</i>	P.H. 201-56
<i>Action of a cavalry brigade in a situation in which defensive action is required for the accomplishment of the mission. M. P. No. 10</i>	P.H. 201-45

Administrative details, incident to a combat situation, which have to be handled by a commander and his subordinates.	
M. P. No. 16	P.H. 201-73
Air Corps. Practical Exercise	P.H. 201-39
Air Corps.—Night Photography. Demonstration	P.H. 201-110
Army of the U. S. and Mobilization Plans. Text	P.H. 201-38
Artillery. Tactical Ride	P.H. 201-111
Assumption of a position in readiness by a reinforced cavalry brigade. M. P. No. 28	P.H. 201-59
Cavalry vs. Cavalry. Illustrates a reinforced cavalry brigade in a meeting engagement and in an attack against cavalry.	
Conf. Problem	P.H. 201-107
Cavalry Leadership test for Small Units. Pamphlet	P.H. 192-31
Cavalry Weapons. Demonstration	P.H. 201-92
Command and Staff. Division in an attack. Field Exercise	P.H. 201-108
Command and Staff. Instruction in the application to a concrete situation of the principles of Command and Staff. Map	
Maneuver	P.H. 201-95
Conduct of a counterreconnaissance detachment. M. P. No. 15	P.H. 201-72
Counterreconnaissance. Illustrates the employment of a cavalry brigade on counterreconnaissance as a moving screen. Practice Map Problem	P.H. 201-62
Decisions made by a commander, concerning the necessity for a flank guard, and its route of march. M. P. No. 13	P.H. 201-71
Delaying Action. Illustrates the formation and actions of a small cavalry rear guard in delaying the advance of a less mobile force. Practice Map Problem	P.H. 201-85
Demolitions. Computation and preparation of charges. Demonstration	P.H. 201-81
Deployed Defense. Practice Map Problem	P.H. 201-62
Development of a detached reenforced division, preparatory to a coordinated attack in a meeting engagement. M. P. No. 34	P.H. 201-100
Dispositions made by the field artillery battalion (horse) of a cavalry division which has taken up a defensive position, and the fires put down during the initial stages of the defense. M. P. No. 18	P.H. 201-50
Employment of a cavalry regiment, with attached machine guns, during an attack and pursuit. M. P. No. 14	P.H. 201-48
Employment of a division as part of a corps in an attack against a defensive zone. M. P. No. 16	P.H. 201-49
Employment of a reinforced cavalry brigade on a mission which requires it to screen the advance of an infantry division. M. P. No. 24	P.H. 201-55
Establishment of an outpost by a brigade of cavalry. M. P. No. 4	P.H. 201-98
Establishment of an outpost by a brigade of cavalry. M. P. No. 11	P.H. 201-46
Estimate of Situation. Illustrates the use of the form for the Estimate of the Situation. Conf. Problem	P.H. 201-102
Estimate of the Situation. Illustrates an estimate of the situation in which the dispositions for the march of a regiment of cavalry with attached artillery and machine guns are influenced by the presence of the enemy. Practice Map Problem	P.H. 201-94
Exercise in preparing field orders from the detailed plans of a commander. M. P. No. 1	P.H. 201-69
Exercise prepared by a Committee of Troop Officers. Illustrating a squadron of cavalry with 1 platoon of machine guns attached in advance in one column; in attack; in withdrawal	P.H. 192-27
Explosives. Classes and Kinds of Explosives. Conference	P.H. 192-27
Field Artillery in Delaying Action. Practice Map Problem	P.H. 201-80

Field Fortifications. Terrain Exercise.....	P.H. 201-84
Formation of a cavalry rear guard, the orders necessary to effect its formation, the combat duties of its commander, and the employment of its various elements. M. P. No. 20.....	P.H. 201-51
Handling of a cavalry brigade in a meeting engagement. Map Maneuver.....	P.H. 201-42
Horsemanship. Written Test No. 1.....	P.H. 201-41
Horsemanship. Horseshoeing. Examination.....	P.H. 201-77
Horsemanship. Animal Management. Written Test No. 1.....	P.H. 201-86
Infantry. Map Maneuver.....	P.H. 201-43
Infantry. Illustrates the coordinated attack of an infantry division which has deployed under the cover of its advance guard and its artillery. Tactical Ride.....	P.H. 201-97
Infantry. Illustrates the use of a strong advance guard in a rapidly moving situation in a meeting engagement between two divisions. Tactical Ride.....	P.H. 201-96
Instructions. Preparation of a Field Exercise.....	P.H. 201-40
Liaison. Demonstration.....	P.H. 201-90
Logistics. Administrative Orders. Practice Map Problem.....	P.H. 201-65
Machine Rifles. Test No. 1.....	P.H. 201-88
Machine Rifles. Assembling the Browning Machine Rifle. Notes.....	P.H. 201-87
Machine Rifle Platoon, Organization, Drill, and Equipment. Demonstration.....	P.H. 201-89
Map Reading. Test No. 1.....	P.H. 201-83
Map Reading Orientation. Practical Exercise.....	P.H. 201-82
March. Illustrates the preparations of a reinforced cavalry bri- gade for a march when encounter with the enemy is likely. Conf. Problem.....	P.H. 201-68
March. Illustrates the considerations of expediency and security necessary in preparing and conducting a march. Practice Map Problem.....	P.H. 201-64
Methods of making comments upon a problem and the awarding of a percentage value to the solution. M. P. No. 29.....	P.H. 201-74
Military Bridges. Conference.....	P.H. 192-30
Military History. French Cavalry in Macedonia, 1918. Lecture.....	P.H. 192-23
Military History. The Jordan Valley Campaign. Lecture.....	P.H. 192-25
Military History. Mesopotamian Campaign. Lecture.....	P.H. 192-24
Military History. Roumanian Campaign; Von Schmeltow's Cavalry in Transylvania. Lecture.....	P.H. 192-20
Military History. Roumanian Campaign; Von Schmeltow's Cavalry Corps in Wallachia. Lecture.....	P.H. 192-21
Military History. Selected Cavalry Actions on the Western Front, 1918. Lecture.....	P.H. 192-22
Offensive Combat. Cavalry vs. Cavalry. Illustrates the employ- ment of a reinforced brigade in offensive combat against cavalry. Practice Map Problem.....	P.H. 201-105
Offensive Combat, Mounted vs. Dismounted. Conf. Problem.....	P.H. 201-67
Orders issued by a division commander for the assumption of the zone defense. M. P. No. 27.....	P.H. 201-58
Outpost. Illustrates the halt for the night and the outpost of a regiment of cavalry. Practice Map Problem.....	P.H. 201-106
Pioneer Duties. Demolitions and Military Bridges. Test.....	P.H. 201-109
Principal considerations and calculations that must be made by a commander before making a march in the presence of the enemy, and a logical method of arriving at a conclusion and decision. M. P. No. 2.....	P.H. 201-70
Rear Guard. Illustrates the use of cavalry with machine guns attached, as a rear guard for cavalry against pursuing cav- alry. Conf. Problem.....	P.H. 201-66
Rifle Marksmanship. Test.....	P.H. 201-104

Riot Duty. Synopsis of Notes.....	P.H. 192-26
Riot Duty. Tactical Aspect. Conference.....	P.H. 192-29
Riot Duty. Tactical Phase. Conference.....	P.H. 192-28
River Crossing, Defensive. Illustrates the defense of a section of river line, by a force which is charged with delaying a hostile pursuit. Practice Map Problem.....	P.H. 201-60
Schooling Movements. Outline.....	P.H. 201-103
Situation in which a cavalry division is compelled to withdraw from action. M. P. No. 30.....	P.H. 201-75
Situation in which a cavalry division is required to select, organize, and defend a position in order to carry out its mission. M. P. No. 26.....	P.H. 201-57
Situation which requires aggressive action, and one in which the decision to attack is appropriate. Terrain Exercise No. 2.....	P.H. 201-101
Supply of a cavalry division in active operations. M. P. No. 22.....	P.H. 201-53
Tactics. Tactical Ride.....	P.H. 201-79
Tactics. Written Review.....	P.H. 201-78
Use of a cavalry force in general reserve in a situation calling for a counterattack. M. P. No. 33.....	P.H. 201-76
Use of a cavalry rear guard. M. P. No. 12.....	P.H. 201-47
Use of a flank guard. M. P. No. 23.....	P.H. 201-54
Uses of observation aviation and indicates some of the principles of war applicable to the situation given. M. P. No. 21.....	P.H. 201-52
Ways that a flank guard must be used in order to accomplish its mission. Practice Map Problem.....	P.H. 201-61
Withdrawal from action. M. P. No. 32.....	P.H. 201-99

THE COAST ARTILLERY SCHOOL

Antiaircraft Artillery.....	P.H. 196-13
Missions and Weapons. (AA 1). Conference.	
Characteristics of Gun Defense. (AA 2). Conference.	
Organization and Functioning of the Gun Battery and Searchlight Battery. (AA 3). Conference.	
Organization and Functioning of Gun Battalion, Antiaircraft Artillery. (AA 4). Conference.	
Characteristics of M. G. Defense. (AA 5). Conference.	
Organization and functioning of the Machine Gun Battery and Battalion (AA 6). Conference.	
Gun Battalion covering supply establishments. (AA 7 & 8). Conference Problem.	
Organization and functioning of the Regiment, Antiaircraft Artillery (AA 9). Conference.	
Rear Area Defense. (AA 10). Conference Problem.	
Intelligence Service and Ammunition Supply. (AA 11). Conference.	
Concentration and Advances. (AA 12). Conference.	
Antiaircraft Artillery covering an Army in an Advance. (AA 13). Conf. Map Problem.	
Rear Area Defense. (AA 14). M. P. No. 36.	
Antiaircraft Artillery covering a Corps in an Advance. (AA 15 & 16). Conference Problem.	
Antiaircraft Artillery in the Attack. (AA 17). Conference.	
Antiaircraft Artillery covering a Corps in an Attack. (AA 18). Conference Problem.	
Employment of antiaircraft artillery in the protection of a detached corps during its advance from a concentration area. (AA 19). M. P. No. 38.	
The Defensive. (AA 20). Conference.	
Employment of the corps antiaircraft regiment in an attack. (AA 21). M. P. No. 39.	

<i>Artillery in Land Warfare. Tactical Ride.</i>	P.H. 202-135
<i>Artillery in Land Warfare. Army Artillery in the Attack.</i> (ALW 64). Conf. Map Problem.	P.H. 202-100
<i>Artillery in Land Warfare. Certain considerations in the employment of a corps artillery brigade and of a corps balloon group in the attack of a defensive position by an independent corps.</i> (ALW 67). M. P. No. 22 (A-IX)	P.H. 202-102
<i>Artillery in Land Warfare. Division Artillery in Position Defense.</i> (ALW 60). Conf. Problem	P.H. 202-95
<i>Artillery in Land Warfare. Divisional Artillery in Withdrawal from action.</i> (ALW 63). Illustrative Problem	P.H. 202-99
<i>Artillery in Land Warfare. Employment of Corps Artillery in the Offensive.</i> (ALW 65). M. P. No. 20 (A-VIII)	P.H. 202-101
<i>Artillery in Land Warfare. Employment of Corps Artillery, less antiaircraft artillery, in a two day withdrawal to a new defensive position, against an enemy preparing to attack.</i> (ALW 69). M. P. 24 (A-X)	P.H. 202-103
<i>Artillery in Land Warfare. Employment of a Corps Artillery Brigade.</i> (ALW 61). Illustrative Problem	P.H. 202-96
<i>Artillery in Land Warfare. Employment of Divisional Artillery in the defense of a position, the selection of positions, and the preparation of defensive fires.</i> (ALW 62). M. P. No. 17 (A-VIII)	P.H. 202-97
<i>Artillery in Land Warfare. Employment of Railway Artillery in Land Warfare.</i> (ALW 70). Conference	P.H. 148-172
<i>Artillery in Land Warfare. March of a Corps Artillery Brigade.</i> (ALW 52). Illustrative Problem	P.H. 202-123
<i>Artillery in Land Warfare. Positions and Missions: 155-mm. Gun Regiment in an Attack.</i> (ALW 71). Conf. Map Problem	P.H. 202-132
<i>Artillery in Land Warfare. Regiment of Divisional Artillery in a Withdrawal from Action.</i> Conf. Problem	P.H. 202-98
<i>Chemical Warfare. Conference</i>	P.H. 196-5
<i>Chemical Warfare. Purpose of the Chemical Warfare Service, etc. Conference</i>	P.H. 196-6
<i>Coast Artillery and the Air Corps. Committee Problem No. 16. Conference No. 24</i>	P.H. 148-174
<i>Combat Intelligence.</i> (TOA 87). Conference	P.H. 196-12
<i>Current Events. Committee Problem No. 15. Conference No. 23</i>	P.H. 148-162
<i>Current Events. Committee Problem No. 19. Conference No. 28</i>	P.H. 206-3
<i>Employment of Cavalry. Pamphlet</i>	P.H. 196-10
<i>Logistics.</i> (Log. 10). Conf. Map Problem No. 5	P.H. 202-119
<i>Logistics. Administrative details, as expressed in an administrative order, for an attack.</i> (Log. 11). M. P. No. 25	P.H. 202-120
<i>Logistics. Administrative Orders for an Attack.</i> (Log. 7). Conf. M. P. No. 3	P.H. 202-116
<i>Logistics. Ammunition Supply of a Field Artillery Brigade.</i> (Log. 19). Conf. Problem	P.H. 202-145
<i>Logistics. Circulation.</i> (Log. 9). Conference	P.H. 148-157
<i>Logistics. Mechanics of preparing a troop motor transport movement table.</i> (Log. 14). M. P. No. 31	P.H. 202-130
<i>Logistics. Supply in Attack.</i> (Log. 8). Conf. Map Problem No. 4	P.H. 202-117
<i>Logistics. Supply on the March.</i> (Log. 6). Conf. Map Problem No. 2	P.H. 202-115
<i>Logistics. Transport.</i> (Log. 4). Conference	P.H. 148-156
<i>Logistics. Troop Motor Transport Movements.</i> (Log. 13). Map Problem	P.H. 202-129

<i>Logistics. Use of standard type railway trains for troop movements, and emphasizes the details incident to the preparation of an entraining table for the movement of a division. (Log. 15). Conf. Map Problem.</i>	P.H. 202-131
<i>Meeting engagement of two small forces. M. M. No. 2.</i>	P.H. 202-133
<i>Meeting engagement of two hostile forces. M. M. No. 3.</i>	P.H. 202-134
<i>Method of preparing an Administrative Order.</i>	P.H. 202-93
<i>Methods of Training. Army Correspondence Courses. (MT 5). Conference</i>	P.H. 196-11
<i>Methods of Training. Exercises in criticism of defective problems (MT 1). Exercise</i>	P.H. 202-136
<i>Methods of Training. Logical method of preparing a problem. (MT 3). M. P. No. 37.</i>	P.H. 202-139
<i>Methods of Training. The preparation of a Map Problem. (MT 2). Conf. Map Problem.</i>	P.H. 202-138
<i>Methods of Training. Preparation of Training Orders. (MT 4). Conference</i>	P.H. 196-7
<i>One Artillery or Two. Committee Problem No. 13. Conference No. 20.</i>	P.H. 148-161
<i>Preparation and Conduct of Map Maneuvers. Notes.</i>	P.H. 148-158
<i>Projects and Plans for Harbor Defense. An Elaboration of Section IX, TR 435-300.</i>	P.H. 202-9
<i>Review of Report of the 2d Coast Artillery (AA) on Tactical Exercises held at Camp Upton, N. Y., July-August, 1926.</i>	P.H. 196-1
<i>Seacoast Defense. Command of Overseas Expeditions. (SCD 2). Notes.</i>	P.H. 148-163
<i>Seacoast Defense. Convoys and Escorts. (SCD 4). Conference.</i>	P.H. 148-164
<i>Seacoast Defense. Employment of Seacoast Artillery against a hostile Landing in force. (SCD 24). Conf. Problem.</i>	P.H. 202-140
<i>Seacoast Defense. Notes on Employment of Tractor Coast Artillery. (SCD 14). Conference</i>	P.H. 148-171
<i>Seacoast Defense. Occupation of Battle Position by a Harbor Defense Regiment. (SCD 25). Conf. Problem.</i>	P.H. 202-141
<i>Seacoast Defense. Organization and Functioning of the Battalion, Railway Artillery. (SCD 11). Conference.</i>	P.H. 148-170
<i>Seacoast Defense. Organization and Functioning of the Battalion, 155-mm. Gun in Seacoast Defense. (SCD 8). Conference.</i>	P.H. 148-167
<i>Seacoast Defense. Organization and Functioning of the Battery, Railway Artillery. (SCD 10). Conference.</i>	P.H. 148-169
<i>Seacoast Defense. Organization and Functioning of the Battery, 155-mm. Gun in Seacoast Defense. (SCD 7). Conference.</i>	P.H. 148-166
<i>Seacoast Defense. Organization and Functioning of the Regiment, 155-mm. Gun in Seacoast Defense. (SCD 9). Conference.</i>	P.H. 148-168
<i>Seacoast Defense. Organization of the San Diego Sector for Defense. (SCD 29). Conf. Problem.</i>	P.H. 202-142
<i>Seacoast Defense. Use by a cavalry regiment of its mobility and fire power to execute a mission in defense of a coast line against landing raids. (SCD 30). Terrain Exercise No. 1.</i>	P.H. 202-143
<i>Selection, occupation, and defense of a position in deployed defense. M. P. No. 19.</i>	P.H. 202-94
<i>Service in the Philippines. Committee Problem No. 18. Conference No. 18.</i>	P.H. 196-2
<i>Summer Training Camps. Committee Problem No. 14. Conference No. 21.</i>	P.H. 148-173
<i>Tactics of Other Arms (TOA 77). M. P. No. 29.</i>	P.H. 202-127
<i>Tactics of Other Arms. Air Corps. Attack Aviation. (TOA 65 & 66). Conference.</i>	P.H. 148-159
<i>Tactics of Other Arms. Air Corps. Bombardment Aviation. (TOA 68). Conference.</i>	P.H. 148-160

<i>Tactics of Other Arms. Air Corps. Observation Aviation. (TOA 96). Conference.</i>	P.H. 196-8
<i>Tactics of Other Arms. Application of the tactical principles of defense in a meeting engagement. (TOA 54). M. P. No. 18.</i>	P.H. 202-107
<i>Tactics of Other Arms. Attack against a Zone. (TOA 61). Conf. Map Problem.</i>	P.H. 202-112
<i>Tactics of Other Arms. Cavalry. Presents a situation in which a brigade of cavalry on an aggressive mission is obliged to assume, temporarily, the defensive. (TOA 55). Conf. Map Problem No. 7.</i>	P.H. 202-108
<i>Tactics of Other Arms. Cavalry. (TOA 69). Conf. Problem</i>	P.H. 202-121
<i>Tactics of Other Arms. Chemical Warfare. (TOA 85). Conference Map Problem.</i>	P.H. 202-147
<i>Tactics of Other Arms. Counterattack. (TOA 62). Conf. Map Problem.</i>	P.H. 202-113
<i>Tactics of Other Arms. Employment of a brigade as part of a division in an attack against a defensive zone. (TOA 80). M. P. No. 32.</i>	P.H. 202-128
<i>Tactics of Other Arms. Employment of the division reserve in a counterattack to restore and maintain the integrity of the battle position. (TOA 75). M. P. No. 28.</i>	P.H. 202-126
<i>Tactics of Other Arms. Principles of Cavalry Combat. (TOA 49). M. P. No. 16.</i>	P.H. 202-104
<i>Tactics of Other Arms. Process of reasoning employed by a brigade commander in coming to a decision to attack. (TOA 72). M. P. No. 26.</i>	P.H. 202-122
<i>Tactics of Other Arms. Pursuit. (TOA 71). Conf. Map Problem</i>	P.H. 202-124
<i>Tactics of Other Arms. Situation in which a position in readiness may be employed advantageously. (TOA 67). M. P. No. 23.</i>	P.H. 202-114
<i>Tactics of Other Arms. Troop Leading of an Infantry Battalion in Attack. (TOA 59). Conf. Problem.</i>	P.H. 202-110
<i>Tactics of Other Arms. Troop Leading of an Infantry Brigade in Attack. (TOA 53). Conf. Problem.</i>	P.H. 202-106
<i>Tactics of Other Arms. Troop Leading of an Infantry Regiment in Attack. (TOA 58). Conf. Problem.</i>	P.H. 202-109
<i>Tactics of Other Arms. Troop Leading of a unit of the division reserve, both prior to the attack of the division when and ordered to take part in the decisive attack. (TOA 60). M. P. No. 21.</i>	P.H. 202-111
<i>Tactics of Other Arms. Withdrawal. (TOA 52). Conf. Map Problem.</i>	P.H. 202-105
<i>Use of Books. Committee Problem No. 20. Conference No. 29.</i>	P.H. 196-4

ENGINEER SCHOOL

<i>Battalion in attack against a defensive zone. M. P. No. 10.</i>	P.H. 200-46
<i>Battalion Operations. Map Maneuver No. 2.</i>	P.H. 200-72
<i>Cavalry Patrols. Conference.</i>	P.H. 173-65
<i>Cavalry Troop in Advance Guard. Illustrative Problem.</i>	P.H. 200-97
<i>Command and Staff. The Infantry Staff. (R-3 Journal). Conf. Problem.</i>	P.H. 200-45
<i>Elements of Sea Power. Notes.</i>	P.H. 200-77
<i>Field Engineering. Examination.</i>	P.H. 200-56
<i>Field Engineering. Terrain Exercise No. 9.</i>	P.H. 200-58
<i>Field Engineering. Examination.</i>	P.H. 200-85
<i>Field Engineering. Terrain Exercise No. 17.</i>	P.H. 200-93
<i>Field Engineering. Bridge Construction. Terrain Exercise No. 9.</i>	P.H. 200-92
<i>Field Engineering. Construction of a Center of Resistance. Terrain Exercise No. 7.</i>	P.H. 200-90

Field Engineering. Construction of Roads. Terrain Exercise No. 8.	P.H. 200-91
Field Engineering. Details of Construction. Terrain Exercise No. 11.	P.H. 200-61
Field Engineering. Duties of Engineers. M. P. No. 1.	P.H. 200-55
Field Engineering. Duties of Engineers. M. P. No. 1.	P.H. 200-86
Field Engineering. The Engineer Combat Company. Program. Demonstration	P.H. 200-74
Field Engineering. The Engineer General Service Platoon in Concrete Construction. Terrain Exercise No. 10.	P.H. 200-59
Field Engineering. Explosives and Demolitions. Equipment and Supplies. Demonstration	P.H. 200-75
Field Engineering. Floating Bridges. Demonstration and Practical Work	P.H. 200-73
Field Engineering. Layout of Combat Groups. Terrain Exercise No. 5.	P.H. 200-89
Field Engineering. Layout of Construction of Project A. Terrain Exercise No. 12.	P.H. 200-62
Field Engineering. Layout of Construction of Project B. Terrain Exercise No. 14.	P.H. 200-64
Field Engineering. Obstacles. Practical Work	P.H. 200-87
Field Engineering. Occupation and Organization of a Defensive Position. M. P. No. 3.	P.H. 200-67
Field Engineering. Organization of the Ground. Terrain Exercise No. 16.	P.H. 200-66
Field Engineering. Organization of the Ground. M. P. No. 6.	P.H. 200-69
Field Engineering. Organization of a Regimental Sector. Illustrates the organization of the ground for defense by a regiment, as part of a larger force, when only a limited time is available. M. P. No. 5.	P.H. 200-87
Field Engineering. River Crossing. M. P. No. 4.	P.H. 200-68
Field Engineering. River Crossing. Bridge Construction. Terrain Exercise No. 13.	P.H. 200-63
Field Engineering. River Crossing. Terrain Exercise No. 15.	P.H. 200-65
Field Engineering. Road Construction. Terrain Exercise No. 8.	P.H. 200-57
Field Engineering. Roads and Road Circulation. M. P. No. 2.	P.H. 200-60
Harbors. Examination.	P.H. 200-83
Infantry Battalion in Attack against a Defensive Position. Tactical Ride No. 2.	P.H. 200-71
Infantry Staff. Map Problem	P.H. 200-49
Instructions regarding Map Problem. Instruction Circular No. 1.	P.H. 200-76
Map Reading and Map Making. Aerial Photographic Mapping. Lecture by Maj. J. W. Bagley, 29th Engrs.	P.H. 173-62
Map Reading and Map Making. Aerial Photographic Mapping. Plotting and Adjusting Secondary Control. Map Problem	P.H. 200-50
Map Reading and Map Making. Route Reconnaissance. Problem No. 7.	P.H. 200-51
Military History. Application of method to the writing of a critical historical narrative. M. P. No. 1-VI.	P.H. 200-52
Military History. Application of method to the writing of a critical historical narrative. M. P. No. 2-VI.	P.H. 200-53
Military History. Application of method to the writing of a critical historical narrative. M. P. No. 3-VI.	P.H. 200-54
Preparation of Master Schedule. Problem.	P.H. 200-94
Preparation of R-1 Journal. Conf. Problem.	P.H. 200-47
Preparation of a Weekly Schedule. Object of this problem is to call to attention the improvements in results from the summer camp that can be obtained from careful planning in advance. Problem.	P.H. 200-95

<i>Program of Course. National Guard and Organized Reserve Officers Course</i>	P.H. 200-70
<i>River and Harbor Improvement. Backwater Curves. Lock and Dam Location. Problem No. 4</i>	P.H. 200-98
<i>River and Harbor Improvement. Canalization. Examination</i>	P.H. 200-82
<i>River and Harbor Improvement. Comparison of Certain Characteristics of Chanoine Wicket and Boulé Gate Types of Movable Dams. Notes</i>	P.H. 200-80
<i>River and Harbor Improvement. Comparison of Certain Characteristics of Fixed and Movable Dams. Notes</i>	P.H. 200-79
<i>River and Harbor Improvement. Dredging. Problem No. 6</i>	P.H. 200-100
<i>River and Harbor Improvement. Estimates for Lock and Dam Construction. Problem No. 5</i>	P.H. 200-99
<i>River and Harbor Improvement. Factors governing location of Locks and Dams. Notes</i>	P.H. 173-64
<i>River and Harbor Improvement. Relation of Bank Protection to Regulation, etc. Notes</i>	P.H. 200-78
<i>River and Harbor Improvement. Text for Backwater Curve Problem. Pamphlet</i>	P.H. 173-63
<i>Troop Leading. Regiment in Attack. Illustrates the troop leading of a regiment in a meeting engagement. M. P. No. 12</i>	P.H. 200-88

FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL

<i>Accompanying Gun in an Attack. (AT 119). Demonstration</i>	P.H. 203-82
<i>Administrative Orders. (CO 21). Map Problem</i>	P.H. 203-57
<i>Ammunition Supply—Battalion of Division Artillery. (Log. 6). Map Problem</i>	P.H. 203-79
<i>Ammunition Supply of a Field Artillery Brigade. (Log. 20). Map Problem</i>	P.H. 203-64
<i>Army Artillery Commander and Staff. (ASD 6). Map Maneuver</i>	P.H. 203-58
<i>Artillery Commander's Estimate of the Situation. (AT 94). Map Problem</i>	P.H. 203-72
<i>Attack against a Prepared Position. Meeting engagement with enemy on defensive. Air force in the Army Offensive. (SA 60). Illustration Problem</i>	P.H. 203-55
<i>Battalion of Corps Artillery (155-mm. howitzers) in an attack against a position defense. (AT 23). Illustrative Problem</i>	P.H. 203-86
<i>Battalion of Divisional Artillery. (ASD 7). Map Maneuver</i>	P.H. 203-62
<i>Battalion of Divisional Artillery in an attack against a Position. (AT 73). Terrain Exercise</i>	P.H. 203-48
<i>Battalion of Divisional Artillery with an advance guard. (AT 24). Map Problem</i>	P.H. 203-85
<i>Battalion of Division Artillery Signal Communications System in an attack in a meeting engagement. (SC 47). Terrain Exercise</i>	P.H. 203-80
<i>Brigade of Division Artillery in an attack in a meeting engagement. (AT 61). Map Problem</i>	P.H. 203-44
<i>Brigade of Division Artillery in a deployed defense. (AT 57). Map Problem</i>	P.H. 203-42
<i>Corps Artillery Brigade in a Position Defense. (AT 90). Map Problem</i>	P.H. 203-66
<i>Corps Artillery in the Attack against a Position. (AT 112). Map Problem</i>	P.H. 203-76
<i>Corps Artillery Staff Duties. (ASD 7). Map Maneuvers</i>	P.H. 203-59
<i>Counterreconnaissance (Cavalry). (SA 47). Map Problem</i>	P.H. 203-53
<i>Divisional Artillery commander and staff. (ASD 8). Map Maneuver</i>	P.H. 203-60
<i>Divisional Artillery in an Attack against a Defensive Zone. (AT 104). Map Problem</i>	P.H. 203-74

<i>Divisional Artillery in a Withdrawal from Action. (AT 125).</i>	
Map Problem.....	P.H. 203-84
<i>Divisional Artillery in a Zone Defense. (AT 99). Map Problem</i>	P.H. 203-73
<i>Divisional Artillery commander and staff. Regimental Artillery commander and staff. (ASD 11-5). Map Problem</i>	P.H. 203-63
<i>Estimate of the Situation. (AT 74). Map Problem</i>	P.H. 203-49
<i>Exploitation of a successful Attack. (SA 59). Map Problem</i>	P.H. 203-54
<i>Infantry Battalion in Attack. (SA 23). Map Problem</i>	P.H. 203-81
<i>Methods of Instruction. Preparation of a Field Exercise. (MI 7). Map Problem</i>	P.H. 203-67
<i>Methods of Instruction. Preparation of a Map Problem. (MI 13). Map Problem</i>	P.H. 203-69
<i>Methods of Instruction. Preparation of a Tactical Ride. (MI 11). Map Problem</i>	P.H. 203-68
<i>Regiment of Corps Artillery (155-mm. Howitzers) in an Attack against a Position. (AT 107). Terrain Exercise</i>	P.H. 203-75
<i>Regiment of Divisional Artillery in a Delaying Action. (AT 122). Terrain Exercise</i>	P.H. 203-83
<i>Regiment of Corps Artillery (155-mm. guns) in a Position Defense. (AT 82). Terrain Exercise</i>	P.H. 203-51
<i>Regiment of Divisional Artillery in an Attack in a Meeting Engagement. (AT 59). Terrain Exercise</i>	P.H. 203-43
<i>Regiment of Divisional Artillery in an Attack against a Position. (AT 87). Map Problem</i>	P.H. 203-65
<i>Regiment of Divisional Artillery in an Attack against a Position. (AT 66). Tactical Ride</i>	P.H. 203-46
<i>Regiment of Divisional Artillery in an Attack against a Position. (AT 80). Terrain Exercise</i>	P.H. 203-50
<i>Regiment and battalion of Divisional Artillery in the initial phases of an Attack against a Position. (AT 56). Tactical Ride</i>	P.H. 203-41
<i>Regiment and battalion of Divisional Artillery in a Meeting Engagement. (AT 54). Tactical Ride</i>	P.H. 203-40
<i>Regiment of Divisional Artillery in Defense of a Position. (AT 64). Terrain Exercise</i>	P.H. 203-45
<i>Regimental Staff Duties. (ASD 9). Map Maneuver</i>	P.H. 203-61
<i>Reinforced Brigade. (AT 71). Map Maneuver</i>	P.H. 203-47
<i>Rifle Company in Attack. (SA 13). Tactical Walk</i>	P.H. 203-52
<i>Separate Arms. Infantry Battalion in Attack. (SA 22). Tactical Walk</i>	P.H. 203-70
<i>Signal Communications. Signal Communications of a Battalion of Division Artillery. (SC 17). Terrain Exercise</i>	P.H. 203-71
<i>Technique of issuing Verbal Orders. (CO 7). Map Problem</i>	P.H. 203-78
<i>Verbal and Dictated Orders. (CO 5). Exercise</i>	P.H. 203-56

INFANTRY SCHOOL

<i>Administration. The Quartermaster Corps. Relations between company commanders and the garrison quartermaster. Lecture</i>	P.H. 194-41
<i>Administration. Staff in Garrison. General principles governing the organization and operation of the staff in a post or garrison. Conference</i>	P.H. 194-53
<i>Animals and Transportation. Examination</i>	P.H. 88-105
<i>Animals and Transportation. Motor Transportation. Reference Matter</i>	P.H. 194-42
<i>Applied Psychology. Management of Men. The Junior Officer. Lecture</i>	P.H. 194-38
<i>Applied Psychology. Management of Men. The Soldier. Lecture</i>	P.H. 194-31

Applied Psychology. Management of Men. The Soldier. Lecture	P.H. 194-54
Army of the U. S. Suggestions to officers going on duty with organized reserves. Notes	P.H. 194-39
Army of U. S. Unit Mobilization Plans. Examination	P.H. 78-103
Automatic Rifle. Examination	P.H. 88-91
Bayonet. Examination	P.H. 88-100
Command and Leadership. Numerals representing angles, intervals, and distances in close-order drill. Reference Matter	P.H. 194-55
Command and Leadership. A Silent Drill. Reference Matter	P.H. 88-101
Command and Staff. Classification and loads of cargo vehicles of infantry regiment. Reference Matter	P.H. 88-87
Command and Staff. Infantry Staff. The activities of the commander and the staff of a battalion and of a regiment, during an attack in open warfare. Demonstration	P.H. 93-19
Command and Staff. Regimental Staff. Instruction in the detailed staff procedure and the actual operations of a regimental command post preliminary to and during combat. Command Post Map Exercise	P.H. 93-20
Command and Staff. Unit Journal. Description of, and the method of maintaining, the unit journal prescribed in Training Regulations No. 420-5, Staff Duties for Infantry Units. Conference	P.H. 194-50
Field Engineering. Field Fortification. Regiment in Defense. Examination	P.H. 93-96
Field Engineering. Organization of the Ground. Regiment in Defense. Map Problem	P.H. 93-25
Grenades. Examination	P.H. 88-93
Individual and collective protection against Chemical Agents. Conference	P.H. 194-32
Instructions for Command-Post Terrain Exercises Encampment Period 1927. Memorandum No. 31	P.H. 194-57
Machine Gun. Direct Laying. Examination	P.H. 88-92
Machine Gun. Indirect Laying. Examination	P.H. 88-97
Machine Gun. Marksmanship. Examination	P.H. 88-88
Machine Gun. Tests of Elementary Training. Examination	P.H. 88-90
Mess Management. Lecture	P.H. 194-52
Military Courtesy and Customs of the Service. Lecture	P.H. 194-56
Mobilization. Suggested form for a Unit Mobilization Plan. Reference Matter	P.H. 194-44
Musketry. Examination	P.H. 88-95
Organization. Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Company. Demonstration	P.H. 88-85
Organization. The Service Company. Demonstration	P.H. 88-86
Physical Training. Low Organization Games. Conference	P.H. 194-51
Physical Training. Boxing. Conference	P.H. 194-37
Pistol. Marksmanship, dismounted. Examination	P.H. 88-96
Printed Instructional Matter. Index	P.H. 93-3
Rifle. Marksmanship. Examination	P.H. 88-98
Signal Communications. Battalion in Defense. Terrain Exercise	P.H. 93-24
Signal Communications. Brigade in Attack. Terrain Exercise	P.H. 93-22
Signal Communications. Messengers. Conference	P.H. 194-49
Signal Communications. Messengers. Map Problem	P.H. 93-23
Signal Communications. Outposts. Map Problem	P.H. 93-21
Tactics. Air Corps. Demonstration	P.H. 93-27
Tactics. Assault Battalion in Attack. Demonstration	P.H. 88-73
Tactics. Assault Battalion in Attack. Terrain Exercise	P.H. 88-70
Tactics. Attack against a Zone Defense. Map Problem	P.H. 93-8
Tactics. Battalion in Attack. Map Problem	P.H. 88-44
Tactics. Battalion in Attack. Tactical Walk	P.H. 88-43

<i>Tactics. Battalion in Attack. Illustrates the decisions as to the use of his troops which must be made by the commander of an infantry battalion acting alone, and the placing of these decisions in the form of an order. Map Problem.</i>	P.H. 88-47
<i>Tactics. Battalion in Attack. Illustrates on the ground the actions and orders of the commander and staff of a battalion, which is part of a reinforced brigade, in a meeting engagement. Terrain Exercise.</i>	P.H. 88-65
<i>Tactics. Battalion in Attack. Terrain Exercise.</i>	P.H. 88-64
<i>Tactics. Battalion in Defense. Map Problem.</i>	P.H. 88-61
<i>Tactics. Battalion in Defense. Illustrates the organization of an interior battalion sector as part of a system occupied by the larger unit which is taking up a position defense under the protection of a covering force. Map Problem.</i>	P.H. 88-50
<i>Tactics. Battalion in Defense. Tactical Walk.</i>	P.H. 88-51
<i>Tactics. Battalion in Defense. Terrain Exercise.</i>	P.H. 88-63
<i>Tactics. Battalion in Defense. Terrain Exercise & Demonstration.</i>	P.H. 88-57
<i>Tactics. Battalion in Defense. Occupation and organization of a position by a battalion of infantry. Terrain Exercise.</i>	P.H. 88-56
<i>Tactics. Battalion of division artillery with an advance guard. Map Problem.</i>	P.H. 88-82
<i>Tactics. Brigade in Attack. Map Problem.</i>	P.H. 88-72
<i>Tactics. Brigade in Attack. Map Problem.</i>	P.H. 93-4
<i>Tactics. Brigade in Attack. Tactical Ride.</i>	P.H. 93-9
<i>Tactics. Brigade in Defense with Artillery attached. Tactical Ride.</i>	P.H. 88-83
<i>Tactics. Cavalry against Cavalry. Tactical Ride.</i>	P.H. 88-58
<i>Tactics. Cavalry against Infantry, advance guard action. Tactical Ride.</i>	P.H. 88-56
<i>Tactics. Cavalry Combat. Map Problem.</i>	P.H. 88-71
<i>Tactics. Combat in Woods. Terrain Exercise.</i>	P.H. 88-49
<i>Tactics. Convoys. Conference.</i>	P.H. 194-35
<i>Tactics. Convoys. Map Problem.</i>	P.H. 88-74
<i>Tactics. Division Air Service. Map Problem.</i>	P.H. 88-59
<i>Tactics. Domestic Disturbances and capture and occupation of towns. Conference.</i>	P.H. 194-34
<i>Tactics. Exercise in Rewriting Map Problem. Conference.</i>	P.H. 194-48
<i>Tactics. Flank Guard. Map Problem.</i>	P.H. 88-62
<i>Tactics. Machine Guns in Attack. Map Problem.</i>	P.H. 88-48
<i>Tactics. Machine Guns in Defense. Map Problem.</i>	P.H. 88-81
<i>Tactics. Machine Guns in Defense. Map Problem.</i>	P.H. 93-13
<i>Tactics. Machine Guns and Howitzers in Attack. Terrain Exercise.</i>	P.H. 93-16
<i>Tactics. Machine Gun Company in Attack. Terrain Exercise.</i>	P.H. 93-14
<i>Tactics. Machine Gun Company in Attack. Tactical Walk.</i>	P.H. 93-30
<i>Tactics. Position in Readiness. Map Problem.</i>	P.H. 88-52
<i>Tactics. Preparation of Map Problems. Conference.</i>	P.H. 194-17
<i>Tactics. Preparation and use of Tactical Exercises. Conference.</i>	P.H. 194-46
<i>Tactics. Problem of Decision. Map Problem.</i>	P.H. 88-84
<i>Tactics. Problem of Decision. Map Problem.</i>	P.H. 93-6
<i>Tactics. Problem of Decision. Map Problem.</i>	P.H. 93-28
<i>Tactics. Pursuit. Conference.</i>	P.H. 194-36
<i>Tactics. Pursuit. Map Problem.</i>	P.H. 93-17
<i>Tactics. Reinforced Brigade in Defense. Purpose is to afford training in the details connected with the organization of a defensive position by a reinforced brigade and with the method of conducting the defense of such a position. Terrain Exercise.</i>	P.H. 93-18
<i>Tactics. Regiment in Attack. Map Problem.</i>	P.H. 88-75

Tactics. Regiment in Attack. Tactical Ride.....	P.H. 88-67
Tactics. Regiment in Attack. Tactical Ride.....	P.H. 88-76
Tactics. Regiment in Attack. Illustrates the actions and orders of the commander and staff of a reenforced regiment in an attack against a deployed defense. Command-Post Terrain Exercise.....	P.H. 93-5
Tactics. Regiment in Defense. Map Problem.....	P.H. 88-68
Tactics. Regiment in Defense. Map Problem.....	P.H. 88-78
Tactics. Regiment in Defense. Tactical Ride.....	P.H. 87-77
Tactics. Regiment in Defense. Illustrates the organization of a regimental sector on an exposed flank in a defensive position with only two battalions available, the 3d battalion constituting the brigade reserve. Map Problem.....	P.H. 88-55
Tactics. Regiment in Defense, with attached artillery, tanks, and air service. Field Exercise.....	P.H. 88-69
Tactics. Relief of a front line battalion. Map Problem.....	P.H. 88-60
Tactics. Relief of front line units. Conference.....	P.H. 194-33
Tactics. Rifle Company in Attack. Tactical Walk.....	P.H. 93-2
Tactics. Rifle Company in Attack. Terrain Exercise.....	P.H. 93-15
Tactics. Rifle Company in Attack. Emphasizes the great importance, in determining the scheme of maneuver of a rifle company, of the scheme of maneuver of the battalion, of the supporting fires given it, of the terrain, and of time and space factors. Terrain Exercise.....	P.H. 93-12
Tactics. Rifle Company in Defense. Terrain Exercise.....	P.H. 93-11
Tactics. Rifle Company in Defense. Terrain Exercise.....	P.H. 93-29
Tactics. Rifle Platoon in Defense. Tactical Walk.....	P.H. 88-46
Tactics. River Crossings. Conference.....	P.H. 194-45
Tactics. River Crossing (Offensive). Map Problem.....	P.H. 88-80
Tactics. Selection of artillery positions. Tactical Walk.....	P.H. 88-53
Tactics. Solution of Map Problem. Map Problem.....	P.H. 88-54
37-mm. Gun. Examination.....	P.H. 88-98
3-inch Trench Mortar. Examination.....	P.H. 88-99
Training. Examination.....	P.H. 88-106
Training. Illustrative Training Scheme. Exercise.....	P.H. 88-104
Training. Inspections and Standards. Conference.....	P.H. 194-40
Training. Inspections and Standards. Examination.....	P.H. 88-108
Training. Inspections and Standards. Exercise.....	P.H. 88-107
Training. Master Schedule. Exercise.....	P.H. 88-102
Training. Troop Schools and Post Schools. Conference.....	P.H. 194-43

MARINE CORPS SCHOOL

Adjustments of errors of closure. Test.....	P.H. 80-99
Advance Guard. (CP 16). Tactical Walk.....	P.H. 80-93
Aeroplane photographic map restitution. Tactical Walk.....	P.H. 80-54
Airplane Photographic Map Restitution. Test.....	P.H. 80-85
Assumption, temporarily, of the defensive in a meeting engagement by a force of all arms in the presence of an inferior force. (TP 72). M. P. No. 9-S. II.....	P.H. 80-91
Battalion in Attack. (TP 54). M. P. No. 14.....	P.H. 80-95
Committee for Course in Overseas Operations.....	P.H. 80-88
Field Artillery. (SA 13). M. P. No. 17.....	P.H. 80-101
Map Maneuver No. 5.....	P.H. 80-86
Military Government. Conference Problem.....	P.H. 80-89
Night Operations. (TP 73). Conference Problem.....	P.H. 80-94
Ordnance and Gunnery. (GO 24). Examination.....	P.H. 80-77
Position which is occupied in this situation requires that the brigade and division reserves provide against envelopment on either flank and a penetration. (FE 10). M. P. No. 6, S. III.....	P.H. 80-92

<i>Position in Readiness. (TP 69). M. P. No. 8, S. II</i>	P.H. 80-90
<i>Road Sketch. Practical Work, Field</i>	P.H. 80-98
<i>Tactics. (TP 59). Map Problem No. 15</i>	P.H. 80-100
<i>Topography. Compass Course Exercises. Illustrates the procedure to be followed and the difficulties involved in going from one point to another across rough terrain where the only reliance for direction is on the compass, and for distance on estimation.</i>	P.H. 80-96
<i>Topography. Night Compass Course Exercise. Illustrates the procedure necessary and the difficulties involved in night marching from one point to another, where the only reliance for direction is the compass, and for distance either pacing or estimation.</i>	P.H. 80-97

MEDICAL FIELD SERVICE SCHOOL

<i>The Noncommissioned Officer. Lecture</i>	P.H. 193-33
<i>Program, Basic Field Course, 1927. Feb. 3d to May 28th.</i>	P.H. 204-12
<i>Training. Methods of Instruction. Coast and Pupil method. Demonstration.</i>	P.H. 204-11
<i>Verbal Orders. Conference</i>	P.H. 193-32
<i>Weekly Schedules, Basic Field Course, 1927</i>	P.H. 204-10

QUARTERMASTER CORPS MOTOR TRANSPORT SCHOOL

<i>Administrative Order. Lecture by 1st Lieut. Robert L. Miller, QMC</i>	P.H. 197-7
<i>Amendment to System of Unit Repair and Unit Replacement for Motor Vehicles</i>	P.H. 197-12
<i>Battery Ignition System. Lecture by 1st Lieut. Herbert C. Mitchell, QMC</i>	P.H. 197-50
<i>Brakes. Lecture</i>	P.H. 197-19
<i>Carburation. Lecture by 1st Lieut. Herbert C. Mitchell, QMC</i>	P.H. 197-47
<i>Classification of Roads and Road Circulation. Lecture by 1st Lieut. Walter C. Thee, QMC</i>	P.H. 197-28
<i>Coordination of Transportation Facilities. Lecture by 1st Lieut. Walter C. Thee, QMC</i>	P.H. 197-11
<i>Cost Accounting. Lecture by Capt. A. S. Levinsohn, QMC</i>	P.H. 197-15
<i>Direct Current Generator. Lecture by 1st Lt. Herbert C. Mitchell, QMC</i>	P.H. 197-2
<i>Division Train. Lecture by Capt. William C. Mahoney, QMC</i>	P.H. 197-29
<i>Elementary Electricity. Lecture by 1st Lt. Herbert C. Mitchell, QMC</i>	P.H. 197-49
<i>Front Axles. Lecture by 1st Lieut. Walter C. Thee, QMC</i>	P.H. 197-45
<i>Fuels and Combustion. Lecture by 1st Lt. Herbert C. Mitchell, QMC</i>	P.H. 197-1
<i>General Description and Functions of Storage Batteries. Lecture by Mr. Sgt. Albert A. Roth, QMC</i>	P.H. 197-21
<i>General Information and Courses of Instruction, 1926-1927</i>	P.H. 197-42
<i>Generator Regulation. Lecture by 1st Lt. Herbert C. Mitchell, QMC</i>	P.H. 197-3
<i>History of Transportation. Lecture by Lt. Col. Edgar S. Stayer, QMC</i>	P.H. 197-20
<i>Industrial Management. Lecture by 1st Lt. Walter C. Thee, QMC</i>	P.H. 197-9
<i>Inspection. Lecture by Capt. George E. Hartman, QMC</i>	P.H. 197-22
<i>Magnetism and Electromagnetism. Lecture by 1st Lt. Herbert C. Mitchell, QMC</i>	P.H. 197-48
<i>Motor Transport Officer. Lecture by Lt. Col. Edgar S. Stayer, QMC</i>	P.H. 197-6

<i>Motor Transport Principles.</i> Lecture by Capt. Geo. M. Herringshaw, QMC	P.H. 197-27
<i>Motor Transport Repair Shops Quartermaster Corps.</i> Lecture by Lt. J. M. Matson, QMC	P.H. 197-36
<i>Motor Vehicle Troubles.</i> Lecture by 1st Lt. Herbert C. Mitchell, QMC	P.H. 197-53
<i>National Defense Act.</i> Lecture by Lt. Col. Edgar S. Stayer, QMC	P.H. 197-39
<i>Operation of the Motor Transport Pool.</i> Lecture by Capt. Geo. M. Herringshaw, QMC	P.H. 197-33
<i>Operation, Organization, and Functions of the Inspection Division of the Holabird Quartermaster Corps Reconstruction Park.</i> Lecture by Capt. Geo. E. Hartman, QMC	P.H. 197-18
<i>Organization of the Infantry Division.</i> Lecture by Lt. Col. Edgar S. Stayer, QMC	P.H. 197-40
<i>Organization of Motor Transport General Depots.</i> Lecture by Lt. Col. Edgar S. Stayer, QMC	P.H. 197-8
<i>Organization of a Motor Transport Pool.</i> Lecture by Capt. Geo. M. Herringshaw, QMC	P.H. 197-26
<i>Preparation and Issue of Orders.</i> Lecture by 1st Lt. Robert L. Miller, QMC	P.H. 197-41
<i>Principles of the Magneto. Armature Type.</i> Lecture by 1st Lt. Herbert C. Mitchell, QMC	P.H. 197-4
<i>Principles of the Magneto. Inductor Type.</i> Lecture by 1st Lt. Herbert C. Mitchell, QMC	P.H. 197-5
<i>Program. Reserve Officers Training Period</i>	P.H. 197-38
<i>Pyroxylin.</i> Lecture by Mr. H. L. Deuber	P.H. 197-16
<i>Rear Axle Construction and the Differential.</i> Lecture by 1st Lt. Walter C. Thee, QMC	P.H. 197-43
<i>Reception Park, its organization, facilities and function.</i> Lecture by 1st Lt. Geo. E. Pruitt, QMC	P.H. 197-31
<i>Relations of Motor Transport Officers of other branches of the service.</i> Lecture by Capt. Geo. M. Herringshaw, QMC	P.H. 197-37
<i>Road Capacity and Causes of Congestion.</i> Lecture by 1st Lt. Walter C. Thee, QMC	P.H. 197-25
<i>Rules and Regulations for a Supply Officer, Agent Finance Officer and Billeting Officer, when on the March, in the Field or on a Convoy.</i> Lecture	P.H. 197-14
<i>Schedule and Routeing.</i> Lecture by Capt. A. S. Levinsohn, QMC	P.H. 197-24
<i>The Science of Paint.</i> Lecture by Mr. H. L. Deuber	P.H. 197-17
<i>Starting Motors.</i> Lecture by 1st Lt. Herbert C. Mitchell, QMC	P.H. 197-51
<i>Supply in the Field.</i> Lecture by 1st Lt. Robert L. Miller, QMC	P.H. 197-13
<i>Tractive Effort and Horsepower required for Motor Vehicles.</i> Lecture by 1st Lt. Walter C. Thee, QMC	P.H. 197-52
<i>Traffic Survey.</i> Lecture by 1st Lt. W. C. Thee, QMC	P.H. 197-30
<i>Troop Movements by Motor Transport.</i> Lecture by Capt. William C. Mahoney, QMC	P.H. 197-34
<i>Trouble Shooting.</i> Lecture by 1st Lt. Herbert C. Mitchell, QMC	P.H. 197-23
<i>Unit Replacement System for making repairs on Motor Transportation.</i> Lecture by Lt. Col. E. S. Stayer, QMC	P.H. 197-46
<i>Warehousing and spare parts.</i> Lecture by 1st Lt. Geo. E. Pruitt, QMC	P.H. 197-32
<i>What is meant by Terminal Capacity.</i> Lecture	P.H. 197-35

THE SIGNAL SCHOOL

<i>Reference Data for Signal Map Problems and Field Exercises.</i> Pamphlet No. 6	P.H. 183-17
---	-------------

V. SUBJECT INDEX OF SELECTED MAGAZINE ARTICLES

AERONAUTICS

- AMERICAN AIR TRANSPORT. By Archibald Black, Air Transport Engineer and author of *Transport Aviation*.—*The Annals*, May, 1927. Page 68. 3 pages.
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Western Front

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